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FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES  
IN ENGLISH NHS HOSPITAL TRUSTS 
2003-2008 
ABSTRACT 
A continuing programme of NPM reforms, grounded in quasi-market modes 
of governance and private sector best practice, have been applied to English NHS 
hospitals over the last thirty years in response to concerns about their performance 
efficiency and accountability. However, in the transition to market modes of 
governance, the retention of hierarchical features gave rise to a multi-layering of 
accountability. From 2001-02 balanced scorecard inspired performance 
measurement systems (PMS), were introduced into the NHS, aimed at improving 
service standards through improved cost efficiency. Study 1 in this thesis finds that, 
in this context, the relationship between service standards and cost efficiency is 
positive and that, consistent with it being a more effective PMS, this was stronger 
for the ‘Annual Health Check’, a PMS characterised by features aimed at reducing 
manipulation, than the Star ratings, its predecessor. 
The approach to the manipulation of financial breakeven, a key 
accountability measure, was however more relaxed, particularly when service 
standards were under threat. The system of ‘financial support’ had its roots in 
previous hierarchical relationships and acted to shift revenue across the NHS in 
order to allow Trusts in financial difficulty to meet their financial objectives without 
damaging service standards. These transfers, which were effected through the 
revenue account, were generally reversed out in future years with the result that 
financial support accelerated revenue recognition in Trusts receiving it. In Study 2, 
the receipt of financial support by Trusts in financial difficulty was found to be 
associated with an improvement in service standards and in future financial 
performance but, in an increasingly demanding performance regime and multi-
layered accountability, evidence was also found of opportunistic exploitation of the 
system. Financial support had a considerable impact on the accountability of both 
NHS Trusts and the wider NHS because of the limited transparency around financial 
support transactions. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PERSONAL MOTIVATION 
Having previously had an accounting career in the private sector I spent ten 
years, from 1997 to 2006, as a non-executive director on the Board of a number of 
NHS Trusts, including three years in the role of Chairman. This period embraced the 
a number of significant reforms to the healthcare system introduced by the Labour 
Government from the early 2000s and I observed the incentive impact of these 
reforms, particularly those related to performance measurement and management, 
on the Trust and its executive managers. 
During my period as a Board member, the management of the Trust felt very 
corporate, particularly in relation to its governance structures which emulated the 
private sector unitary board model. However, although we ‘felt’ like self -governing 
institutions contracting with healthcare commissioners, there were aspects of 
accountability relationships which intrigued me.  Why, for example, when we held a 
private sector style AGM and were publicly accountable in our own right, were the 
Chair and CEO annually summonsed to the offices of the Department of Health’s 
Regional Office and required to answer to the Regional Director?  And in relation to 
financial accountability and the financial statements, why were the auditors so 
relaxed about accounting policies that seemed to be at odds with generally 
accepted accounting practice?  
This thesis was inspired by these questions and extends previous research 
which was focused largely on governance and on the manipulation of financial 
performance (Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood, 2007, 2008a and 2008b).  The 
main focus of the thesis is on the incentive impact of performance measurement 
and on the effectiveness of permitting flexibility in reporting performance, both 
financial and nonfinancial1. 
                                               
1
 Although inspired by my experience on the Boards of NHS Trusts, the specific Trusts with 
which I have been associated have not contributed in any way to this thesis, nor are they 
associated with the analysis or conclusions, which are entirely my own.  
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1.2 PRIMARY THEME 
A large and diverse literature, based in agency theory, explores the question 
of how best to incentivise managerial effort in the interests of principals. Recognition 
that over-reliance on financial measures and their potential for being manipulated in 
ways which can undermine the strategic capacity of the organisation (Hopwood, 
1972) has led to the development of multi-dimensional models of performance 
measurement such as the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a). 
These models, by introducing nonfinancial measures of performance, aim to 
incentivise goal congruent managerial effort and to mitigate managerial opportunism 
in the achievement of financial accountability objectives. A key assumption 
underpinning these models is that additional measurement diversity is beneficial, an 
assumption that is supported by analytical studies (Holmstrom, 1979; Banker and 
Datar, 1989; and Feltham and Xie, 1994). However, in both the analytical and 
normative literature a proliferation of performance measures is seen as 
counterproductive, diverting and dispersing management effort away from key 
strategic objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) and potentially generating no 
benefits or incurring unnecessary costs (Feltham and Xie, 1994).  
The manipulation of performance measures is the subject of an extensive 
empirical literature which, in a variety of institutional settings, seeks to identify such 
manipulation and portray it as having adverse consequences. In the NHS Bevan 
and Hood (2006) provide prima facie evidence of manipulation to achieve 
performance targets in the NHS and argue that this renders these measures 
unreliable for the purposes of assessing performance and the delivery of public 
accountability. Elsewhere, however, studies have found that the focus on waiting 
targets and the improvements observed in the English NHS have not been achieved 
at the expense of important unmeasured activities (Propper, Sutton, Whitnall and 
Windjmeier, 2010; Kelman and Friedman, 2009) but that, on the contrary, other 
aspects of performance, such as mortality and readmission rates, not integrated into 
the performance measurement system, also improved. 
The issue of whether manipulation of reported performance can be 
beneficial and in the principal’s interest has been more fully explored in the 
accounting literature where a more balanced perspective of manipulation is 
adopted. This literature argues, and demonstrates, that, even though it undermines 
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financial accountability, the manipulation of reported financial performance  can be 
in the interests of the principal.. Demski, Frimor and Sappington (2004) for example 
demonstrate that the manipulation of financial performance can be beneficial if 
measures taken to address gaming result in other, more damaging, forms of 
manipulation.  
This thesis focuses on performance measurement within the NHS and 
investigates whether changes in performance measurement during the study period, 
which involved reducing the scope for manipulation, led to beneficial or adverse 
consequences, with particular emphasis on managerial incentives and financial 
accountability. To investigate this central question two studies are undertaken. 
Study 1 investigates the incentive impact of a change in performance measurement 
system design on the achievement of the Government’s strategic policy objective of 
delivering high service standards in the NHS cost effectively. A key feature of this 
change was an increase in measurement diversity. Study 2 focuses on the 
measurement of financial performance, which remained a key accountability 
measure throughout the period of study, most notably as a result of Trusts’ statutory 
duty to breakeven. In relation to the central question, Study 2 investigates whether a 
form of officially recognised flexibility in reporting financial performance delivered 
benefits to patients and the public. 
1.3 BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS 
Over the last thirty years public sector organisations throughout the 
developed world, particularly Australasia, Europe and North America, have been 
subject to a wave of reforms aimed at addressing perceived issues of performance, 
efficiency and accountability. These reforms, captured by the notion of New Public 
Management, (Hood, 1991, 1995), have been characterised by quasi-market modes 
of governance, with their emphasis on contracting and competition between 
corporatised units of accountability, and by the adoption of private sector 
managerial best practice, including an increased emphasis on cost efficiency and 
performance measurement. The brunt of these reforms has been felt most in 
sectors such as healthcare where free markets are possible but where there has 
been a long tradition of Government intervention. In the English National Health 
Service (NHS) early moves towards market modes of governance, particularly in 
areas relating to accounting and accountability, were often characterised by the 
  
 Page 14 
 
retention of features grounded in previous hierarchical relationships. In this context, 
the continuing programme of reforms under successive political regimes, has 
fundamentally changed performance management and accountability relationships 
in the NHS and has given rise to an evolving framework of incentives faced by NHS 
managers. The aim of this thesis is, in the setting of English NHS hospital Trusts 
over the period from 2002-03 to 2007-08, to investigate the impact of the changing 
incentive framework, on the key foci of NPM reforms: performance, efficiency and 
accountability.  
NHS Trusts were established in 1991 to own and manage public hospitals 
and to provide hospital services in a quasi-market relationship with healthcare 
commissioners and other healthcare providers. The objective was to create an 
‘internal market’ where competition between Trusts would drive up the efficiency 
and performance of hospitals. The accountability of hospitals was also enhanced by 
making each Trust publicly accountable in its own right. This was achieved mainly 
through a requirement, established in statute, for each Trust to achieve financial 
breakeven. However, although NHS Trusts were quasi-independent self-governing 
organisations, elements of their previous hierarchical relationship with Health 
Authorities were retained. Rather than reporting direct to Parliament they continued 
to be performance managed by the Department of Health which in turn continued to 
be accountable to Parliament for the performance of the NHS as a whole, including 
NHS Trusts and the fulfilment of their statutory duties. Thus, whilst the introduction 
of NHS Trusts served to bring greater emphasis to agency relationships in an 
environment previously characterised by hierarchical modes of governance, it also 
introduced a dispersion and multi-layering of accountability within the wider NHS. 
Fulfilment of a Trust’s statutory duty to breakeven is determined by 
reference to the Trust’s financial statements. However, during the 1990s, reported 
financial performance also acted as the primary measure by which the overall 
performance of a Trust was assessed and, in the absence of more reliable 
indicators, also became a proxy for Trust cost efficiency. Thus reported financial 
performance became the main reference point for measuring each of performance, 
efficiency and accountability. Reliance on this one measure was predicated on the 
effective operation of the ‘internal market’ which, in the event, failed to materialise. 
By the end of the 1990s, there was considerable concern that a reliance on financial 
breakeven, rather than leading to improvements in performance and efficiency, had 
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instead given rise to adverse consequences for patient care. The incoming Labour 
Government of 1997 identified that NHS service standards had become a major 
public concern (Department of Health, 2000) and proceeded to introduce a number 
of reforms which sought to align managerial interests with those of patients and the 
public by incentivising improved service standards as well as cost efficiency.  
The key policy focus on service standards was realised through an evolving 
performance measurement regime which progressively reduced the scope for 
neglecting unmeasured activities in order to meet the key accountability objective of 
the statutory duty to breakeven. However, whereas the manipulation of performance 
measures which involved the neglect of unmeasured activities was viewed 
negatively, a contrasting manifestation of the emphasis on service standards was 
evident in the policy framework for the manipulation of financial performance. For 
most of the three decades leading up to 2007 some forms of manipulation of 
financial performance were viewed positively and were officially sanctioned where 
they allowed Trusts in financial difficulty time to address their underlying financial 
problems without recourse to strategies which might be damaging to patient care. 
The manipulation of performance measures and the different policy approaches 
adopted by the Department of Health to the manipulation of financial and 
nonfinancial performance provides an underlying theme for the investigations in this 
thesis.  
The Labour Government’s first step in the incentivisation of high service 
standards was taken when, in 2001-02, consistent with a wider international trend in 
public sector performance measurement, a multidimensional performance 
measurement system (PMS) was introduced into the English NHS, in the form of the 
Star ratings. However, the heavy weighting given to a narrow range of nonfinancial 
measures in the Star ratings, became a focus for disquiet about its vulnerability to 
manipulation. Rather than incentivising cost efficiency as a means of improving 
service standards, concerns continued to be expressed that unmeasured activities 
were being neglected and, further, that financial performance was being sacrificed 
in order to enhance Trust ratings. Given Trusts’ statutory duty to breakeven, the 
potential for improving a Trust’s Star rating by incurring a deficit in order to improve 
performance against nonfinancial measures was a particular source of concern for 
policy makers. In 2005-06 the Star ratings were replaced by the Annual Health 
Check, a system that was characterised by features aimed at further reducing the 
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scope for manipulation, most notably, increased measurement diversity and a more 
even balance between financial and nonfinancial measures.  
Both the AHC and the Star ratings had a number of common features. Both 
were inspired by the balanced scorecard and, in both systems, aggregated 
performance ratings were awarded to Trusts based on their performance against a 
number of financial and nonfinancial measures. A limited number of these 
measures, reflecting key Government priorities, were both influential to the ultimate 
performance rating and common to both systems. Further, performance ratings 
were linked to a system of performance management which featured rewards for 
good performance and penalties for poor performance, including the dismissal of 
the CEO.  
The Star ratings and the AHC, by reducing the scope for neglecting 
unmeasured activities, aimed to incentivise cost efficiency as a means of improving 
service standards. Further early emphasis was given to cost efficiency by the 
introduction, in 1998, of a new costing system which permitted the development of a 
measure of Trust cost efficiency, the Trust reference cost index. This index 
facilitated the benchmarking of Trust cost efficiency. In a further measure to 
strengthen incentives, to enhance accountability and to promote the sharing of best 
practice in service delivery, reference cost indices and Trust performance ratings 
were made publicly available. 
Taken together, the NPM reforms of the early 21st century altered the 
incentive framework faced by NHS Trusts and reflected a move away from a focus 
on financial breakeven as the primary measure of performance, efficiency and 
accountability. However, by virtue of the statutory duty to breakeven, reported 
financial performance remained the primary measure for discharging the financial 
accountability of NHS Trusts. In the context of a more demanding performance 
measurement regime the achievement of this objective became increasingly 
challenging. For Trusts in financial difficulty, however, there was, until 2006-07, 
some flexibility in the reporting of financial performance from the system of ‘financial 
support’. In this system, surplus funds from elsewhere in the NHS could be 
transferred, on a non-recurrent basis, to Trusts in financial difficulty with the 
objective of allowing them to meet their immediate accountability objectives without 
recourse to strategies which would be damaging to patient services.  
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The manipulation of reported financial performance to achieve accountability 
objectives was deeply embedded in the institutional history and accountability of 
NHS hospitals. Financial support, with features reminiscent of budget reallocations, 
had its roots in the period when hospitals were managed as cost centres in a 
hierarchical relationship with health authorities. Although NHS Trusts were set up as 
quasi-independent, self-governing entities, elements of this hierarchical relationship 
were retained. They continued to be performance managed by Strategic Health 
Authorities (SHAs), the regional representatives of the Department of Health, who 
also oversaw and co-ordinated financial support transactions. Trusts in financial 
difficulty wishing to access financial support were required to agree a recovery plan 
with the SHA and this recovery plan was expected, in the majority of cases, to 
accommodate the repayment of the sums advanced.  
The accounting policy for financial support treated both its receipt and 
repayment as adjustments to the revenue account. In this way, financial support, 
which acted to flatter both reported financial performance and Trust performance 
ratings, represented both a form of income shifting across the NHS, and a form of 
accelerated revenue recognition within Trusts receiving it. This accounting policy 
was in accordance with NHS accounting regulations which were in turn compliant 
with GAAP, adapted for the NHS setting.  
In another reference back to hierarchical relationships, where hospitals were 
managed as cost centres, the operation of the system of financial support was 
largely hidden from public scrutiny. Prior to 2002-03, the financial statements of 
NHS Trusts were not required to disclose financial support transactions. From 2002-
03 onwards however, following concerns expressed by the Audit Commission (Audit 
Commission, 2005), disclosures were mandated but were limited only to Trusts 
receiving financial support in the year of receipt. There were no equivalent 
requirements to disclose ‘repayments’ or for Trusts releasing surpluses for 
brokerage as financial support. 
1.4 KEY FEATURES OF THE THESIS 
The thesis focuses on the research setting of English NHS acute hospital 
Trusts and comprises two principal studies. Study 1 investigates the relationship 
between service standards and cost efficiency in the context of an evolving 
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performance measurement regime and Study 2 investigates the performance and 
accountability impact of financial support, an officially sanctioned form of flexibility in 
reported financial performance which, for Trusts in financial difficulty, permitted the 
meeting of financial objectives without sacrificing service standards. 
A key feature of the research design for both Study 1 and Study 2 is the 
formulation of an objective function for NHS Trusts which draws, for its authority, on 
key Government policy documents such as the White paper, ‘The New NHS’ 
(Department of Health, 1997), the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000) and the 
Performance Assessment Framework (Department of Health, 1999). This objective 
function models performance against service standards as a function of cost 
efficiency in the presence of a financial resource constraint determined by Trusts’ 
statutory duty to breakeven. In a setting which is characterised by an increased 
emphasis on agency relationships, this is then used, in both studies, as a basis of 
developing predictions which are testable using econometric analysis.  
The use of broad based measures of nonfinancial performance and cost 
efficiency is also a key feature of this thesis. The measurement of both hospital 
efficiency and service quality is generally challenging. However, in the English NHS, 
the data collected for Trust performance ratings permits the construction of a more 
objective and broader measure of nonfinancial performance, uniform across Trusts 
and time, than has hitherto been possible, whilst the Trust reference cost index 
represents a broad based measure of the cost of a hospital’s aggregate activity, 
adjusted for case mix and variations in cost due to location. 
1.5 STUDY 1 
1.5.1 Introduction 
Study 1 in this thesis investigates the relationship between service standards 
and cost efficiency in the period following the introduction of a multi-dimensional, 
balance scorecard inspired, performance measurement system. It further exploits 
the juxtaposition of the Star ratings and the AHC to investigate whether the AHC, 
consistent with its additional features aimed at reducing manipulation, better 
incentivised cost efficiency as a means of improving service standards than the Star 
ratings.  
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In Study 1 the objective function provides a basis for investigating the impact 
of PMS design on the incentivisation of cost efficiency as a means of improving 
service standards. Two particular characteristics of PMS design are considered: 
measurement diversity and the balance between financial and nonfinancial 
measures. As an aid to the interpretation of this analysis a stylised ‘performance 
comet’ provides a diagrammatic representation of the impact of PMS design on the 
predicted distribution of nonfinancial and reported financial performance. Particular 
emphasis is given to the impact of PMS design on weak and inefficient Trusts 
which, from a policy perspective, is arguably of most interest. These Trusts 
comprise the tail of the performance comet and a consideration of this ‘tail’ is 
considered as part of the analysis. Production possibility frontier analysis, combined 
with the ‘performance comet’, then facilitates the generation of predictions for the 
impact of PMS design on the relationship between service standards and cost 
efficiency. These predictions provide the basis for the investigations in Study 1. 
1.5.2 Contribution 
The relationship between service standards and cost efficiency has been of 
considerable interest in the literature because of the concern that the pursuit of cost 
efficiency may be damaging to service standards (Mutter, Rosko, Greene and 
Wilson, 2011). However, studies of this relationship have been hampered by the 
lack of broad measures of hospital efficiency and of service quality. Prior studies 
have therefore defaulted to narrow measures of efficiency, such as theatre 
utilisation or patient length of stay, or measures of cost efficiency derived from the 
use of frontier analysis techniques (Worthington, 2004). These techniques have 
dominated the empirical archival literature on hospital efficiency but have been 
subject to considerable criticism because of the sensitivity of results to model 
specification and choice of input and output variables. On the other hand, narrow 
measures of efficiency such as theatre utilisation are limited in their ability to proxy 
for overall hospital efficiency.  
Access to measures of hospital services has proved similarly challenging. 
Previous studies have therefore used patient and staff survey results or have used 
narrow measures, such as mortality rates which as a result of variations in case mix, 
are limited in their ability to measure quality. In the English NHS, however, the 
systematic collection and publication of data for the Trust performance ratings and 
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reference cost indices provides an opportunity for investigating the relationship 
between service standards and cost efficiency using measures which are arguably 
superior to those used in previous studies.  
Both the Star ratings and the AHC, consistent with wider international trends 
in performance measurement, were inspired by the balanced scorecard. The Star 
ratings introduced, for the first time in the NHS, a systematic performance 
measurement system which incorporated nonfinancial measures as well as financial 
measures, with the objective of reducing incentives to sacrifice service standards in 
order to meet the statutory duty to breakeven. However, concerns persisted and in 
2005-06 the Star ratings system was replaced by the Annual Health Check, 
characterised by greater measurement diversity and a better balance between 
financial and nonfinancial measures.  
In the normative literature on the balanced scorecard Kaplan and Norton, 
(1992) argue that increased measurement diversity, featuring both financial and 
nonfinancial measures, leads to better performance. This argument has been 
supported by analytical research founded in principal-agent theory which has 
focused on the alignment of managerial incentives and which demonstrates that 
more (costless) measures are preferred if the additional measures provide 
incremental information about managerial activities of interest to the principal 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Banker and Datar,1989; and Feltham and Xie,1994).  
 A large number of empirical archival studies have investigated the 
performance impact of balanced scorecard systems in the private sector literature. 
However, studies adopting an empirical archival approach in the public sector 
accounting literature, particularly in the area of performance measurement and 
management, are notable by their absence (Goddard, 2010; Broadbent and Guthrie, 
2008, 1992). In this literature, studies on balanced scorecard implementations have 
adopted a largely critical or interpretive approach and have focused on the tensions 
between different modes of governance, the political context in which performance 
measurement was introduced and the potential for manipulation. 
The economics literature also contains a number of studies which 
investigate the impact of performance measurement systems in a healthcare 
setting. These studies adopt an empirical archival approach but rather than 
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investigating the relationship between service standards and cost efficiency they 
focus on the identification and consequences of trade-offs and the neglect of 
unmeasured activities. However, the results of two UK studies, which investigate the 
impact of Government targets on unmeasured aspects of care, deliver findings 
which are consistent with a positive association (Kelman and Friedman, 2009 and 
Propper, Sutton, Whitnall and Windjmeier, 2010). In these studies performance on 
unmeasured activities was found to be positively associated with performance on 
measured activities. The authors’ interpretation of these findings was that the 
imposition of Government targets had incentivised process improvements which 
had led to greater efficiency and wider organisational benefits beyond the narrow 
objective of target achievement.  
Study 1 makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it makes a 
contribution to the literature on hospital cost efficiency by conducting an 
investigation which uses broad based measures of Trust cost efficiency and service 
standards which are arguably superior to those used in previous investigations. 
Second, it contributes to the literature on the performance impact of PMS design by 
exploiting the quasi-experimental setting of the Star ratings and the AHC to 
investigate whether, consistent with Government policy objectives, the AHC was 
more effective at incentivising cost efficiency as a means of improving service 
standards than the Star ratings. Third, it contributes to the limited number of 
empirical archival studies on performance measurement in the public sector 
accounting literature in the UK and Europe, hitherto dominated by interpretive and 
critical studies. 
1.6 STUDY 2 
1.6.1 Introduction 
Study 2 in this thesis investigates the performance and accountability impact 
of financial support, an officially sanctioned source of flexibility in reported financial 
performance which, for Trusts in financial difficulty, permitted the meeting of 
financial objectives without sacrificing service standards. 
Study 2 applies the objective function of hospital Trusts to specify testable 
models and utilises financial support disclosures to conduct three investigations. 
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First, the impact of financial support on contemporaneous service standards is 
investigated by constructing a performance adjusted benchmark level of 
nonfinancial performance and comparing this with the actual level of nonfinancial 
performance for Trusts in receipt of financial support. Second, to test whether there 
are on-going benefits to service standards, consistent with improved business 
processes, the association between the receipt of financial support and the change 
in nonfinancial performance from the year of receipt to the following year, is also 
investigated. Finally, to investigate whether financial support allowed Trusts time to 
address their financial difficulties, the association between financial support and the 
subsequent change in underlying financial performance is also examined. 
Descriptive statistics, in the context of a policy review are used to identify the 
impact of financial support on Trust and wider NHS accountability. 
1.6.2 Prior literature and contribution  
A large international literature exists on the manipulation of reported financial 
performance. This literature is dominated by the investigation of earnings 
management in the private sector in response to a number of incentives including 
those related to regulatory constraints, political costs and the avoidance of losses. 
Elsewhere a much smaller literature refers to the manipulation of financial 
performance using terms such as creative accounting and income smoothing. In this 
literature a number of studies investigate income shifting between group entities to 
deliver benefits to shareholders, mostly in the form of a lower tax burden, or to meet 
accountability requirements in institutional settings characterised by dispersed and 
multi-layered accountability. Vinnari and Nasi (2008) for example investigate income 
shifting between a Finnish utility company and its ‘parent’ municipal council which 
permitted the council to meet its breakeven requirement.  
The empirical literature on earnings management views manipulation as 
having largely negative consequences. In the analytical literature however a more 
balanced view of the manipulation of financial performance is adopted and, under 
certain conditions, it has been shown to have positive consequences, for example, 
by allowing managers to devote productive effort in the interests of principals rather 
than adopting more damaging short term tactics in order to meet financial objectives 
(Demski, Frimor and Sappington, 2004; Arya, Glover and Sunder, 2003). However, 
  
 Page 23 
 
the literature also demonstrates that such flexibility should be made available only to 
‘good’, highly skilled managers, who will use it to work in the principals’ interests, 
and not to ‘poor’ managers who might squander the opportunity or use the flexibility 
opportunistically in their own interests. Demski (1998) further shows that accounting 
regulation can be used as a mechanism for selecting ‘good’ managers by making 
income manipulation difficult, requiring skill and hard work, especially to deal with 
the reversing out of its effects. Arya, Glover and Sunder (2003) also argue that it is 
the implicit role of regulators to make income smoothing challenging but not 
impossible.  
In the UK, NHS Trusts have, since their inception in 1991, been required to 
prepare financial statements based on GAAP, as interpreted as being appropriate to 
the public sector setting by HM Treasury. The Department of Health then develops 
accounting policies which are compliant with the Treasury’s requirements, including 
variations from GAAP to reflect the NHS context. The accounting policy for financial 
support represents one such adaptation which relaxes conventional conditions for 
revenue recognition thereby facilitating the achievement of immediate accountability 
objectives for Trusts in financial difficulty.  The objective of this policy was to 
temporarily protect service standards by providing time for these Trusts to address 
underlying performance issues. In this setting the function of selecting skilled 
managers who will work in the public’s interests is performed, not by accounting 
regulation, but by the Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), the regional 
representatives of the Department of Health. SHAs are responsible for performance 
managing NHS Trusts, a role which encompassed, in a form of self-regulation, the 
oversight and co-ordination of financial support transactions. Trusts in financial 
difficulty wishing to access financial support were required to agree a credible 
recovery plan with the SHA and this often had to accommodate repayment of the 
sums advanced. Over the period of Study 2, however, concern was growing that, in 
the context of multi-layered accountability and an evolving incentive framework, 
financial support was being applied opportunistically to disguise deficits without 
underlying performance issues being addressed. These concerns were exacerbated 
by the lack of transparency regarding the impact of financial support on reported 
financial performance.  
The adoption of private sector GAAP has represented a key NPM initiative in 
many international public sector reform programmes. Both GAAP itself and the 
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adaptations which have been deemed appropriate for the public sector context have 
been subject to critical review in the public sector accounting literature, which is 
dominated by a qualitative research paradigm. Adaptations have been subject to 
criticism on the basis that they erode understandability, comparability and 
accountability and that, in the context of a breakeven requirement, they can have 
implications for service delivery. Empirical archival studies however are notable by 
their absence from this literature. 
Study 2 makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it 
contributes to the limited literature which investigates the manipulation of reported 
financial performance in a public sector setting in which accountability is dispersed 
and multi-layered. Second, it contributes to the literature on the manipulation of 
financial performance in the public sector by investigating the performance impact of 
the flexibility in reported financial performance it afforded to Trusts in financial 
difficulty. Third, it contributes an empirical archival study to the literature on the 
adoption and adaptation of GAAP by investigating the impact of a variation from 
conventional GAAP on both the performance and accountability of NHS Trusts.  
1.7 FINDINGS 
The findings from Study 1 indicate that the relationship between 
performance against service standards and cost efficiency is significantly positive 
throughout the period of study. This finding, which is based on the use of broad 
based measures of both cost efficiency and nonfinancial performance, confirms the 
findings of previous studies which use stochastic frontier analysis to obtain 
measures of hospital cost efficiency and which use, as measures of service quality, 
either survey based measures or narrow measures which are restricted in their 
scope, such as mortality rates. These findings provide evidence that the multi-
dimensional performance measurement systems introduced by the Labour 
Government do provide a framework within which service standards are not, overall, 
sacrificed in the pursuit of cost efficiency. Further, the findings from Study 1 indicate 
that the relationship between nonfinancial performance and cost efficiency in the 
AHC is significantly stronger than in the Star ratings. These findings provide 
evidence that the additional measurement diversity and better balance between 
financial and nonfinancial measures which characterise the AHC reduce the 
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potential for manipulation and are consistent with the AHC being a more effective 
vehicle for incentivising cost efficiency as a means of improving service standards.  
Study 2 investigates the performance and accountability impact of financial 
support. The findings from this study indicate that the policy of income manipulation 
represented by financial support delivered overall benefits to patients and the public 
in the form of better service standards in Trusts in financial difficulty. Further, 
consistent with the aim of allowing Trusts time to address their financial problems, 
there was also an improvement in subsequent underlying financial performance. 
However, there is also evidence that the system was not wholly effective during the 
study period. In a significant minority of Trusts, no improvements in service 
standards were observed. These findings contribute to the public sector literature on 
the manipulation of financial performance by demonstrating that manipulation can 
deliver benefits to patients and the public, but that the filters used for selecting 
‘good’ managers need careful consideration, particularly in a setting characterised 
by multi-layered accountability and an evolving framework of incentives driven by a 
continuing programme of NPM reforms. A partial explanation for the findings from 
Study 2 may be the limited transparency surrounding the impact of financial support 
on key measures of public accountability. As a consequence public and 
parliamentary scrutiny of the policy, which could have served to mitigate the 
opportunistic use of financial support, was impeded.  
The policy of financial support had a significant impact on the accountability 
of NHS hospital Trusts, even after the disclosure requirements from 2003. The 
amount of financial support in circulation in the period 2003-04 to 2005-06 
amounted to about £1bn and was received by over a third of all Trusts. Further, of 
all Trusts which reported a surplus in the period of study, 35% had an underlying 
deficit and, on average, financial support transformed a mean Trust deficit of circa 
£8m to one of £2m. Despite the materiality of financial support transactions, 
disclosure requirements were imposed only on those Trusts receiving it in the year 
of receipt. There were no equivalent disclosure requirements for subsequent 
‘repayments’ of financial support, nor of funds released for brokerage by Trusts in 
surplus. The system of financial support, as a form of income shifting, did not affect 
the overall reported financial performance of the NHS as a whole but it did have an 
impact on wider NHS accountability by reducing the number of NHS Trust deficits 
and breaches of the statutory duty to breakeven reported annually to Parliament by 
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the Department of Health. These findings contribute to the literature on the adoption 
and adaptation of GAAP in a public sector setting. The accounting policy for 
financial support, which represented an adaptation of GAAP considered appropriate 
to the NHS setting, largely concealed its impact on key measures of accountability 
and prevented effective scrutiny of the policy’s effectiveness by Parliament and the 
public.  
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. 
CHAPTER 2 provides a historical analysis of the development of NHS 
hospitals, and their modes of governance, to provide a context for the development 
of the literature review in Chapter 3. 
CHAPTER 3 commences in Section 3.2 with a review, within the wider 
public sector, of the development and characteristics of New Public Management, 
an approach to public sector management which draws on market based solutions 
and private sector best practice as a response to concerns about the performance 
and accountability of public sector organisations. It proceeds in Section 3.3 with a 
review of the literature on the cost efficiency of hospitals, a key concern of policy 
makers since the inception of the NHS. The literature on the role of multi-
dimensional performance measurement systems, particularly those inspired by the 
balanced scorecard, in improving performance is then considered (Section 3.4), 
including studies concerned with the manipulation of performance measures. These 
initial sections of the Chapter focus on setting the context for the first study in this 
thesis, which investigates the relative effectiveness of two performance 
measurement systems in the incentivisation of cost efficiency as a means of 
improving service standards. Developing the theme of manipulation, the literature 
on the manipulation of reported financial performance is also reviewed (Section 
3.5). This section of the Chapter as for other sections, considers both the private 
sector literature, which in this case is represented by the earnings management and 
income shifting literatures, and the public sector and healthcare literature. Lastly, 
the literature on the application of GAAP in public sector organisations is reviewed 
(Section 3.6). These last two sections of the literature review develop the setting for 
the second research question which investigates the extent to which the 
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manipulation of hospital reported financial performance can be beneficial to 
stakeholders such as patients, the public and Parliament. 
CHAPTER 4 considers the institutional setting for the two studies of this 
thesis. Section 1, provides a brief description of NHS Trusts in the context of the 
programme of NPM reforms during the period of this study. Section 2 proceeds to 
consider the financial accountability of NHS Trusts and other NHS organisations; 
Section 3 covers the measurement of cost efficiency within the NHS. Then, in 
Section 4 a description of the two performance measurement systems, the Star 
ratings which was in operation from 2002-2005 and the Annual Health Check which 
replaced it in 2006, is provided. Finally, in Section 5, the policy of financial support is 
outlined with particular attention to its purpose, the accounting policy which was 
adopted and the consequent impact of Trust and wider NHS accountability 
CHAPTER 5 covers the research methodology for both studies in this thesis. 
It commences with the generation of an objective function for NHS Trusts. This 
objective function provides a basis for the application of production possibility 
frontier analysis to generate predictions about the relationship between cost 
efficiency and service standards and on the relative impact of the Star ratings and 
the AHC on the incentivisation of cost efficiency as a means of improving 
nonfinancial performance. A stylised illustration of the impact of this analysis on the 
predicted distribution of the financial and nonfinancial performance of Trusts is 
provided in the form of the ‘performance comet’. The research design determines 
the core data required and the Chapter continues with a description of the process 
of data collection and the construction of variables, particularly the construction of a 
uniform measure of nonfinancial performance across the study period. Finally, the 
Chapter concludes with the construction of non-parametric and multivariate models 
to facilitate the investigation of the two main research questions in this thesis. 
CHAPTER 6 reports the findings of the two main empirical studies.  
Finally, CHAPTER 7 draws together the findings from the two investigations, 
interprets them in the wider context of NPM type innovations and discusses their 
implications for policy development. The contribution to the literature is reviewed, 
the limitations of the investigations considered and opportunities for further research 
explored.  
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CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NHS HOSPITALS2 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter provides a brief introduction to the history of the development 
of hospitals and the role of accounting in that development, particularly in the 
context of the New Public Management initiatives introduced after 1979. Particular 
attention is given to issues of accountability, performance measurement and 
efficiency which represent the focus for the two studies in this thesis. These issues 
are explored in much greater depth in Chapter 4. However, this brief history and 
overview is provided with the objective of framing the literature review which follows 
in Chapter 3. This Chapter comprises the following: first, a brief history of hospitals 
prior to 1979; second, the development of New Public Management in the NHS in 
the period from 1979 -1997 when a Conservative Government was in power; and 
finally a review of the period from 1997-2008, after the election of a Labour 
Government.  
2.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HOSPITALS PRIOR TO 1979 
Prior to the establishment of the NHS in 1948 there were approximately 
3000 hospitals in existence, approximately 1000 operating in the more prestigious 
voluntary sector and 2000 operated by local councils. Voluntary hospitals, often 
founded by doctors, were completely independent and included internationally 
famous teaching hospitals such as St Bartholomew's, Guy's and St Thomas', 
smaller general hospitals and the least prestigious of this group, about 300 small 
specialist hospitals, specialising in particular types of patient, for example, children 
or particular types of treatment, for example, ophthalmology, orthopaedics, and 
neurology. Municipal hospitals in contrast were run by local authorities providing 
services originally covered by the provisions of the Poor Law and thus mainly 
catering for the poor, the elderly and the chronically ill.  
                                               
2
 Numerous texts which deal with the history of the NHS have been used to source material 
for this short section.  Much of the material is common across all texts and so individual 
points are not identified with specific texts. The texts used are:  Klein, 2006; Mohan, 
2002; Pollock, 2004; Rivett, 1998; Talbot-Smith and Pollock, 2006; Watkin, 1978 and 
Webster, 2002. 
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Distribution of hospital services thus developed in response to the strength 
of the voluntary sector and the priorities and financial resources of local authorities 
resulting in a patchwork of services which were variable in quality and quantity. In 
1948 both types of hospital were brought together in a single system and an 
essentially collectivist model of provision was adopted with both financing and 
service delivery being provided by the state. Le Grand, (2003) refers to this period 
as being associated with ‘knightly’ assumptions about the motivations and 
behaviour of public servants and professionals. Those who operated the system 
were assumed to be selfless, altruistic and acting in the public interest. These 
‘knights’ could be trusted to provide high quality services informed by their 
professional ethics and mores. Thus, under this ‘trust’ model (Le Grand, 2007, 
2010) government provides the finance and sets the overall budget for a public 
service but no more. Those who provide the service are trusted to spend the budget 
in the public interest and to allocate resources so as to deliver a service that is 
efficient, responsive, accountable, equitable, and of high quality (Le Grand, 2010). 
 In contrast with these modes of governance the structure of the NHS during 
this period was hierarchical. Prior to the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime 
Minister in 1979, there were 14 Regional Health Authorities, 90 Area Health 
Authorities and 192 District Health Authorities. Area Health Authorities covered 
areas which were broadly coterminous with local authority boundaries whereas 
District Health Authorities covered the catchment areas of district general hospitals. 
Funds flowed down to the District Health Authorities from the Department of Health, 
as illustrated in Figure 1, on the basis of a capitation formula. From this allocation 
hospitals negotiated a budget within which to operate. Management of the hospitals 
was performed directly by the District management team which was responsible for 
the performance of hospitals through functional lines of responsibility and 
professional regulation. Governance of hospitals during this period is thus most 
commonly associated with the notion of ‘command and control’ but as Le Grand 
(2002 a,b) observes, for much of this period there were ‘few commands and 
precious little control’. Instead the delivery of services was dominated by the clan 
modes of governance of the medical profession (Lapsley, 1993; Bourn and 
Ezzamel, 1986; Ouchi 1980; Le Grand, 2002 a, b).  
In this environment, governed by shared values and social norms, little value 
was placed upon the role of management and accounting information. Lapsley 
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(1993, 1992) goes as far as suggesting that, during this period, NHS financial 
managers operated by stealth, with inevitable consequences for transparency and 
accountability. Often, in the absence of sound management information systems, 
recourse to crude control techniques which focused on the management of real 
transactions, such as delaying payment to creditors, manipulating inventory levels 
and delaying the replacement of staff, was used to manage cash limited budgets.  
 
Figure 1: Hospital services and the NHS in 1979 
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2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN THE NHS: 1979 - 1997 
By 1979 when Margaret Thatcher was elected, variable quality of care and 
waiting times for treatment led to an erosion of confidence in the ‘trust’ model which 
had also delivered standardised relatively low levels of service which patients were 
no longer prepared to passively, and gratefully receive. The belief in the ‘knightly’ 
motivations had become increasingly displaced by a view that ‘knavish’ motivations 
were more prevalent, and that, consistent with public choice theory, clinicians and 
managers acted in self-interest rather than in the public interest (Le Grand, 2003). 
Further, patients were no longer willing to be ‘pawns’ passively and gratefully 
receiving a paternalistic service that was arranged around the needs and 
convenience of the providers irrespective of their own needs and concerns. 
Following the election of Margaret Thatcher’s government in 1979, driven by distrust 
of health service professionals and a belief that market mechanisms were the way 
in which user oriented, efficient services could be incentivised and delivered a 
programme of public sector reforms was instigated. These reforms, which looked to 
the private sector for managerial best practice, became part of the wider 
international sweep of reforms which became known as New Public Management 
(Hood 1991, 1995). In 1984, the first of a number of significant reforms was 
introduced. In response to criticisms of excessive delays in decision making 
(Lapsley, 1993, 1994) Area Health Authorities were abolished and hierarchies 
flattened. Further, a major challenge to the autonomy of the medical profession and 
their associated clan mode of governance came in the form of the Griffiths review 
(Griffiths, 1983) which introduced the concept of general management to the NHS. 
Griffiths, who was a businessman and therefore more familiar with hierarchical, 
rather than clan modes of governance, famously reported:  
 `In short if Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the 
corridors of the NHS today she would almost certainly be searching for the people in 
charge.'  
Following the Griffiths Report (Griffiths, 1983), the system of functional lines 
of responsibility and professional regulation with direct management of hospitals by 
the District Health Authority, was abolished and Unit General Managers, drawn from 
both public and private sectors, were appointed to manage hospitals and report 
through to equivalent positions in the Health Authorities. Hospitals remained as cost 
  
 Page 32 
 
centres within the primary unit of accountability, the Health Authority, and continued 
to be managed by reference to a budget allocation. Challenges to the ability of 
hospitals to live within their budget allocation continued to be dealt with through 
internal negotiation and reallocation of funds. LeGrand (2002a, b) and Lapsley 
(1993), interpret the culture of the NHS in the period following Griffiths, as one of 
transition from clan modes of governance towards an emphasis on hierarchical 
modes of governance associated with rules and bureaucracy, (Ouchi, 1980). 
Others, such as Pollitt (1986) and Pollitt et al. (1991) expressed concern that the 
new managerialism was too insensitive to deal with the political context within which 
public sector organisations operate and that the focus during this period was heavily 
weighted towards a perceived need to improve cost efficiency without sufficient 
regard being paid to other aspects of performance. The perception of these reforms, 
which were considered by many professionals in the NHS to have the potential to 
make a positive contribution to the performance of the NHS, suffered further 
damage when they became inextricably associated with the Government’s aim of 
making cuts in public sector spending.  
During this period the Conservative government also introduced other 
initiatives aimed at improving efficiency by economising on transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) and improving the use of resources. These 
included competitive tendering for non-core services such as laundry, cleaning and 
catering (Lapsley, 1993). These reforms, although relatively modest in their scope, 
were inspired by the notion of contestable markets (Bailey, 1981; Baumol, 1982; 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982) in which the market for public services is opened 
to potential new entrants as a means of driving up efficiency. This model found 
favour with the Government of the day as a more politically acceptable alternative to 
privatisation (Lapsley, 1993).  
Much more significant reforms were to follow with the introduction in 1989 of 
the ‘internal market’, an idea promoted by Alain Enthoven, (Enthoven, 1985), an 
American adviser to the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, during the 1980s. The 
NHS and Community Care Act, 1990 served to accelerate the move towards quasi-
market modes of governance, characterised by contracting relationships, through 
the separation of the purchaser and provider functions. Purchasers, in the form of 
health authorities were allocated budgets to buy health care from 'providers'. 
Contracting between purchasers and providers was to be based upon the cost of 
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delivering services. However, hospital costing systems were insufficiently developed 
to allow such cost-based pricing to be established (Ellwood, 1995, 1996a, 1996b). 
In a reversion to hierarchical modes of governance contract negotiations defaulted 
to the negotiation of block contracts based on previous budget allocations. A further 
innovation aimed at enhancing market modes of governances was the 
establishment of ‘GP3 fundholders’ who were allocated a share of the Health 
Authority budget allocation. GP fundholders were able to purchase services direct 
from providers rather than having the Health Authority purchase the services on 
their behalf. The original intention of the Government was that they would take over 
the role of local commissioning from the Health Authorities. However, the take up of 
fundholding status was patchy and, given the independent status of GP practices, 
the consequences for patients, particularly in relation to access to services, were 
questioned.  
The separation of purchase from provision was institutionalised through the 
establishment of NHS Trusts as self-governing non-profit provider organisations, 
wholly financed by public capital, but delivering hospital services outside the formal 
boundaries of the Department of Health and Social Security. The non-profit status of 
NHS Trusts was an institutional feature which was embodied in a statutory duty to 
break-even (NHS and Community Care Act, 19904). This statutory duty to break 
even represented the primary mechanism for the performance measurement and 
management of NHS Trusts and for the discharge of their public accountability 
throughout the 1990s. Other duties imposed by the Department of Health included a 
requirement to contain capital expenditure within an approved limit and not to 
exceed a cash flow limit. These additional requirements arose out of the alignment 
of the new NPM accruals based accounting of NHS Trusts with the traditional cash 
budgeting of health authorities where there was no distinction between capital and 
revenue expenditure.  
In the context of block contracts and the volatility in expenditure arising from 
irregular payments, such as those associated with major capital projects, the 
                                               
3
 GP: general practitioner 
 
4
 National Health Service and Community Care Act (1990) available at: 
  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1990/Ukpga_19900019_en_1.htm 
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achievement of the financial breakeven requirement proved challenging. In a further 
demonstration of inertia in the move from hierarchical to market modes of 
governance, a number of accounting mechanisms associated with the previous 
hierarchical regime were retained in order to give Trusts some accounting flexibility 
in the reporting of financial breakeven. The objective was to prevent the potentially 
adverse consequences for patient care that managers might otherwise adopt in 
order to achieve breakeven. These mechanisms included agreed transfers from 
Trusts’ capital budget to their revenue account and a system of resource transfer, 
reminiscent of budget reallocations and a form of income shifting, which became 
known as financial support. The system of financial support, which is the focus for 
Study 2, is considered in depth in Chapter 4 which describes the institutional context 
for the two studies in this thesis. Trusts also used a variety of crude techniques 
based on the deferral of expenditure to a future period in order to assist in the 
achievement of breakeven (Lapsley, 1993), including the deferral of patient 
treatment. By the late 1990s however there was considerable public concern about 
waiting times for treatment and the impact this was having on patient care and 
service standards (Department of Health, 2000).  
2.3.1 Summary of funding and accountability in 1997 
Figure 2 illustrates the funding and accountability of hospitals throughout the 
1990s until 1997, when the Labour Government was elected. Funds flowed from the 
Department of Health to local commissioners, the local health authorities and GP 
fund-holders, who purchased hospital services from self-governing NHS Trusts. 
NHS Trusts although operating outside the boundaries of the Department of Health, 
were accountable for their performance to the Department of Health through its 
regional offices. The Department of Health, in turn, was accountable to Parliament 
for all spending in the NHS which not included funds allocated to commissioners but 
also any overspending, in the form of reported deficits, in NHS Trusts. 
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Figure 2: Hospital services and the NHS in 1997 
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participants. For example, in London, where purchaser decisions threatened the 
viability of some London hospitals, (Klein, 2010), the Secretary of State intervened 
and placed restrictions on purchasing policies. Health Authorities were thus 
restricted from switching providers because such actions had the potential to 
destabilise existing providers and the political consequences of hospital closures 
were considered unacceptable. Similarly, patients had very little opportunity to 
exercise choice in either the purchaser of their services (the Health Authority or GP 
fund-holder) or the provider.  
These issues were also identified by the new Labour Government, elected in 
1997 which, in its review of the state of the NHS identified that that there was an 
absence of clear incentives to improve performance; that patients were 
disempowered and that services were not designed around the convenience and 
concerns of the patient. Further, a lack of national standards had led to 
unacceptable variations in treatment, (Department of Health, 2000, Chapter 2). 
One of the first actions of the Labour Government was to abandon GP 
fundholding, which was associated with very high transaction costs. However the 
principle of the purchaser-provider split was retained. Local commissioning bodies 
were re-established in the form of Primary Care Trusts, with significant GP 
representation, and the regional offices of the Department of Health were replaced 
by Strategic Health Authorities. The main role of Strategic Health Authorities, as 
with the regional offices they replaced, was the performance management of local 
NHS bodies, including NHS Trusts which were accountable to the Department of 
Health for their performance, and the coordination of the strategic development of 
health services within their regional boundaries.  
Following these structural changes, the Government went on to push 
through further NPM inspired reforms which simultaneously increased the 
prominence of quasi-market modes of governance whilst in other areas 
strengthened the culture of ‘command and control’ (Le Grand, 2002a). These policy 
initiatives were first outlined in the White Paper, ‘The New NHS’, (Department of 
Health, 1997), which made a commitment to improvements in both the quality and 
efficiency of NHS services. Indeed these were seen as being interdependent: higher 
quality services and improved cost efficiency went hand in hand (para. 3.8). In terms 
of quality, waiting times for treatment, in particular, had become the public’s top 
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priority (Department of Health, 2000), not only because of the length of time that 
patients were required to wait for treatment but also because of local and regional 
variations in waiting times. A more rigorous approach to the measurement of 
performance was to be developed, to be effected through a new system of 
efficiency measures (reference costs, para. 2.17) and through the establishment of 
a performance assessment framework (para. 3.14) with a wide range of measures 
covering fairer access to services, better quality of care and patient experience, as 
well as real efficiency gains (Department of Health, 1999). The effectiveness of the 
performance assessment framework was to be further reinforced by a linked system 
of performance management which incorporated, incentives for good performance, 
in the form of additional investment and freedom from regulation, and sanctions for 
poor performance, including direct intervention by the Department of Health. The 
CEOs of poorly performing organisation were also under threat of dismissal 
(Department of Health, 2000). The Performance Assessment Framework was 
trialled first in Health Authorities (Department of Health, 1999) and, a year later, the 
NHS Plan announced plans to develop and extend the framework to NHS Trusts 
(Department of Health, 2000). Moreover, in an initiative to improve Trusts’ public 
accountability and to further incentivise good performance Trust performance 
ratings were to be made publicly available.  
By 2002 the Government, having established its multi-dimensional 
performance measurement system (PMS) in the form of the Star ratings system, 
was signalling a return to further market-based solutions to promote improved 
performance and efficiency. These reforms were to be based on the notions of voice 
and choice, (Le Grand, 2010) and the contestability of markets, (Bailey, 1981; 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982) (Department of Health, 2002a, 2003b, 2005). 
Greater choice was to be offered to patients, including choice of both hospital and 
individual consultant, with cash following the patient to encourage utilisation of 
capacity. However, competition between providers was not to be on the basis of 
price but on the basis of quality. The price of each treatment was to be determined 
by reference to a national tariff (Department of Health 2002b, 2003a), a system 
known as Payment by Results. This new system, facilitated by the investment in the 
reference costing system which formed the basis for treatment pricing, facilitated the 
opening up of the market for hospital services to an increasingly diverse range of 
providers. Foundation Trusts, with greater commercial freedoms than NHS Trusts, 
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were to be established. These Trusts although non-profit and part of the NHS, were 
to be free of the statutory duty to breakeven, were able to borrow on commercial 
terms from banks and other lending institutions and had a greater degree of 
flexibility over their service portfolio. The intention was that over time, similar to the 
transition of hospitals to NHS Trust status, Foundation Trusts would become the 
dominant organisational form, with all hospital Trusts eventually becoming 
Foundation Trusts. During the period of this study, however, the majority of 
hospitals remained as NHS Trusts. Further, the market was to be made more open 
to private sector participation through the creation of independent sector treatment 
centres and through the commissioning of some services from private sector 
organisations.  
As a consequence of this series of reforms the accounting flexibilities that 
were carried over from the old hierarchical modes of governance were gradually 
whittled away. First, the flexibility accorded by the ability to defer patient treatment 
was eroded by the introduction of the Star ratings system with clear performance 
standards relating to waiting times. At around the same time the introduction of 
accruals accounting in all Government Departments, including the Department of 
Health, resulted in the withdrawal of the facility of transferring resources from the 
capital budget to the revenue account. During the period of this study therefore the 
system of financial support, in which surplus funds from elsewhere in the NHS were 
transferred into Trusts in financial difficulty as non-recurrent ‘additional income’ 
(NHS Accounting Manual5), became the most significant mechanism for according 
flexibility in the reporting of breakeven. The increasing momentum towards market-
based governance in the period from 2002, finally resulted in the withdrawal of the 
system of financial support in 2006-07 following the introduction of Payment by 
Results and the opening up of hospital services to alternative forms of provider for 
whom favourable funding arrangements, as represented by ‘financial support’, were 
not available. (Audit Commission, 2006a, p.9).  
                                               
5
 Available at: http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/finman.nsf/ManualDownload?OpenView   
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2.4.1 The funding and accountability of NHS Trusts from 2001 
The funding and accountability of NHS Trusts within the wider context of the 
NHS during the period of study is summarised in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Funding and accountability for English NHS hospitals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Audit Commission (2006a) 
# 
A proportion of treatments were also commissioned from Independent Sector 
Treatment centres, which are regulated for quality of care by the Healthcare Commission 
(subsequently the Care Quality Commission). 
NHS Trusts, Foundation Trusts and Monitor are all quasi-independent entities operating 
outside the boundaries of the Department of Health 
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Parliament annually votes funds to the Department of Health and these are 
largely devolved down to Primary Care Trusts on the basis of a capitation formula to 
fund the provision of healthcare for their locality. Primary Care Trusts commission 
hospital services from a variety of providers, mainly NHS Trusts and Foundation 
Trusts6. NHS Trusts, although self-governing bodies, are accountable for their 
performance to the Department of Health through the Department’s regional 
intermediaries, Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). An SHA’s primary function is 
the performance management, on behalf of the Department of Health, of NHS 
Trusts and Primary Care Trusts operating within its area. A secondary function of 
SHAs is the coordination of the strategic development of health services in their 
region. A limited amount of funding flows to the SHAs to allow them to fulfil these 
performance management and strategic co-ordination roles. Both SHAs and PCTs 
fall within the accounting boundary of the Department of Health, whereas NHS 
Trusts and Foundation Trusts, as quasi-independent organisations contracting with 
PCTs to deliver services, fall outside it. This distinction is reflected in their financial 
statements which are prepared on different bases. Primary Care Trusts and 
Strategic Health Authorities, which are basically cost centres within the Department 
of Health, prepare an operating cost statement, the out-turn of which, for the 
purposes of public accountability, is compared with their ‘Revenue Resource Limit’, 
essentially their allocated budget. In contrast, both NHS Trusts and Foundation 
Trusts, which are regarded as ‘trading organisations’7 prepare an income statement, 
the balance on which provides the basis for assessing compliance with the statutory 
duty to breakeven. In contrast to NHS Trusts, Foundation Trusts are accountable 
directly to Parliament, each Foundation Trust being required to submit annual 
financial statements direct to Parliament, and are subject to regulation by an 
independent regulator Monitor rather than by Strategic Health Authorities. Monitor 
receives some funds from the Department of Health for the purposes of fulfilling this 
regulatory role. As a consequence of the different basis of regulation of Foundation 
Trusts, which permits greater independence and commercial freedom than NHS 
                                               
6
 Primary Care Trusts, in addition to commissioning hospital services also commission 
primary care services such as general practice and dentistry services, which are largely 
delivered through private sector providers. 
 
7
 See NHS Summarised Accounts from 2002-03 available at:  
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0304/nhs_england_summarised_accou.aspx 
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Trusts, they are excluded from the studies in this thesis. However, the 
establishment of Foundation Trusts from 2004-05 occurs during the study period 
and they have significance, particularly from a policy perspective, for the 
interpretation and discussion of the findings of the two studies. 
2.4.2 Summary 
In summary, during the period covered by this thesis, NHS acute hospital 
Trusts operated as quasi-independent organisations who contracted with health 
care commissioners (Primary Care Trusts) to deliver hospital services to patients.  
Trusts’ statutory duty to breakeven represented the primary mechanism by which 
Trusts discharged their public accountability but from 2002-03 this was 
supplemented by a Trust performance rating system which aimed to incentivise cost 
efficiency as a means of delivering high service standards within the constraint of 
financial breakeven. The achievement of financial breakeven remained challenging 
for NHS Trusts throughout this period, particularly in the context of the new 
performance measurement system, which restricted the flexibility associated with 
the ability to defer patient treatment into a future accounting period. The only major 
flexibility available to Trusts during the period of study was the system of financial 
support whereby surplus funds from elsewhere in the NHS could be accessed by 
Trusts in financial difficulty. These funds served to flatter both reported financial 
performance and Trust performance ratings by being credited to revenue but were 
provided to Trusts who could demonstrate that they would use the funds effectively 
to support service standards whilst addressing their financial difficulties, often to the 
extent that the original funds advanced were repaid. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The establishment of NHS Trusts in 1991 represented a key element in the 
NPM innovations introduced to the NHS by successive Conservative Governments 
during the 1980s and 1990s. The increased emphasis on market-based governance 
mechanisms, particularly the separation of purchaser and provider and the 
emphasis on contracting, served to accentuate the principal-agent nature of 
relationships within the NHS (Hood 1991, 1995). Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) predicts that agents will incur monitoring costs to reduce 
information asymmetry and to align incentives with principal’s objectives. Consistent 
with this new emphasis, the 1997 Labour Government, in its role as executive agent 
to Parliament and the public, sought to align managerial interests in the NHS with 
those of patients and the public, by introducing a number of reforms aimed at 
incentivising cost efficiency and improved service standards. A new system for 
measuring Trust cost efficiency was developed and a multidimensional performance 
measurement system (PMS) introduced. To further incentivise Trust managers, a 
system of performance management, representing an extrinsic form of motivation 
also associated with agency relationships, was also introduced. This system was 
linked to Trust performance ratings with rewards for good performance and 
penalties, particularly the threat of dismissal, for poor performance. Further, the 
performance of each individual Trust was made publicly available, a measure which 
simultaneously served to align incentives and to enhance the public accountability 
of local hospitals within the wider context of the NHS.  
These market based mechanisms were however introduced into an 
institution which had traditionally been associated with public administration and 
hierarchical models of governance. Indeed, many parts of the NHS, particularly 
those operating within the boundaries of the Department of Health, continued to be 
governed in this way. The alignment of market based modes of governance with the 
hierarchical modes of governance associated with public administration led to a 
complex multi-layering of incentives within the NHS and, in NHS Trusts, led to 
inertia in the relinquishing of mechanisms which served to deliver flexibility in the 
delivery of their public accountability, particularly the statutory duty to breakeven.  
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 This Chapter reviews the literature relevant to these NPM developments 
and sets the context for the two studies in this thesis. 
The Chapter commences in Section 3.2 with a review of the development 
and characteristics of New Public Management. This review is set within the context 
of wider public sector reforms, going beyond the scope of the NHS alone, and 
includes a consideration of the literature which is critical of NPM initiatives. Section 
3.3 proceeds with a review of the literature on the cost efficiency of hospitals. This 
section commences with a brief review of the extensive, international, literature on 
hospital cost efficiency using frontier analysis techniques. It then proceeds to 
consider UK public sector accounting research into costing and cost efficiency 
before concluding with a short consideration of policy based papers drawn from the 
economics literature. Cost efficiency has been a key concern of policy makers since 
the inception of the NHS and improved cost efficiency has often been a key aim of 
NPM type reforms. Indeed, this aim of improving cost efficiency whilst improving 
service standards, was a key objective of the multi-dimensional performance 
measurement systems which were introduced into the NHS from 2002. The 
literature on the role of multi-dimensional performance measurement systems in 
improving performance, particularly those inspired by the balanced scorecard, is 
considered in Section 3.4. This section first considers analytical studies on multi-
dimensional performance measurement before reviewing normative studies 
including those relating to the balanced scorecard. The impact of these models on 
performance is then considered, first from the perspective of empirical studies in the 
private sector and then from the perspective of the public sector, particularly 
healthcare.  
A key focus of studies on performance measurement is that of manipulation. 
An extensive literature exists on this topic, particularly the manipulation of reported 
financial performance which has a substantial literature of its own. This is 
considered in Section 3.5. In the private sector this literature is dominated by the 
earnings management literature, but elsewhere there is a literature on income 
shifting between group entities aimed at realising overall economic gains in the form 
of a lower tax burden. Further, a small number of studies considers the manipulation 
of financial performance in response to incentives generated by institutional settings 
which vary from the traditional Anglo-American corporate model of governance and 
accountability. These include a Finnish study in which transactions between a 
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quasi-independent water company and a municipal City Council were manipulated 
in order to facilitate the fulfilment of the City Council’s statutory requirement to 
breakeven. This section (3.5) on the manipulation of reported financial performance 
concludes with a critique of the methods used for detecting such manipulation and 
with a review of the literature which considers whether the consequences of 
manipulation are positive or negative.  
NHS Trusts have a statutory duty to breakeven, a key component of their 
public accountability, compliance with which is determined by reference to their 
published financial statements. Their reported financial performance is determined 
by applying accounting policies that are compliant with UK GAAP insofar as it is 
relevant and applicable to the public sector. The application of private sector GAAP, 
itself an NPM type initiative, necessarily involves adaptations to fit the public sector 
setting. In the last substantive section of this Chapter (Section 3.6) the literature on 
the application of GAAP-based accruals accounting in public sector organisations, a 
considerable proportion of which is of a critical nature, is considered. The final 
section of the Chapter (Section 3.7) concludes with a summary of key issues 
arising from the literature review and identifies the contribution of this thesis to the 
different strands of literature considered.  
3.2 NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
In the early 1980s concerns over the accountability and performance of public 
sector organisations led to a programme of reforms which became collectively 
known as New Public Management (Hood, 1991, 1995). In contrast with the public 
administration model which emphasised stewardship and which drew its 
management practices from the military (Hood,1991), New Public Management 
drew on market models and private sector best practice as mechanisms to deliver 
better cost efficiency and performance in public sector organisations. Despite being 
characterised by a degree of ambiguity, the value of the New Public Management 
(NPM) concept lies in its ability to capture key features and themes of the reforms 
that originated in the policies of the Thatcher era and continued throughout the 
period of the subsequent Labour government. These key features were summarised 
by Hood (1991, 1995) as: disaggregation of public sector entities into corporatised 
units; greater emphasis on cost efficiency; increased use of explicit standards and 
measures of performance; greater emphasis on output and results; the adoption of 
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management techniques which mimic private sector best practice; the increased 
use of contractual relations and an increase in competition for the provision of 
services; and finally, an increase in the application of responsibility accounting with 
clearer managerial assignment of responsibility and accountability for action. In a 
review of the sweep of reforms since the 1980s, Lapsley (2008) concluded that 
there was no foreseeable retreat from NPM reforms in the public sector and that, if 
anything, the momentum would continue. 
The theoretical foundations of New Public Management lie in new 
institutional economics with its emphasis on efficient contracting informed by 
transaction cost economics, and rational, self-interested behaviour informed by 
agency theory (Groot and Budding, 2008; Hood 1991). New institutional economics, 
in its turn, drew from public choice theory to develop a number of administrative 
reform doctrines based on contestability, user choice and transparency (Hood, 
1991). These, combined with an increased emphasis on ‘professional’ management 
and the adoption of business like management practices, gave rise to a wave of 
NPM reforms in public services in which market based mechanisms were adopted 
to address the perceived failures of hierarchical modes of governance. However 
these market based reforms have been criticised on the basis that the implications 
for public services have not been fully appreciated by policy makers. Whilst 
acknowledging that new institutional economics has relevance and value in the 
public sector, Ezzamel and Willmott (1993), for example, raise concerns about the 
erosion of professional values, clan based mechanisms of control and transactions 
underpinned by assumptions of trust (Ouchi, 1980). They argue that the increased 
emphasis on rational self-interested behaviour and a reliance on incentives to 
promote behaviour in the public interest, also paradoxically, gives rise to greater 
potential for dysfunctional responses and adverse consequences for the quality of 
public services. Indeed, the effectiveness of NPM type initiatives is considered to 
have been impeded by clinician resistance arising from the clash of cultures 
between the clinicians’ traditional clan based modes of governance, the hierarchical 
managerial modes of governance associated with the Griffiths reforms 
(Griffiths,1983) and, latterly, market-based innovations (Lapsley, 2008). Pollitt et al 
(1986), Bourn and Ezzamel (1986), Preston, Cooper and Coombs (1992) and Jones 
and Dewing (1997) all find evidence of reluctance amongst clinicians to become 
engaged, for example, with the technique of budgeting with many clinicians 
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challenging the feasibility of reconciling the competing underpinning values and 
assumptions of clinical freedom and financial accountability.  
Lack of confidence in New Public Management has also been eroded by 
instances of the adoption of private sector models which appear to have little 
substantive role to play in the management or governance of public sector bodies. 
For instance, Hodges, MacNiven and Mellett, (2004) find little engagement of the 
public with the notion of an Annual General Meeting for NHS Trusts, with the 
number of staff in attendance often exceeding the number of members of the public, 
despite considerable effort by Trusts to attract the public to them. They conclude 
that the NHS Trust AGM offers only a weak form of public accountability for NHS 
Trusts where lines of accountability are more strongly focused up through the 
Department of Health to Parliament. Other studies, which question the value of 
NPM initiatives that do not adequately recognise the public sector setting in which 
they are applied, include the questioning of the value of remuneration committees in 
the determination of NHS Trust Chief Executive pay (Ballantine, Forker and 
Greenwood, 2008b) and of the role of the Annual Report in the Australian fire 
service, (Kloot, 2009). This failure to adequately recognise the specific 
characteristics of the public sector setting has also been extensively criticised in the 
literature relating to the application of accruals accounting and generally accepted 
accounting practice in public sector entities as, for example, in studies undertaken 
by Barton (1999, 2000, 2004, 2005); Ellwood, (2003, 2008); and Ellwood and 
Newbury (2006) 
Cultural resistance and poor application of NPM initiatives have both 
contributed to the perceived failure of some NPM initiatives but often unsuccessful 
models reappear in a different guise. Lapsley (2008) refers to this phenomenon as 
‘Back to the Future’. He cites that the replacement of the, allegedly, failed Star 
ratings system by the Annual Health Check, which had many similar features, as an 
example of this ‘Back to the Future’ phenomenon. Other authors have gone further 
and suggested that, not only have some initiatives failed but the NPM movement as 
a whole has run its course, so much so that the movement is dead, (Dunleavy et al. 
2005). New initiatives, it is argued, facilitated by an increasingly digital age, are 
being developed which run counter to NPM type initiatives based on disaggregation, 
competition and incentives. Examples of such initiatives include those which permit 
citizens direct electronic access and active management of their tax records, or 
  
 Page 47 
 
which allow patients to access their medical records and monitor their own 
treatment. These innovations represent a shift away from agency-centered 
processes, typical of New Public Management, to those which are citizen or 
stakeholder-centered, allowing citizens and businesses to substantially run their 
own interactions with government. However, de Vries (2010), in a review of 
Dunleavy et al.’s paper, argues that although NPM ‘is in trouble … it is not really 
dead’. Further, Lapsley (2008) concludes that the NPM project, despite criticism of 
many its aspects, forges ahead with no immediate prospect of its demise. 
Research into NPM initiatives has been extensive but despite its roots in 
new institutional economics, and the greater prominence of principal-agent 
relationships arising from, for example, the separation of the commissioning and 
provision of healthcare services, NPM research has been dominated by interpretive 
and critical studies using a qualitative or case study method (Goddard, 2010). This 
bias towards qualitative research is reflected in recent reviews of public sector 
accounting research such as Broadbent and Guthrie (2008) and Van Helden (2005). 
Broadbent and Guthrie’s review builds on a previous 1992 study (Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 1992) by focusing on contextual or ‘alternative’ accounting research. It 
specifically excludes positivist studies and research published in US journals. 
Similarly in a review of public sector management accounting research Van Helden 
(2005) identifies that only 11 out of 55 studies (20%) used an economics based 
framework and only three out of 55 (5%) used an archival approach. As with 
Broadbent and Guthrie (2008, 1992) a consideration of US published research was 
excluded from his study. This bias towards qualitative research in the public sector 
accounting literature was further confirmed by Goddard (2010) in the first review of 
public sector accounting research which includes US studies. Goddard identifies the 
paradigmatic bias towards interpretive and critical research in Europe and 
Australasia and contrasts this with the US where research in Government and not 
for profit entities is dominated by positivist studies informed by neoclassical 
economics and utilising quantitative research methods which exploit readily 
available databases. A cross tabulation of author residency and methodological 
paradigm (excluding descriptive studies) showed that 95% of US papers adopted a 
functionalist paradigm as compared with 35% of papers from the rest of the world 
and a similar cross tabulation by research topic showed that 8% of US studies were 
on the topics of accountability and performance management, as compared with 
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41% for the rest of the world. These statistics highlight the bias towards qualitative 
research in the ‘rest of the world’ where the majority of research into public sector 
performance management and accountability has been undertaken. Goddard 
further raises the important point that, as a result of NPM initiatives, such as those 
related to performance measurement, a number of new and interesting databases 
have now become available in the UK but that these databases remain largely 
unexploited. He expresses concern that opportunities for undertaking investigations 
which could serve to improve our understanding of public sector reforms are being 
overlooked. Further, comparisons are drawn with the US where the dominant 
neoclassical paradigm in the top US journals and in the elite business schools has 
led to a marginalisation of behavioural accounting research (Williams, Gregory-
Jenkins and Ingraham, 2006) which has been arguably detrimental to the overall 
field of study. The current paradigmatic focus in UK arguably poses similar potential 
risks to the development of public sector accounting research.  
Notwithstanding the paradigmatic bias in Europe there have been a number 
of studies which have adopted an archival empirical method. Goddard identifies 
eight such papers out of a total of 188 (4%) in the period 2005-2007 and outside of 
this period examples exist in the area of NHS audit (Clatworthy, Mellet and Peel, 
2002; Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood, 2008a) and in CEO pay (Ballantine, 
Forker and Greenwood, 2008b).  
This thesis contributes to the limited research that adopts a positivist 
approach by utilising publicly available data to perform two empirical archival 
investigations into performance measurement and its manipulation in NHS acute 
hospital Trusts. The first investigation addresses a key policy concern: the 
relationship between service standards and cost efficiency and the impact of PMS 
design on the extent to which cost efficiency is incentivised as a means of delivering 
improved performance. The focus in this study is the relative impact of the Annual 
Health Check as compared with the Star ratings. The second study focuses on the 
manipulation of performance measurement systems, with particular emphasis on 
the manipulation of financial performance. Financial support, an NHS specific 
transaction, represented a form of income shifting between NHS organisations 
which largely served to accelerate revenue recognition in Trusts receiving it. For 
Trusts in financial difficulty it served to flatter both performance ratings and reported 
financial performance and to mislead Parliament and the public about the number 
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and size of NHS Trust deficits. The aim of this second study is to investigate the 
performance and accountability consequences of financial support and to determine 
whether it led to a public benefit in the form of better performance, both financial 
and nonfinancial, in Trusts receiving it. 
3.3 COST EFFICIENCY IN HOSPITALS 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Cost efficiency has been a key policy concern for the NHS since its 
establishment in 1948 and a particular concern has been the efficiency of hospitals 
as they account for around two thirds of the NHS budget. The literature on hospital 
efficiency falls into three main categories. By far the largest strand is drawn from the 
economics literature and uses frontier analysis techniques to investigate and identify 
the determinants of hospital efficiency. This literature is international in its scope 
with studies set in over 30 countries. Second, a strand of literature exists in the UK 
public sector accounting domain. The focus of this literature has been on the 
development of costing systems, particularly the reference cost system which was 
introduced in 1998 and which provides the cost information for the Trust reference 
cost index, a measure of Trust efficiency. A third strand of literature is represented 
by studies which adopt a macro-economic perspective and which investigate the 
efficiency of the NHS overall. Each of these is considered in turn. 
3.3.2 Hospital efficiency studies using frontier analysis techniques 
By far the biggest stream of literature on hospital efficiency is represented by 
studies using frontier analysis techniques, such as data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), to obtain measures of hospital efficiency 
and to identify the factors which influence it. Over 700 such studies on healthcare 
organisations have been published in the last five years in over 30 countries, with 
the majority focusing on hospitals (Worthington, 2004, Hollingsworth, 2008).  
Methodologically, frontier analysis techniques compare the efficiency of a 
hospital, not with a mean value as in econometric modelling, but with a frontier 
value. In DEA the frontier is determined by the best performing organisations and 
there are therefore organisations which appear as 100% efficient. In SFA the 
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frontier is a mathematically constructed frontier and organisations therefore rarely 
exhibit 100% efficiency. A stylised illustration of the two methods is shown in Figure 
4.  
 
Figure 4: Comparison of DEA and SFA approaches to frontiers 
 
 
Adapted from Worthington (2004) 
With DEA the frontier is constructed non-parametrically from the 
observations themselves, whereas with SFA a parametric function is fitted to the 
data. Organisations within the frontier (hollow points) are inefficient to the extent that 
they deviate from these frontiers. However, in both models the distance to the 
frontier (double dotted arrow) could be the result not only of inefficiency, but also 
because of misspecification of the production function or measurement error. There 
has thus been considerable concern about the sensitivity of results to model 
specification and the choice of input and output variables (Parkin and Hollingsworth, 
1997; Chirikos 1998; Street 2003). Mixed findings from studies adopting different 
models have exacerbated these concerns. Further, the interpretation of the results 
from studies adopting frontier techniques has often proved problematic from a policy 
perspective. A number of factors, such as geographical location, specialisation and 
size for example have been identified as affecting hospital efficiency but the findings 
SFA frontier 
DEA frontier 
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so far provide insufficient information to be useful for determining policy. Street 
(2003), for example, points out that the apparent inefficiency of small hospitals could 
be for a number of reasons including the need for smaller hospitals to maintain a 
reserve capacity for dealing with accident and emergency cases which, 
proportionately, may be larger than for bigger hospitals. Addressing inefficiency 
based on these measures could therefore lead to adverse consequences for patient 
care. Resistance to frontier techniques has also been provoked by insensitive use of 
findings, particularly in the US, to deliver direct policy recommendations regarding 
budget controls and cuts in funding (Worthington, 2004). Many of the concerns 
regarding the use of frontier techniques centre around the fundamental issue that, in 
contrast to regression analysis, there has been no theoretical basis for identifying 
input and output variables, or of explaining the differences between one 
organisation and another (Ludwig, Van Merode and Groot, 2010). So, whilst the 
identification of the factors which influence organisational efficiency can provide 
interesting insights into an organisation’s observed relative efficiency, many findings 
are difficult to interpret from a policy perspective.  
Although the frontier analysis literature is international in its scope much of it 
is concentrated in the US. Three recent reviews of the literature illustrate this. The 
most recent (Rosko and Mutter, 2011) restricts itself to studies set in the US using 
the stochastic frontier analysis technique and published between 1994 and 2008, of 
which there were 27. The authors conclude that the application of stochastic frontier 
analysis to specific policy issues is in its infancy but that it has potential for 
development such that it could prove useful in appropriate contexts.  
A slightly earlier review (O’Neill, Rauner, Heidenberger and Kraus, 2008) 
focused on DEA based studies over the period 1984-2004. Of 79 papers reviewed 
in a cross national study 49 (62%) were set in the US, whence the DEA technique 
originated. Only 6 were set in the UK of which two were set in Northern Ireland 
(McCallion, McKillop, Glass and Kerr, 1999; McCallion, Glass, Jackson, Kerr and 
McKillop, 2000) and one was set in Scotland (Parkin and Hollingsworth, 1997). All 
three studies which included England, (Jacobs, 2001; Maniadakis and Thanassoulis 
2000; Maniadakis, Hollingsworth and Thanassoulis, 1999), covered the period prior 
to the Labour Government reforms of the early 21st Century.  
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Jacobs (2001) compared hospital rankings using the three cost indices used 
by the UK Department of Health in the period prior to 1997 with those obtained 
using DEA and SFA. She concluded that each frontier method has particular 
strengths and weaknesses, potentially measuring different aspects of efficiency. 
Further, she found that the differences in efficiency between Trusts were not large 
and concluded that the savings from bringing up poorer performers would be 
modest. 
In two further studies, Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2000) and Maniadakis, 
Hollingsworth and Thanassoulis (1999) used Malmquist productivity indices, 
computed using data envelopment analysis, to evaluate the efficiency of acute 
hospitals in the UK following the introduction of the internal market in 1991. They 
found that, even when service quality was incorporated into the analysis, 
productivity declined in the year following the introduction of the internal market but 
improved thereafter though not significantly.  
The third most recent review of hospital efficiency using frontier analysis 
techniques was also an international study covering both DEA and SFA studies 
published from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s. Worthington (2004), rather than 
carrying out a comprehensive review, selected 38 studies using EconLit, the Journal 
of Economic Literature electronic database, to identify articles that were 
representative of frontier efficiency measurement in health care services. Of these, 
20 (52%) were set in the US and only six in the UK, of which one was set in 
Scotland (Parkin and Hollingsworth, 1997); two concerned health authorities, the 
purchasers of healthcare services, (Thanassoulis, Boussofiane and Dyson, 1996; 
Giuffrida and Gravelle, 2001) and three investigated an acute hospital setting 
(Maniadakis and Thanassoulis, 2000; Street and Jacobs, 2002; Street, 2003).  
Street and Jacobs (2002) and Street (2003) critically evaluate the OLS 
methodology used by the Department of Health for calculating the efficiency index, 
known as the casemix cost index (CCI), which preceded the Labour Government 
reforms of the early 2000s, with stochastic frontier techniques. Consistent with 
Jacobs (2001), they conclude that, using stochastic frontier techniques, hospitals 
exhibited a higher level of efficiency than was suggested by the CCI indices. 
However, Folland and Hofler (2001) and Street, (2003) warned that, although 
stochastic frontier analysis produced robust results for mean hospital efficiency, it 
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was an inappropriate technique for ranking individual hospitals and for setting 
targets because the individual estimates of hospital efficiency using SFA techniques 
are highly sensitive to study design.  
One persistent concern of frontier based studies is the issue of quality. If 
quality cannot be observed and is a hidden component of costs then the pursuit of 
cost efficiency on the basis of frontier findings may lead to the perverse outcome of 
lower quality services. More recent studies using frontier techniques therefore adopt 
a two stage research design: measures of inefficiency are obtained through frontier 
techniques and then these measures are used as a variable in regression analysis. 
Deily and McKay (2006), for example, in a sample of urban acute care Florida 
hospitals, regress hospital mortality measures against a measure of cost efficiency, 
obtained from a stochastic cost frontier estimation, and find a positive association.  
Further, in a response to the criticism that frontier based studies are not 
underpinned by theoretical analysis, Ludwig, Van Merode and Groot (2010), in an 
investigation of Dutch hospitals, use an agency perspective to predict and find a 
positive association between quality and efficiency. In this study a number of quality 
measures were obtained using staff surveys. A two stage analysis, where these 
survey based measures of quality were regressed against the outputs from a 
stochastic frontier estimation of cost efficiency, was then used to identify a positive 
relationship between quality and efficiency.  
Ludwig, Van Merode and Groot (2010) used survey-based measures of 
quality rather than outcome measures, such as mortality rates, because, unless 
adjusted for case mix, outcome measures can be wrongly interpreted as indicative 
of low quality when high risk cases are being treated. The use of survey based 
measures of quality is also supported by Schwartz et al. (2011) who conclude that 
the value of survey based measures of quality has been underestimated. Their 
results suggested that such measures of quality were a more valid measure of 
performance than more objective measures and suggested that staff surveys could 
provide a useful complement to the use of patient surveys when evaluating 
organisational performance and the effects of improvement strategies. 
In their recent study, Schwartz et al (2011), in a study of 470 US hospitals, 
also challenged reliance on individual metrics for quality, such as mortality rates, as 
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compared with composite measures. They identify that hospitals which are 
measured as highly efficient on a composite measure of quality, (as was determined 
for English NHS hospitals under both the Star ratings and the AHC), were rarely in 
the top quintile on most individual measures. They conclude that composite 
measures may be useful for policy purposes (for example, designing pay-for-
performance systems) and for informing consumers about overall hospital quality, (a 
function which the Star ratings and the AHC performed), but they pose a challenge 
for hospital quality improvement programs. Although excellence in all components 
of the composite measure is desirable, hospitals may prioritise their improvement 
efforts to focus primarily on a few measures at the expense of others. The authors 
conclude that a balanced scorecard approach that employs both composite 
measures and individual component measures (as in the Star ratings and AHC) 
may be most useful for the development of effective, targeted strategies for 
incentivising the cost effective delivery of high service standards.  
In the English NHS, although several studies exist which investigate the 
impact of the reforms of the 1990s, investigations into the impact of the Labour 
Government reforms since 2000 appear to be rather more scarce. A study 
published in 2006 for example was still focused on the market based reforms of the 
1990s (Ferrari, 2006). However, a more recent study (Cooper, Gibbons, Jones and 
Macguire, 2010) investigated the impact on hospital efficiency of the competition 
reforms introduced by the Labour Government in 2006. Interestingly, this study did 
not use a frontier analysis approach to calculate hospital efficiency, but instead used 
average length of stay for hip replacement operations as a proxy measure. 
Regression analysis using a difference in difference estimator was then used to 
identify that hospitals affected by more competition reduced their patient length of 
stay more than those less affected. As the improvements occurred in the period 
prior to treatment they concluded that were genuine improvements in efficiency and 
not obtained at the expense of the quality of treatment. 
In summary, a large literature exists which adopts frontier analysis 
techniques to obtain measures of hospital efficiency and to identify the factors that 
influence it. These techniques have so far not been adopted by policy makers 
because of concerns about the theoretical underpinning for the choice of input and 
output variables, because of the sensitivity of the results to model specification and 
choice of technique, and because frontier analysis is not yet sufficiently developed 
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for the purposes of measuring and ranking the efficiency of individual hospitals. The 
incorporation of controls for service quality into frontier analysis techniques has also 
proved a challenge and recent research studies have adopted a mixed method of 
frontier analysis and regression analysis to investigate these relationships. 
3.3.3 Cost efficiency measurement in the NHS 
A consistent policy focus since the establishment of the NHS in 1948 has 
been cost efficiency, particularly in hospitals which account for approximately two 
thirds of NHS expenditure. Many of the structural reforms of the NHS since its 
inception have been driven by the pursuit of cost efficiency, including the 
introduction of the ‘internal market’ by the Conservative Government in the 1990s. A 
key feature of the internal market was the separation of the purchasers and 
providers of healthcare which was effected through the establishment of NHS Trusts 
(Lapsley, 1994). The original vision was that the competition between hospitals 
would drive improvements in both efficiency and quality. However, as purchases of 
hospital services were to be made at cost, a key requirement for the operation of 
this market based system was the ability for hospitals to cost services effectively. 
Unfortunately little investment had been put into the development of costing 
systems (Ellwood 1995, 1996a, b) and they were found to be inadequate to the 
task. As a consequence the working of the ‘internal market’ was undermined 
(Lapsley, 1994) and contracting defaulted to block contracts, based on historical 
budget allocations. It was not until after the Labour Government was elected in 1997 
that the necessary investment was made into a system, the reference costing 
system, that could be used as a basis for cost based pricing. This system was also 
used to develop a composite index of Trust cost efficiency, (Trust reference cost 
indices), based on the weighted average costs of individual treatments. Under this 
system a Trust with an average level of costs was given a Trust reference cost 
index of 100. Trust reference cost indices of more than 100 represented higher 
costs and lower cost efficiency and vice versa. 
In the early years after its implementation the reference cost system was 
characterised by variations in coding and cost allocation practices which gave rise 
to considerable variation in reported treatment costs between hospitals. However, 
after substantial investment in the improvement of data quality, the Audit 
Commission (2010a) concluded that, of all sectors of the NHS, hospital Trusts had 
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the most sophisticated costing systems and the best quality data. However, for 
mental health and ambulance Trusts, where the roll out of the reference costing 
system occurred much later, data quality issues were more of a concern. Further, 
whilst acknowledging the need to continually work on improving the reference 
costing system, the Department of Health, in response to the data quality concerns 
reported by the Audit Commission also drew attention to the fact that these findings 
were based on survey and interview responses and that the perceptions of data 
quality appeared to be unduly harsh when compared with the results from a detailed 
analysis of the quality of reference costing in sixteen pilot sites (Audit Commission, 
2010b). In reality data quality issues in acute services were concentrated in two 
specific areas: outpatients and non-admitted patient care (Department of Health, 
2010).  
Few studies have been carried out on the subject of reference cost indices 
and, in the main, they conclude that caution should be exercised in the use of 
reference costs for benchmarking. Two interview based studies in three NHS Trusts 
shortly after reference costs were introduced (Jones 2002) and again some years 
later (Guven–Uslu and Conrad, 2008), in which a range of clinicians and managers 
were interviewed, identified scepticism about the value of reference costs for 
benchmarking purposes largely because of concerns about data quality and the lack 
of alignment with measures of service quality. At the level of individual treatments 
(Health Resource Groups) there is no link between reference costs and measures 
of quality. As a consequence, benchmarking against cost alone could lead to an 
erosion of quality.  
Similar issues were also identified by Northcott and Llewellyn (2003) in a 
study of Trust reference cost indices shortly after their introduction in 1998. Between 
1999 and 2000 they observed considerable volatility in Trust reference cost 
rankings which they suggested was partly due to cost allocation and data quality 
issues. Further, they identified concerns over the use of ‘average’ as a benchmark, 
which is not a benchmark for excellence and which may or may not represent an 
acceptable standard of efficiency. Based on a study using critical discourse analysis 
(Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005), they concluded that as a consequence, hospitals 
were becoming more ‘average’ not only in their costs but also in their clinical 
activities. Thus, it was argued that the discourse of ‘excellence’ was being displaced 
by the discourse of ‘the average’. Further, Northcott and Llewellyn, (2005) raise 
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questions as to the ability of benchmarking exercises, such as the Trust reference 
cost index and performance ratings, to promote learning and improve effectiveness. 
Instead, they were viewed as being more likely to prompt a defensive response, 
designed to protect the status quo, for example, by asserting that the costs were 
inaccurate; that the mix of HRGs (Health Resource Groups) was skewed compared 
with national patterns, or that as a centre of excellence, more difficult and more 
expensive cases were treated (Jones,2002). 
However, as predicted by Northcott and Llewellyn (2003) the Government 
remained committed to the development of reference costs and by 2009 the Audit 
Commission (2010), identified an increasing diversity of users and uses of reference 
cost data. Most significantly the Department of Health uses reference costs as a 
basis for the new hospital treatment cost based tariff system, Payment by Results 
(Department of Health, 2002b). Further uses were also identified. Both 
commissioners and providers used the data to support efficiency improvement 
initiatives and for service line reporting and management. The Department of Health 
also uses reference costs for calculating the weighted capitation formula which 
determines the level of funding passed annually to each PCT. Other users include 
academics and the National Office for Statistics which uses reference costs as an 
input to the macro-economic analysis of NHS efficiency (Department of Health, 
2010). Further, the Department of Health, by annually publishing Trust reference 
cost data, has established itself as being at the leading edge of the development 
hospital cost governance metrics. As a consequence there has been international 
interest in the National Reference Costing Exercise (NRCE) from organisations 
such as the World Health Organisation, and the World Bank, and from countries as 
diverse as Albania and the USA (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005). 
3.3.4 Macro-economic studies on the efficiency of the NHS 
Elsewhere, attempts have been made to measure the efficiency of public 
sector services, including the NHS, using macro-economic data. A recent study by 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (Phelps, 2009) reviews the productivity of 
public services over the period from the election of the Labour Government in 1997 
up to 2007. Using a recently developed and experimental index of public sector 
output which included an adjustment for quality, (previously ignored), the ONS finds 
that public sector productivity fell by 3.4% over the 11 year period. This represented 
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an increase in the volume of input required to produce a unit of output of 0.3% per 
annum on average which compares with a figure of 0.4% per annum for health 
services. The higher loss of efficiency in health services was attributed to higher 
labour cost increases throughout much of the period which were offset, to some 
extent, by lower rises in costs elsewhere, as for example in drugs expenditure. 
In an earlier study which focuses only on the NHS, Le Grand (2002a) used 
the Department of Health’s measure of activity, the Cost Weighted Activity Index 
(CWAI), divided by a measure of expenditure adjusted for price changes, for 
hospital and community health services (HCHS) to obtain an index of the units of 
activity per unit of resources, a crude efficiency index. Using this measure Le Grand 
evaluates annual changes in NHS efficiency and concludes that efficiency rose until 
the Labour Government was elected in 1997 but declined in the three years to 2000. 
The focus of both these studies is long term trends in productivity across the 
whole healthcare system. They do not attempt to identify the policy changes which 
may have contributed to such changes in efficiency.  
3.3.5 Summary 
In summary, the literature on hospital efficiency is dominated by studies 
adopting a frontier analysis methodology to obtain measures of cost efficiency and 
to identify the factors influencing it. However, despite continual development of this 
technique, considerable concern remains about the theoretical underpinning for the 
choice of input and output variables and the sensitivity of results to model 
specification. Further, a consideration of service quality in the context of studies 
using frontier analysis techniques has also proved a challenge. As a consequence, 
recent research has adopted a mixed method of frontier analysis and regression 
analysis, where the relationships between variables can be more effectively 
investigated. Two such studies which investigate the relationship between quality 
and cost efficiency, Deily and McKay, (2006) in the US and Ludwig, Van Merode 
and Groot, (2010) in the Netherlands, find a positive relationship. The investigation 
of the relationship between quality and efficiency using frontier techniques has 
further been hampered by the lack of availability of broad based measures of 
hospital quality. As a consequence studies have either resorted to narrow measures 
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of quality such as mortality rates (Deily and McKay, 2006) or broad measures based 
on survey responses (Schwartz et al., 2011; Ludwig, Van Merode and Groot, 2010). 
Studies using frontier analysis to investigate the impact of policy reform on 
efficiency are limited and in the UK these are mostly focused on the internal market 
reforms of the 1990s. Only one study (Cooper, Gibbons, Jones and Macguire, 2010) 
investigates the impact of a post 2000 reform on hospital efficiency. However, this 
study, rather than adopting frontier analysis, uses regression analysis to investigate 
the impact of the Labour Government’s competition reforms introduced in 2006 on 
length of stay for hip replacement patients. There are no studies which investigate 
the impact of the multi-dimensional performance measurement systems introduced 
by the Labour Government from 2002 onwards on NHS hospital efficiency. 
In the accounting literature studies on hospital efficiency have focused on 
the development of costing systems and to the institutional responses to the 
introduction of Trust cost efficiency indices and cost benchmarking. These studies 
have adopted a mix of research paradigms with critical review and interpretive 
approaches being dominant. These studies are narrowly focused on the referencing 
costing system and so do not capture the interaction of incentives associated with a 
wider programme of NPM initiatives. There are no studies which consider the 
relationship between cost efficiency indices and other aspects of performance.  
Finally a much smaller literature investigates trends in efficiency within the 
healthcare sector from a macro-economic perspective. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on hospital cost efficiency in two 
ways: first, by investigating, using regression analysis, the relationship between cost 
efficiency and service standards in English NHS hospitals in the period from 2003-
2008 and, second, by investigating the relative effectiveness of two performance 
measurement systems, the Star ratings and the Annual Health Check, in 
incentivising cost efficiency as a means of improving service standards. 
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3.4 MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The literature on multi-dimensional performance measurement is both 
extensive, multidisciplinary and covers both public and private sectors. This section, 
which reviews this literature, focuses on studies in the accounting and economics 
domains, and is organised as follows. First, formal analytical studies of multi- 
dimensional performance measurement (section 3.4.2) are considered. This is 
followed by a review of normative studies, particularly focusing on the balanced 
scorecard (section 3.4.3). Next, in section 3.4.4, the very large private sector 
literature which investigates the performance impact of nonfinancial measures and 
the balanced scorecard is reviewed. Section 3.4.5 proceeds by considering a 
number of critical studies which challenge the underlying assumptions of the 
balanced scorecard model and offer a partial explanation for the mixed findings from 
the empirical literature. Then, in section 3.4.6, a summary of this largely private 
sector based research is provided. Finally, public sector research into multi-
dimensional performance measurement systems is reviewed and summarised in 
sections 3.4.7 and 3.4.8. 
3.4.2 Formal analytical studies  
Formal analytical studies of multi-dimensional performance measurement 
systems, which are drawn from the economics literature, adopt an agency 
perspective of multi-dimensional performance measurement and are sector neutral, 
being applicable to both public and private sector settings. 
The limitations of financial measures for inducing managerial effort in the 
interests of principals are well documented. Financial measures are generally 
backward looking, do not capture aspects of performance of interest to principals, 
and can become divorced from an entities’ strategic priorities. Proponents of the 
strategic performance management models, such as the balanced scorecard 
(Kaplan and Norton,1992, 1996a) argue that increased measurement diversity, in 
which both financial and nonfinancial measures feature, leads to better performance 
by reducing the potential for managers to neglect unmeasured activities and to trade 
one aspect of performance for another (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). These 
notions have been supported by analytical research founded in principal-agent 
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theory which has focused on the alignment of managerial incentives mainly in terms 
of reward systems. Holmstrom (1979), Banker and Datar (1989) and Feltham and 
Xie (1994) show that more (costless) measures are preferred if the additional 
measures provide incremental information about managerial activities of interest to 
the principal. Holmstrom (1979), however, observes that imperfect information on 
managerial actions is used extensively in practice to alleviate moral hazard and 
shows that any additional information, however imperfect, can be used to improve 
the welfare of both principal and agent. Concentrating on the role of management 
accountants in formulating performance measures Banker and Datar (1989) further 
identify a large class of situations under which linear aggregation, a simple and 
commonly used means of constructing performance measures, is optimal. They 
conclude that divisional performance evaluation on the basis of a profit measure 
alone will rarely be optimal. Feltham and Xie (1994) extend this analysis into a 
multitask environment and conclude that a diverse set of measures will be beneficial 
when an additional measure reduces either risk or non-congruity. These studies 
place their research largely in the context of reward systems which incorporate 
strong performance incentives. Although such contracts are rare in the public sector 
the introduction of NPM quasi-market modes of governance, with their emphasis on 
contracting and extrinsic managerial incentives, has led to an increasing 
accentuation of the agency aspects of relationships, notably in the UK. Further, 
despite the emphasis on the private sector in agency based accounting studies, the 
agency literature is not sector or entity specific in its application.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.5) define an agency relationship in very 
general terms as ‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent’. They point out 
that agency relationships, in which a utility maximising agent may not always act in 
the interest of the principal(s), exist in all types of organisation, not only private 
sector for profit entities but also in government organisations, mutuals and 
cooperatives and at all levels of management. The ‘problem’ of inducing an agent to 
behave in the principal’s interest, by the establishment of appropriate incentives and 
by the incurrence of monitoring costs, is thus a general one. A number of important 
contributions to the analytical and empirical investigation of performance 
measurement systems in public organisations using a principal-agent framework 
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have been made by Courty and Marschke who use data from a large scale job 
training programme in the US to investigate a number of research questions of 
interest in both the public sector and wider performance measurement literature 
(Courty and Marschke, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2007 and 2008). The use of 
performance measures was mandated in the federally funded agencies of the JTPA 
(Job Training Partnership Act)8 and they were often published and linked to 
managerial payment (Propper and Wilson, 2003).  
In a review of the principal agent multi-tasking literature, Courty and 
Marschke, (2003b) conclude that one of the main challenges in using performance 
measures is to manage gaming. They proceed to develop an evolutionary model of 
PMS design as gaming is revealed over time. This model suggests that because the 
gameability of a performance measure cannot be observed ex ante, the only way to 
identify a good performance measure is through experimentation. Courty and 
Marschke supplement their analysis by drawing on empirical evidence from the 
JTPA programme and observe that the performance measurement system had 
been updated several times over a period of over 20 years. This theme was further 
developed in a review of the evolution and development of performance 
measurement within the JTPA programme (Courty and Marschke, 2007) where they 
argue that in the public sector, which is characterised by objectives which are 
multidimensional and often not well defined, PMS designers cannot expect to 
anticipate all responses because local managers gain a superior understanding of 
how to influence the measures as they become accustomed to them. However, 
using the experience of the JTPA programme, they argue that the designers of 
government performance measures are capable of detecting how they are 
misaligned with programme objectives and taking remedial action. Gaming 
strategies need not therefore persist and, as system designers gain experience, 
performance measures may become more aligned with organisational objectives. 
This theme of continual review and constant renewal of performance measurement 
system design can be observed in many public sector systems. In the NHS, for 
instance, the Star ratings system was introduced to remedy the failures of past 
systems to address the trading off of service standards to achieve financial 
                                               
8
 The Job Training Partnership Act (1982) was a US federal law enacted to establish federal 
training programmes for the young and unskilled to facilitate their entry into the labour 
market.   
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breakeven, a key measure of public accountability. This resulted, inter alia, in 
extended waiting times for treatment. The potential for manipulation of the Star 
ratings was in turn the subject of criticism (Bevan and Hood, 2006) and the system 
was replaced in 2006 by the Annual Health Check which incorporated features, 
such as greater measurement diversity, to mitigate the sources of manipulation that 
had been identified. 
A further issue which Courty and Marschke investigated was the question as 
to whether the incidence of gaming responses aimed at maximising incentive 
awards affected organisational efficiency. They found (Courty and Marschke, 2004) 
first, that JTPA training agencies timed the reporting of trainees’ performance 
outcomes in order to maximize incentive awards and second, through formal and 
empirical testing, found that these timing responses lowered the effectiveness of job 
training and gave rise to an adverse impact on organisational goals. They further 
demonstrate both formally and empirically that the existence of distortions in 
performance measures, which elicit gaming responses, can be identified by 
estimating how the association between a performance measure and the true goal 
of the organisation changes with the activation of the measure (Courty and 
Marschke, 2008). 
As Courty, Heinrich and Marschke (2005) observe, the use of performance 
measurement systems and incentives in public sector programs has been a key 
component of ‘reinventing Government’ in the US and New Public Management 
initiatives in Europe and Australasia. In the UK, such initiatives have been driven by 
concerns about both performance and accountability and have resulted in 
accountability and governance structures which have been adapted from private 
sector best practice. This approach has served to accentuate the agency aspects of 
relationships amongst UK public sector organisations, with a much greater 
emphasis on performance monitoring and the development of stronger incentive 
frameworks. This developing institutional setting has thus opened up opportunities 
for the adoption of a positivist research paradigm and an agency based framework 
of analysis to investigate questions relating to the performance impact of multi-
dimensional performance measurement systems in the public sector.  
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3.4.3 Normative studies and the balanced scorecard 
The development of normative models for multi-dimensional performance 
measurement, particularly the balanced scorecard (BSC), which were initially 
designed for private sector application and later adapted to a public sector setting, 
are considered in this section.  
Alongside the theoretical analysis of performance measurement a number of 
normative multi-dimensional performance measurement models, often aimed at the 
practitioner community, were also developed. These models, by incorporating a 
range of non-financial performance indicators in a normative framework, attempt to 
address the well-documented limitations of over-reliance on financial performance 
as a basis for performance evaluation, (Hopwood, 1972; Argyris, 1977; Otley, 
2008). They include the Performance Prism, (Neely, Adams and Kennerley, 2002), 
the Performance Pyramid, (Lynch and Cross, 1991), the Business Excellence 
Model, (Kanji, 1998) and most notably the Balanced Scorecard, (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992).  
The Balanced Scorecard model aims to embed an organisation’s choice of 
performance measures within the context of its strategic objectives and long term 
goals. The traditional balanced scorecard model comprises a number of measures 
in each of four key perspectives: customers, internal processes, learning and growth 
and financial performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a). The underlying 
premise is that the translation of strategy into specific objectives and measures 
linked in a causal chain of leading and lagging indicators in the four key 
perspectives leads to improved economic performance, measured either by 
accounting measures of performance, such as return on assets, or market based 
measures of performance, such as change in market value. Normative models such 
as the balanced scorecard draw on contingency theory with the choice of measures 
being influenced by the firm’s strategy, competitive environment and its internal 
resources and competencies. The balanced scorecard thus says little about the 
number or identity of the measures, the weightings that should be applied or the 
timescale for monitoring purposes. Ittner and Larcker (2003) suggest that this 
silence may pose problems for practitioners attempting to apply the balanced 
scorecard in their own organisations and that this may offer a partial explanation for 
some of the perceived failures of the model. Other, more fundamental questions 
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about the balanced scorecard model have however been raised in a number of 
critical studies. These are considered in section 3.4.5, after a review of the literature 
which examines the empirical question of the performance impact of nonfinancial 
measures in section 3.4.4 below. 
3.4.4 Empirical studies on the performance impact of nonfinancial measures 
in the private sector 
A large accounting literature exists which investigates the performance 
impact of nonfinancial measures in the private sector. This literature is reviewed in 
this section and is further categorised into survey based studies using self-reported 
measures of performance, cross sectional studies using measures of actual 
economic performance and quasi experimental studies also using actual economic 
performance. Actual economic performance in these latter studies has been 
measured either in terms of accounting measures such as return on assets and, if a 
quoted company, in terms of market value. 
The Balanced Scorecard was originally developed for the for profit private 
sector. Although increasingly adopted in not for profit and public sector settings, 
(see section 3.4.7.3), empirical archival research into the performance impact of the 
balanced scorecard, and more generally the use of nonfinancial measures, has 
taken place almost exclusively in the for profit sector.  
In a review of empirical studies which test the association between the use 
of nonfinancial measures and economic performance Ittner (2008) identifies three 
strands of research. The first strand comprises large scale cross-sectional studies 
which investigate whether greater use of nonfinancial measures is associated with 
better economic performance. In this category two further subcategories are 
identified: studies using survey respondents self-assessment of performance and 
the second using actual measures of performance such as accounting or stock 
returns. The second strand of studies comprises quasi experimental company level 
studies examining whether performance improves after the introduction of 
nonfinancial measures. A further, more limited and recent, strand of literature tests a 
key assumption of the balanced scorecard model, that of cause and effect linkages 
between performance measures. 
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3.4.4.1 Survey based cross sectional studies using self-reported measures of 
performance 
Ittner (2008) identifies that the majority of cross sectional studies support the 
hypothesis that the use of nonfinancial measures is associated with better 
performance. However the strength of the statistical relationship declines with the 
sophistication of the research design. Those studies which report the highest 
positive association are those which investigate self-reported performance rather 
than actual performance, as in Hall (2008) and Hoque and James (2000). This 
difference between perception and actual performance, also identified in Braam and 
Nijssen’s (2004) investigation of the impact of the balanced scorecard in Dutch 
firms, raises questions about the quality of perceptual outcomes as indicators of 
actual economic outcomes. A partial explanation for the different results could be 
the well documented limitations of survey responses which are associated with 
common method bias (arising from the tendency of respondents to answer 
questions in a similar way) and the crude nature of categorical scales which leaves 
considerable scope for interpretation by respondents (Ittner, 2008).  
3.4.4.2 Cross sectional studies using actual economic performance 
Cross sectional studies using actual economic performance are fewer than 
those using perceptual outcomes. Recent studies include Ittner, Larcker and 
Randall, (2003) and Said, HassabElnaby and Wier (2003).  
In an investigation of 140 financial services firms, Ittner Larcker and Randall 
(2003) investigated the association between measurement diversity and financial 
performance. The answers to survey questions were used to obtain three measures 
of measurement diversity: overall measurement diversity, financial measurement 
focus and non-financial measurement focus. Responses on ten performance 
categories were obtained: short term financial results (e.g., annual earnings, return 
on assets, cost reduction); customer relations (e.g., market share, customer 
satisfaction, customer retention); employee relations (e.g., employee satisfaction, 
turnover, workforce capabilities); operational performance (e.g., productivity, safety, 
cycle time); quality (e.g., defect rates, quality awards); alliances (e.g., joint 
marketing or product design, joint ventures); supplier relations (e.g., on-time 
delivery, input into product/service design); environmental performance (e.g., 
government citations, environmental compliance or certification); innovation (e.g., 
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new product or service development success, development cycle time) and 
community (e.g., public image, community involvement). Each performance 
category was scored by survey respondents on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high) against 
a number of criteria: importance to long term success; extent to which goals were 
set for each performance category; measurement quality; and finally the extent to 
which measures in each category were used for (a) problem identification, (b) 
capital investment decisions, (c) performance evaluation and (d) external disclosure. 
Financial focus was measured by the values assigned to short-term financial results 
and non-financial focus by the average values assigned to the remaining nine 
performance categories. For the purposes of investigating the impact of 
measurement diversity on actual performance the scores for the extent to which the 
performance category was used for performance evaluation and decision making, 
had goals set and had high measurement quality, (i.e. all criteria except importance 
to long term success), were averaged. Overall measurement diversity was then 
determined as being the average score for all 10 performance categories; financial 
measurement focus was determined as being the average score for short-term 
financial results and non-financial measurement focus was determined as being the 
average score for measures related to the nine nonfinancial performance 
categories. To investigate the association between actual economic performance 
and measurement diversity four measures of actual economic performance were 
used: return on assets, sales growth, one year stock returns and three year stock 
returns. Using these measures, Ittner, Larcker and Randall found that overall 
measurement diversity and nonfinancial measurement focus had a positive 
association with one year stock returns. However there was no association between 
these measures and accounting returns or with three year stock returns. Similarly 
there was no association between financial measurement focus and any of 
accounting or stock return variables. 
Said, HassabElnaby and Wier (2003) investigated the impact on 
performance when nonfinancial performance was incentivised through the inclusion 
of nonfinancial measures in performance contracts. Performance was measured as 
both return on assets and stock performance whereas a categorical variable of 0 or 
1 was used to identify firms which used nonfinancial measures. A matched sample 
of firms was then constructed using industry, size and return on assets as matching 
criteria. They found that the use of nonfinancial measures was associated with 
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contemporaneous and future stock returns and with future accounting performance, 
but not with contemporaneous accounting performance. 
Mixed findings have also been found in earlier studies which investigate the 
relationship between customer satisfaction measures and financial performance. In 
an investigation of 73 US retail bank branches Ittner and Larcker (1998b) found 
support for a positive association between financial accounting measures and a 
number of measures of customer satisfaction. Financial performance in this study 
was measured as business unit revenues, expenses, margin (revenue minus 
expenses) and return on sales (margin/sales). A positive association was observed 
for revenues, margin and return on sales but not for expenses 
3.4.4.3 Quasi experimental studies 
Quasi experimental studies, in contrast with cross sectional studies, trade 
generalisability for a more tractable research setting. In a study of eighteen hotels in 
a hotel chain, using monthly data over a period of seventy two months, Banker 
Potter and Srinivasan (2000) investigated whether, consistent with the normative 
balanced scorecard model, customer satisfaction measures were leading indicators 
of financial performance. Customer satisfaction was measured in two ways: 
complaints and the likelihood of return, based on customer responses on customer 
feedback forms. Financial performance was measured as revenue, costs and 
operating profit. Customer satisfaction was found to be positively associated with 
future revenue and profit but, consistent with Ittner and Larcker (1998b), not with 
costs. The lead time on the improvement was identified as being six months. 
However, as with Ittner, Larcker and Randall’s (2003) choice of a single industry, 
the choice here of a single parent organisation resulted in a more homogeneous 
sample than multi-industry studies, mitigating the need, for example, to control for 
variations in incentive system, organisation structure, clientele and infrastructure. A 
limitation of this study was however the absence of a control group. The study relied 
instead on alternative control measures in the form of comparative data from 
competitor organisations, for example, an industry collected benchmark of average 
revenues per available room in the same location. The authors also acknowledged 
the essential arbitrariness and thus noisiness of the customer satisfaction scores. A 
second investigation in this study also found that the inclusion of nonfinancial 
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measures in managerial incentive contracts improved performance both on those 
measures and on revenues and profits. 
In a second, more recent quasi experimental study, Davis and Albright 
(2004) compared the performance of four bank branches implementing a balanced 
scorecard with five control branches which did not implement a balanced scorecard. 
The measure of performance used in the study was a composite measure of 
financial performance based on nine key measures determined by bank strategists 
and BSC designers and which was linked to a bonus system. Comparing 
performance in one complete period prior to implementation and one complete 
period post implementation, they found that the performance of the implementers 
improved after implementation and that it improved more than non-implementers. 
The limitations of this study included the small sample size, the use only of non-
parametric statistics and the limited generalisability of the results. 
3.4.4.4 Summary of empirical studies on the performance impact of nonfinancial 
measures in the private sector 
In summary, empirical private sector studies into the performance impact of 
nonfinancial measures have faced considerable research design challenges. In 
order to develop our understanding of these relationships a variety of innovative 
research designs characterised by increasing sophistication have been adopted. 
Not surprisingly the findings from such studies are mixed and although generally 
supporting a positive relationship between the use of nonfinancial measures and 
economic performance, the more sophisticated research designs deliver weaker 
results. Further, the results for the association between accounting performance 
and nonfinancial measures are generally weaker than for stock market 
performance. These results highlight that our understanding of these relationships 
needs further development.  
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3.4.4.5 Empirical studies examining the assumption of causal linkages between 
financial and nonfinancial measures 
One of the underpinning assumptions of the original balanced scorecard 
model (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) was that improved economic9 performance 
follows from the incorporation of nonfinancial measures into performance 
measurement systems. This ‘cause and effect’ relationship became further 
consolidated into the model as it developed from a performance measurement 
system into a strategic management tool in which performance measures are 
embedded in the firm’s strategy through the modelling of cause and effect linkages 
amongst key performance indicators. This process became known as ‘strategy 
mapping’ (Kaplan and Norton, 2000). Failures in implementation of the balanced 
scorecard, by for example not giving sufficient attention to the task of causal 
mapping, were identified by Ittner and Larcker (2003) as giving rise to perceived 
failures in the BSC itself. However, although a large literature tests the association 
between financial and nonfinancial measures few studies go so far as to test 
whether a causal model was established or whether there were causal links 
between selected measures. In their study of financial services firms Ittner, Larcker 
and Randall (2003) use a survey instrument to investigate whether use of causal 
modelling as recommended by Kaplan and Norton (1996a) is positively associated 
with economic performance and found that it is not. Smith and Wright (2004), on the 
other hand, using path analysis to test an integrated causal model of performance in 
the US PC industry, find a positive association between customer loyalty and, 
through a chain of linkages, financial performance. First, customer loyalty was found 
to be positively associated with product price and sales growth, and in turn 
customer loyalty and sales growth were positively associated with return on assets. 
In contrast, Malina, Nørreklit and Selto (2008) using Granger causality analysis 
found only limited support for causal relationships between measures in a Fortune 
500 company’s balanced scorecard.  
In summary, studies which investigate causal linkages between different 
aspects of performance have generated mixed findings. These findings are 
consistent with a developing strand of critical literature which challenges the 
                                               
9
 Economic performance is defined, consistent with previous usage in this thesis, as being 
accounting performance, such as return on assets, or stock market performance. 
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underpinning assumptions and theoretical grounding of the balanced scorecard 
model. This literature is considered in the next section. 
3.4.5 Critical studies of the balanced scorecard model. 
Ittner and Larcker (2003) offer an explanation for the mixed findings of 
empirical studies which investigate the performance impact of the balanced 
scorecard by arguing that perceived failures in the model are the result, not of the 
failures in the model itself but of users failures to engage sufficiently with the 
disciplines it imposes, particularly that of strategy mapping. However, a number of 
studies have challenged this explanation by challenging the model itself and its 
theoretical underpinning. 
In an early review of performance measurement research Ittner and Larcker 
(1998a) identify that our understanding of the notion of ‘balance’ in performance 
measurement, and particularly the balanced scorecard, is limited. They argue that 
there is not only a need to define more precisely the concept of ‘balance’ but also a 
need to understand better the ways in which ‘balance’ promotes performance. They 
note that a common view is that ‘balance’ is achieved through measurement 
diversity, as promoted for example by Kaplan and Norton (1992). Multiple measures 
in each of the domains of financial performance, customer related performance, 
internal business processes and learning and growth, it is argued, minimises the 
risk that valuable information relating to business performance is overlooked or lost. 
They further suggest that future research could provide additional insights into the 
concept of balance, by for example, shedding light on whether a wide selection of 
diverse measures or a smaller set of more reliable measures with greater predictive 
capability best promotes improved business outcomes. Ittner and Larcker (1998a) 
further note that the increased use of nonfinancial as well as financial measures 
exacerbates the problem of trade-offs, whereby actions taken to improve one 
measure may lead to short term declines in other performance measures. They 
argue that this creates a challenge for the retention of ‘balance’ in managerial 
actions and performance evaluation and conclude that additional research is 
needed on the inevitable trade-offs that managers make among financial and 
nonfinancial measures. 
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The issue of lack of precision, not only in the definition of ‘balance’, but also 
for example in isolating lead and lag relationships, is also raised by Nørreklit, 
Jacobsen and Mitchell (2008) in a critical review of the BSC. Further, in contrast to 
Ittner and Larcker, (2003), Nørreklit (2000, 2003) and Nørreklit, Jacobsen and 
Mitchell (2008), offer an explanation for mixed empirical findings, not by arguing that 
this is a consequence of users’ failures to engage with the model, but challenging its 
theoretical basis. Nørreklit (2000) for example argues that the assumption of 
causality which underpins the model is flawed and not logical. She points out, by 
way of illustration, that customer loyalty does not necessarily lead to better financial 
performance if retained customers are those which are essentially unprofitable. In 
her subsequent paper, (Nørreklit, 2003), she goes on to argue that the theoretical 
underpinning of the BSC is weak and that its popularity owes much to the use of 
persuasive rhetorical devices characteristic of the consulting industry rather than the 
result of sound argument borne out of a strong theoretical framework. Nørreklit 
uses, as a basis for her analysis, Chapter 1 of Kaplan and Norton’s (1996b) text, 
‘The Balanced Scorecard’. Whilst acknowledging the academic credentials of the 
balanced scorecard, for which Kaplan won the 1997 American Accounting 
Association’s award for best theoretical contribution, she also draws attention to the 
extensive use of analogies and metaphors and the use of emotive and loaded 
language. Nørreklit is particularly critical of the ‘company-as-machine’ analogy 
which Kaplan and Norton adopt when they liken a company to a jet aircraft and the 
CEO as its pilot. These analogies, she argues, oversimplify the task of managers, 
who are often operating in complex competitive environments, by reducing it to the 
need to press buttons and pull levers to achieve desired outcomes. This mechanical 
analogy, with references back to physical science, also underpins the cause and 
effect relationships which form the basis for the balanced scorecard, creating an 
illusion of scientific validity without providing solid evidence that such cause and 
effect relationships exist. Nørreklit also refers to the technique of contrasting the old 
(bad) with the new (good). So the old ways of measuring performance are bad, and 
the balanced scorecard which is new, is good. The balanced scorecard is 
associated with the new information age as compared with the old industrial age. 
‘Old’ methods of performance measurement, using ‘an accounting model developed 
centuries ago’, contain the ‘seeds of destruction’ whereas the balanced scorecard is 
‘innovative and new’ and recognises the value of intangible assets. Nørreklit 
concludes that, as a consequence of these rhetorical devices, the balanced 
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scorecard concept is open to interpretation, intuition and emotions, and is more akin 
to propaganda and the management guru genre than reasoned academic 
argument.  
The absence of a theoretical underpinning for the balanced scorecard was 
also identified in Bessire and Baker’s (2005) critical comparison of the BSC as 
compared with the much older French Tableau de Bord. Using a constructivist 
perspective they argued that this lack of theoretical foundation arises from an 
ambiguous and confused understanding of the political dimension of management 
control. 
3.4.6 Summary of findings from the literature on performance measurement 
in the for profit sector 
In summary the findings from empirical investigations in the for profit sector 
do offer support for the notion that nonfinancial measures improve economic 
performance, measured in terms of both accounting and stock performance. 
However, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the findings do not paint a consistent 
picture. Possible reasons for these mixed findings include the absence of a sound 
theoretical underpinning; variations in research design; the absence of a cause and 
effect relationship between financial and nonfinancial measures (Nørreklit, 2000, 
2003) and poor implementation and understanding of the balanced scorecard model 
(Ittner and Larcker, 2003). 
3.4.7 Multi-dimensional performance measurement systems in the public 
sector 
Again the literature in this section is drawn from both the accounting and 
economics domains. As identified by Goddard (2010) public sector accounting 
studies, including those whose research focus is the NHS, are dominated by critical 
commentary and interpretive studies. In contrast, economics based studies are 
generally empirical archival studies. The focus of these studies is however largely 
restricted to the identification of the gaming and manipulation of performance 
measurement systems. Both these streams of public sector research are reviewed. 
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3.4.7.1 Introduction 
Notwithstanding our limited understanding of their performance impact, and 
despite being designed for application in the private sector, balanced scorecard 
inspired performance measurement systems have been increasingly applied in 
public sector and non-profit organisations. Kaplan (2001) essentially promoted a 
New Public Management type argument that non-profit organisations should mimic 
private sector management techniques in order to improve their performance. Whilst 
acknowledging that the financial perspective for non-profits acts as a constraint 
rather than a primary objective, Kaplan (2001), using case study examples to 
illustrate his arguments, proposed adaptations to the standard balanced scorecard 
model to fit the non-profit setting. Such adaptations included the positioning of the 
organisation’s mission as the primary objective with elevation of the ‘customer’ 
perspective and the reduction in influence of the financial perspective. The need for 
financial viability and cost efficiency as factors enabling the achievement of non-
profit objectives were identified as key factors informing the choice of measures in 
the financial perspective. A further adaptation was the interpretation of ‘customer’, 
which, in a non-profit setting was seen to have two dimensions: clients for the 
organisation’s services and funders. He concludes by arguing that the balanced 
scorecard offers a strategy alignment tool that enables managers ‘to align initiatives, 
departments and individuals to work in ways that reinforce each other so that 
dramatic performance improvements can be achieved.’ Kaplan (2001) is essentially 
a normative contribution to the literature and no empirical evidence is provided to 
support the author’s assertions.  
The empirical literature investigating the impact of performance 
measurement in the public sector is more limited. A partial explanation for the 
absence of studies investigating the relationship between nonfinancial and financial 
measures, including cost efficiency, may be the challenges of research design in a 
setting where financial performance cannot be assumed to be the primary objective 
but, as Kaplan observed, is generally regarded as a constraint. Instead, studies 
whose research focus is the public sector concentrate on the dysfunctional 
consequences of performance measurement and are mainly to be found in the 
economics, rather than the accounting, literature. (Smith 1995; Propper and Wilson, 
2003; Courty and Marschke, 2004; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Kelman and Friedman, 
2009; Propper, Sutton, Whitnall and Windjmeier, 2010). These studies are largely 
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empirical archival investigations with the UK healthcare sector as the research 
focus. Exceptions are: Courty and Marschke (2004), in which the research focus is 
the US JTPA10 programme, and Propper and Wilson (2003), which reviews the use 
and usefulness of performance measurement in both the UK and the US.  
In the accounting literature, in contrast, the investigation of the application of 
performance measurement systems in the public sector is dominated by interpretive 
and case study analyses (Goddard, 2010). In their second review of ‘alternative’ 
public sector accounting research covering the period 1992-2006, Broadbent and 
Guthrie (2008) identified 38 papers out of a total sample of 452 on the topic of 
accountability, which included performance measurement and management, and 
governance. They observe that papers on performance measurement and 
management cover two main themes: the issue of whether organisations do what is 
expected of them and whether the systems imposed help to make transparent or 
obscure managerial action. Goddard’s (2010) review, in contrast with Broadbent 
and Guthrie’s (2008), included US journals and papers adopting a functionalist 
paradigm. He found that in the period from 2005 to 2007 the proportion of papers on 
performance management alone amounted to 10.6% of the sample of 188 papers, 
and accountability and governance accounted for a further 12.2%. However, despite 
the inclusion of US journals only 8 papers (4.3%), out of the total sample of 188, 
employed an empirical archival method as compared with 25% using interviews, 
37% surveys and 10% case studies. Further, as has been previously identified in 
Section 3.2, on NPM and public sector accounting research, 95% of US papers 
adopted a functionalist paradigm as compared with 35% of papers from the rest of 
the world whilst, in contrast, only 8% of US studies were on the topics of 
accountability and performance management, as compared with 41% for the rest of 
the world. These statistics highlight the bias towards qualitative research in 
performance measurement and management. 
The remainder of this section focuses on studies in the healthcare sector 
particularly the NHS and proceeds as follows. First, empirical studies on 
performance measurement in the NHS drawn from the economics literature are 
reviewed. Second, interpretive studies on performance measurement in the NHS 
                                               
10
 Job Training Partnership Act 
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drawn from the public sector accounting literature are considered and finally, 
empirical studies in healthcare, including US based investigations, are reviewed.  
3.4.7.2 Economics based studies on performance measurement in the NHS 
In the economics literature investigations have focused on gaming 
responses to performance measurement. Evidence of gaming is found in both 
Bevan and Hood (2006) but both Kelman and Friedman (2009) and Propper, 
Sutton, Whitnall & Windjmeier, (2010), using more sophisticated statistical 
techniques, question whether the extent of gaming within the system leads to 
significant welfare losses. 
Bevan and Hood (2006) in an interpretive review of performance 
measurement within the NHS argue that problems of both measurement and 
gaming were largely ignored in the Government’s performance rating system for the 
NHS. By using limited data and some basic statistical analysis they provide prima 
facie evidence to support their argument that this was unjustified and that little 
reliance could be placed on improvements in reported performance. They cite, for 
example, references to ambulances waiting outside hospitals to reduce accident 
and emergency reported wait times and the use of trolleys as ‘beds’ to reduce 
emergency admission times. They go on to recommend improvements in the design 
of the system to reduce the incidence of gaming and conclude that the UK 
Government’s performance rating system11, consistent with Courty and Marschke’s 
(2003) dynamic and evolutionary model of performance measurement system 
design, was an example of the Government ‘learning by doing’. Overall, Bevan and 
Hood’s review, although persuasive, was largely interpretive in its approach with 
only elementary statistical analysis to support the interpretation and conclusions. 
The persuasiveness of the paper however may be attributable in part to the use of 
rhetoric, including the generation of a sense of drama and excitement, and the use 
of metaphors and analogies, as identified in Nørreklit’s (2003) review of the 
balanced scorecard. The authors for example liken the Star ratings to the Soviet 
system of ‘targets and terror’ and use words such as ‘heroic’ ‘dramatic’ and ‘groan’ 
for example as in: 
                                               
11
 This system was known as the Star rating system, being based on a categorical 
assessment of performance ranked on a scale of zero to three stars. 
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a) ‘…governance by targets requires two sets of heroic assumptions..’ (p.533) 
b) ‘…there were indeed dramatic improvements in reported performance…’ 
(p.533) 
c) ‘…English health care system, in particular, groan(s) under regulation and 
audit’. (p.534) 
In contrast, Kelman and Friedman (2009), in a statistical investigation of the 
impact of the accident and emergency waiting target in NHS acute hospital trusts 
found no evidence of gaming in the form of resource transfer (effort substitution) 
from unmeasured activities (in the form of resources from the orthopaedics 
department), and no evidence of a reduction in quality of care, (measured by death 
rates and re-admissions). Rather they find an improvement in care. They suggest 
two reasons for their findings: first, that complementarities exist such that process 
improvements to achieve access targets (waiting times for treatment) serve to 
improve overall hospital efficiency and so benefit other areas of clinical care and 
second, that negative feedback about gaming, from colleagues or from external 
stakeholders, could result in gaming being self-limiting. They go on to discuss 
possible managerial responses to limit the impact of dysfunctional responses: the 
inclusion of additional measures, adaptation of measures and, lastly, cultivation of 
the public service ethic amongst employees. Kelman and Friedman (2009) noted, 
for example, that resource transfer from orthopaedics to accident and emergency 
may not have been observed in their investigation because inpatient waits, for which 
orthopaedics was a key driver, were also subject to measurement. However, even if 
dysfunctional responses do occur, Kelman and Friedman argue that this does not of 
itself mean that the system fails to improve overall organisational performance. The 
appropriate comparison they argue is not between a PMS without dysfunctional 
responses and one with dysfunctional responses but between a PMS with 
dysfunctional responses and no PMS. Similarly, this could be extended to a 
comparison between two PMS, one with more dysfunctionality and one with less 
dysfunctionality. They conclude that, when presented with evidence of dysfunctional 
responses to performance measurement, abandonment of the PMS would not be an 
appropriate policy response.  
This theme is further developed in Propper, Sutton, Whitnall & Windjmeier, 
(2010) who argue on the one hand that a weak incentive framework and multiple 
objectives allow managers to game performance targets but on the other hand, that 
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high profile targets, increased monitoring and publication of performance may be 
beneficial. High profile targets can act as missions around which employees 
coalesce and links to rewards can reduce the amount of effort devoted to tasks 
which employees value but which do little to improve social welfare. Further, as a 
result of inherent inefficiencies in the public sector, arising from multiple objectives 
and weak incentives, targets, particularly those which are focused on activities 
widely perceived as in need of improvement, can act to improve measured 
outcomes without diversion of activity or gaming. The authors then use difference in 
difference analysis to conduct a natural experiment which compares waiting times 
for treatment in English hospitals, where a performance measurement regime was 
in force, with those from Scottish hospitals, where there were no targets, to 
establish whether targets achieved their objective. They found that waiting times for 
treatment were significantly reduced, that there was no evidence of resource 
transfer from other activities and that quality of care was not eroded. Indeed, as in 
the case of Kelman and Friedman (2009) they found that the quality of care, 
measured by 30 day mortality rates, emergency readmissions and acute myocardial 
infarction, improved after the introduction of waiting targets. As with Kelman and 
Friedman they deduced that the process improvements necessitated by target 
achievement served to improve overall efficiency and had beneficial effects 
elsewhere. Some evidence of waiting list manipulation was detected but there was 
no evidence of welfare loss associated with this form of gaming. The authors did 
however acknowledge the limitations of their measures of quality of care and 
identified that these only related to patients who were actually treated.  
The beneficial effects of performance measurement were also explored in 
another study which exploited the different regimes in England and Wales. Hauck 
and Street (2006) used four hospital Trusts serving both English and Welsh 
patients, three in England and one in Wales, to investigate the relative impact of the 
performance measurement regime in England on patient experience over the period 
of 1998-2004. Whilst acknowledging that factors other than the performance 
measurement regime may explain their results, they found that the English hospitals 
recorded increased levels of activity, undertook proportionately more day case 
treatment, and mortality rates fell. In Wales, in contrast, activity levels remained 
constant, the proportion of day case activity fell, proportionately more non-elective 
patients were admitted, and mortality rates rose. There was also partial evidence 
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that English patients faced lower waiting times than their Welsh counterparts and 
were more likely to be admitted within a target waiting period. 
In summary, although prima facie evidence for the existence of manipulation 
and gaming exists in relation to the performance measurement systems applied to 
NHS hospitals, empirical archival studies provide evidence that such dysfunctional 
responses were not statistically significant across the whole population of hospital 
Trusts. Further, these empirical studies provide evidence that performance 
measures, based on waiting times, led to improvements in quality of care. 
3.4.7.3  Performance measurement studies drawn from the public sector 
accounting literature 
In contrast with the economics literature, the accounting literature has 
predominantly focused on interpretive and case study analyses of the 
implementation of multi-dimensional performance measurement systems, 
particularly those inspired by the balanced scorecard. By far the most dominant 
theoretical framework in the public sector accounting literature on performance 
measurement and management is institutional theory (Modell, 2009). Of twenty 
eight studies reviewed by Modell (2009), the research focus of three was healthcare 
and one of these (Chang, 2006) was set in the UK. This paper responded to the call 
from Brignall and Modell (2000) for more public sector performance measurement 
studies to adopt an institutional framework of analysis. Institutional theory, they 
argued, had been neglected within a large body of literature which focused on 
system design rather than system implementation and so typically ignored issues of 
institutional and political processes. They characterise managers’ primary 
motivation for performance measurement as being legitimacy seeking rather than 
efficiency maximisation and argue that a framework grounded in institutional theory 
would facilitate a consideration of the dynamic interplay between funders, 
professionals and client groups. Developing this theme further Chang (2007, 2009) 
in two further studies concludes that performance measurement in health 
authorities, which commission rather than deliver health services, is used for 
legitimacy seeking purposes rather than as a strategic management tool (Chang, 
2009) and that Kaplan and Norton’s claim that the balanced scorecard model can 
be adapted for strategic management in the public sector fails to give sufficient 
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weight to the political context in which public sector organisations operate (Chang, 
2007).  
An alternative theoretical framework for interpreting the application of the 
balanced scorecard in a hospital setting was adopted by Aidemark (2001). In a case 
study investigation of Swedish hospitals Aidemark (2001) considers the meaning of 
a balanced scorecard (BSC) in a hospital setting by investigating the introduction of 
BSC systems in the hospitals of Jonkoping County Council. Using interviews and 
internal document analysis Aidemark examined the balanced scorecard 
implementation from the perspective of Ouchi’s (1979 and 1980) markets, 
hierarchies and clan modes of governance. Scorecards were introduced in 
Jonkoping County Council in response to concerns over funding and the wish by 
clinicians to reassert patient needs within the performance measurement regime 
which had historically focused on financial performance to the detriment of other 
aspects of healthcare management. In this setting the conventional notions of 
balance, such as a balance between long and short term objectives, as expounded 
by Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996a, 2001) were rejected in favour of a notion of 
balance as a network of perspectives operating in balance with no single 
perspective having priority. This contrasts with private sector BSCs in which there is 
an assumption that financial objectives are pre-eminent. In the non-profit hospital 
setting financial objectives were no longer pre-eminent and, consistent with Kaplan 
(2001) were interpreted in terms of constraints. Further, in this setting, in contrast 
with the original balanced scorecard model, the scorecard was not regarded as a 
top down tool of management control but as a mechanism for articulating a bottom 
up view of clinical activities and a means of constructing a new reality in which 
patient care was given priority. However, although the BSC allowed clinicians to 
reassert the patient care agenda in both management and wider political contexts, 
Aidemark concluded that the top down hierarchical characteristics of the balanced 
scorecard set in the context of the clan controls of professional clinicians created a 
mix of control mechanisms that was unstable and questioned whether the use of 
balanced scorecards in this setting would be a story of failure. 
Other studies which consider the notion of balance include that of Ballantine, 
Brignall and Modell (1998) who note the influence of strategic objectives on the 
performance measurement systems of an NHS Trust on the one hand and a 
Swedish dental practice on the other. Given the need to tailor performance 
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measures to strategy, they consider the question as to what additional information is 
needed for a balanced performance evaluation and observe that in both the U.K. 
and Sweden there is a tension when attempting to balance the provision and use of 
financial and non-financial information. They conclude that the decentralised model 
of performance measurement in the Swedish dental practice was arguably more 
balanced than the centralised approach imposed on a UK NHS Trust. However, as 
in earlier private sector studies, (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a), the concept of 
‘balance’ in this study remains imprecise. 
A number of other studies, predominantly descriptive in nature, document 
and interpret the experience of healthcare organisations in adopting a balanced 
scorecard approach to performance measurement. Zelman, Pink and Matthias 
(2003) review the extent of balanced scorecard adoption within the US healthcare 
sector, including a notable example in the Duke Hospitals of North Carolina. Here 
the balanced scorecard was adopted at both an organisational level, as in the case 
of the Duke Children’s Hospital (Meliones, 2000), and in individual departments, as 
in the Duke Women’s Services Unit (Jones and Filip, 2000). An early study (Pink et 
al, 2001) reviewed one of the first system-wide adoptions of a balanced scorecard 
approach in 89 hospitals in Ontario, Canada. Inspired by a call for the use of 
balanced scorecards for performance measurement in healthcare organisations 
(Forgione, 1997) this ‘bottom-up’ application was driven by the need, in the context 
of new payment systems, to maintain service quality through efficiency 
improvements and increasing political pressure to improve accountability. A 
particular concern of those devising the system was the choice of financial 
measures and eventually four main categories were identified: financial viability, 
cost efficiency, liquidity and capital assets. The importance of data quality, the need 
for compromises driven by data availability, and the benefits that were perceived 
from the benchmarking of performance against other hospitals, were the key 
lessons learnt from this application. Similar results were found by Radnor and Lovell 
(2003a, b) who reviewed the application of the balanced scorecard in an English 
Primary Care Trust.  
In contrast, a more interpretive paper (Agrizzi, 2008) draws on Broadbent 
and Laughlin’s conceptualisation of performance measurement and management 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009) to investigate a hospital’s response to the 
introduction of multi-dimensional performance measurement in the English NHS. 
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She concludes that the hospital was deflected from its intended pathway of change 
and thus failed to meet intended outcomes despite having pursued both proactive 
and reactive strategies. 
3.4.7.4 Empirical archival studies in the healthcare sector 
Empirical archival studies in the healthcare sector tend to be concentrated in 
the US where Leslie Eldenburg at the University of Arizona has developed a stream 
of literature which exploits data from Californian hospitals. These hospitals are 
characterised by a variety of organisational forms in both the for-profit and non-profit 
sectors. The first strand of the literature investigates the impact of organisational 
form on performance (Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2003), on board composition 
(Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach and Wosinska, 2004), and on the demand for 
accounting information (Eldenburg and Krishnan, 2008). The second strand 
investigates the response of hospital managers to changes in incentives arising 
from changes in accounting rules (Eldenburg and Vines, 2004) and medicare 
payments (Eldenburg and Kallapur, 1997; Kallapur and Eldenburg, 2005). 
In the UK empirical archival studies in the healthcare sector are largely 
restricted to issues of governance (Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood, 2008a, b; 
Clatworthy, Mellet and Peel, 2002; Basioudis and Ellwood, 2005a, b) and financial 
reporting (Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood, 2007). An exception, concerning the 
relationship between financial and nonfinancial performance is an investigation of a 
small sample of NHS Trusts by Clatworthy and Mellett (1997) in which no 
relationship between return on capital and performance against patient charter 
standards was found. 
3.4.8 Summary of performance measurement literature in healthcare 
In summary there are few empirical archival studies in the healthcare sector 
which focus on performance measurement systems, whether in the US or 
elsewhere. Further, and perhaps as a consequence of the different institutional 
settings and the different paradigmatic traditions, the body of literature reflects, in 
many respects, the paradigmatic isolation identified in Goddard (2010): empirical 
studies are concentrated in US journals and settings and interpretive studies are 
concentrated in the UK and Europe. 
  
 Page 83 
 
Studies into the application of balanced scorecard performance 
measurement systems in healthcare organisations are largely interpretive and cover 
applications at both the individual hospital level and at a system wide level. The 
literature on system wide multi-dimensional performance systems questions, from a 
number of perspectives, whether such systems have the power to deliver desired 
outcomes because of the potential conflict between managerial and clinician modes 
of governance and because the wider institutional and political context in which 
such systems are applied do not appear to be adequately reflected in their design. 
These concerns have also given rise to questions about their ability to inform 
performance improvement strategies at the level of the individual hospital.  
 In the economics literature there is greater representation of empirical 
archival studies but these largely focus on the incidence of dysfunctional responses 
to performance measurement. However, the evidence from these studies, that there 
were improvements in the quality of care in English NHS hospitals which were 
subject to the new performance measurement regime, is consistent with a story of 
improved efficiency through process improvement which has beneficial effects 
throughout the hospital.  
3.5 MANIPULATION OF REPORTED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Notwithstanding the development of performance measurement systems 
which incorporate a wide range of nonfinancial measures, financial measures 
remain of central importance to the evaluation of organisational performance, 
whether in the private or public sector. In the private sector financial measures 
represent the overriding focus for performance improvement. In the public sector, in 
contrast, although not regarded as representing the primary objective, financial 
measures remain important and as financial resources are regarded as a constrain, 
often include measures relating to the efficiency of the organisation (Pink et al, 
2001; Kaplan, 2001). Measures of financial performance, however, are as 
vulnerable to manipulation and dysfunctional responses as other measures of 
performance. There is a long history of research exploring the manipulation of 
financial performance which dates back over 50 years (see, for example, Park, 
1958). More recently this has evolved into a large body of literature known as the 
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‘earnings management’ literature. However, this term is very much associated with 
private sector studies. Elsewhere the literature also refers to the manipulation of 
financial performance using terms such as income smoothing and creative 
accounting (Amat and Gowthorpe, 2005). Further, there is a strand of literature 
which investigates the manipulation of subsidiary performance in response to 
economic incentives which deliver benefits to shareholders, such as those 
associated with the lowering of the overall corporate tax burden.  
Underpinning much of the empirical research is an implicit assumption that 
the manipulation of financial performance has adverse consequences for 
stakeholders: earnings management seeks to mislead shareholders about the 
underlying performance of the firm and so results in inefficient resource allocation 
(Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Regulation 
which seeks to restrict accounting choices and to improve the transparency of 
financial statements is therefore perceived as being beneficial. The opportunistic 
view of earnings management has, however, been challenged in the analytical 
literature which argues that a narrow view of earnings management may lead to 
policy initiatives which are detrimental to stakeholder interests (Arya, Glover and 
Sunder, 2003). This strand of the literature argues that earnings management 
contains additional information of value to principals, and that a certain degree of 
accounting flexibility is desirable when, for example, it incentivises goal congruent 
effort on the part of the agent (Demski, Frimor and Sappington, 2004; Arya, Glover 
and Sunder, 2003). 
The remainder of this section proceeds as follows. First, empirical evidence 
for the manipulation of financial performance in response to incentives which are 
relevant to a public sector setting is reviewed (Section 3.5.2); secondly, the 
mechanisms used for manipulation and the methods for detecting them are 
considered (Section 3.5.3), and thirdly, the consequences of manipulation, positive 
and negative, are considered (Section 3.5.4). The section concludes with a 
summary section, section 3.5.5. 
3.5.2 Incentives for the manipulation of reported financial performance 
Much of the literature on the manipulation of reported financial performance 
has been conducted in a private sector setting. A significant proportion of this 
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literature identifies manipulation in response to incentives including those related to 
regulatory constraints, political costs, the avoidance of losses and executive 
compensation. The evidence provided by these studies is relevant to both public 
and private sector settings and is reviewed here. Being mostly set in the private 
sector the literature also identifies manipulation in response to incentives relating to 
the operation of capital markets. These include capital market transactions, such as 
share issues, which generally create incentives to raise the firm’s share price; 
analysts' expectations, which create incentives to report steadily increasing 
earnings per share, and contractual outcomes, such as the determination of 
executive compensation and compliance with debt covenants, (Healy 1985; Healy 
and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Schrand, 2004). This literature is excluded from this 
review. 
However, incentives to manipulate financial performance do not operate only 
at the level of the ultimate reporting entity. A further strand of literature concerns the 
manipulation of the reported financial performance of subsidiary entities. The 
majority of this literature concerns incentives to shift income between subsidiaries in 
response to economic incentives in the form of a lower tax burden. However a small 
number of studies has identified manipulation of reported financial performance in 
response to incentives which are specific to an institutional setting which differs from 
the conventional Anglo-American, capital markets dominated, model of corporate 
reporting.  
This section of the literature review proceeds to review the literature on the 
incentives to manipulate financial performance which are relevant to a public sector 
setting as follows: first, regulatory incentives; second, political incentives; third, loss 
avoidance; fourth, executive compensation. The last two parts of this section are 
informed by the view that, in the NHS, the system of financial support is a form of 
income shifting that allows Trusts in financial difficulty to meet their immediate 
accountability requirements whilst delivering benefits to patients in the form of better 
service standards. First, private sector studies investigating income shifting across 
group subsidiaries in response to incentives which deliver benefits to shareholders, 
mainly in the form of a reduced taxation burden, is considered. Finally, the 
manipulation of ‘subsidiary’ financial performance in response to accountability 
incentives which arise from specific institutional settings, which differ from the 
conventional Anglo-American capital markets model, is reviewed. 
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3.5.2.1 Regulatory incentives 
Much of the research on regulatory incentives for earnings management is 
set in the financial services industry where failure to meet capital requirements 
incurs significant costs, associated with regulatory intervention. However evidence 
of earnings management to avoid these costs is mixed. Numerous studies find that, 
in the banking sector, loan loss provisions are used to manipulate earnings and/or 
capital maintenance ratios (as in Wahlen, 1994; Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolu 
1995; Bhatt, 1996; Lobo and Yang, 2001) but elsewhere no evidence is found 
(Ahmed, Takeda, Thomas, 1999; Collins, Shackleford and Wahlen, 1995). In a very 
recent study of over 11,000 banks over a period of sixteen years, Alali and Jaggi, 
(2011) find that, consistent with higher political and regulatory costs, large banks 
and those with high risk asset portfolios use loan loss provisions more than small 
banks and those with low risk asset portfolios to manage reported earnings. Further 
they found that, following the onset of the financial crisis, there was more earnings 
management in the years 2007-2008 than in previous periods. Although these 
studies are set exclusively in the banking sector such regulatory considerations 
often apply in the context of public services. In the English NHS, for example, 
Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood (2007) found evidence of earnings management 
in English hospital Trusts consistent with a statutory duty to report financial 
breakeven, failure to comply with which was reportable to Parliament, and had the 
potential for reputational damage and risk of dismissal (Ballantine, Forker and 
Greenwood, 2008b). 
3.5.2.2 Political incentives 
Private sector studies have also examined the influence of political costs on 
earnings management as for example when an industry is at risk of further 
regulation and high profits might bring unwanted political attention. Key (1997) for 
example found evidence of income decreasing earnings management in cable 
television companies during periods of US congressional hearings aimed at 
regulating cable prices. Similarly, Makar, Alam and Pearson, (1998) found that 
companies investigated for anti-trust merger violations engaged in earnings 
management to lower ‘excess’ profits to moderate evidence of an anti-competitive 
environment. Political incentives also feature in non-profit settings. Consistent with 
the predictions of Hoerger (1991), for example, Leone and Van Horn (2005) found 
that non-profit hospital CEOs manage earnings just above zero in order to achieve a 
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target level of earnings consistent with their budget constraint. Further, in the 
English NHS, the potential claw-back of surpluses was identified as an incentive for 
income decreasing earnings management in English NHS hospital Trusts 
(Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood, 2007). 
3.5.2.3 Loss avoidance  
In addition to earnings management to achieve analysts’ forecasts there is a 
considerable literature which investigates the extent of earnings management used 
to avoid reported losses. This literature is predicated on the assumption that there 
are perceived costs associated with small losses which are avoided if a small profit 
is reported. However, although evidence of loss avoidance is provided in the form of 
discontinuities in the earnings distribution around zero, (as in Hayn, 1995 and 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) the incentives for loss avoidance in the private 
sector, as compared with earnings decreases, are less well articulated. Burgstahler 
and Dichev, for example, support their hypothesis on the basis that ‘References to 
the desirability of 'consistent profitability' are commonplace in annual reports, news 
releases, and press coverage, suggesting that there are incentives to avoid losses’. 
Further the use of earnings distributions to identify earnings management aimed at 
loss avoidance has been criticised on the grounds that there exist alternative 
explanations for the observed discontinuities around zero. (Beaver, McNichols and 
Nelson, 2007; Durtschi and Easton, 2005, 2009; Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 
2003). In the not for profit sector the incentives to avoid losses are more clearly 
articulated. Both Brickley and Van Horn (2002) in an investigation of US non-profit 
hospitals and Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood (2008b) in an investigation of 
English NHS hospital Trusts find that reported deficits are associated with relatively 
high levels of CEO turnover. Using research designs similar to those used in private 
sector studies they find evidence of the manipulation of reported financial 
performance to avoid reported deficits. 
3.5.2.4 Executive compensation 
Early evidence of the manipulation of accruals to increase earnings-based 
bonuses was found by Healy (1985). However the findings from more recent 
research, which uses more refined criteria, (Gaver, Gaver and Austin 1995; 
Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995) are more mixed and are suggestive that 
other incentives sometimes act contrary to the incentive to maximise bonuses. 
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Gaver, Gaver and Austin’s findings, for example, suggest that companies manage 
earnings to smooth earnings over a number of accounting periods rather than to 
maximise bonuses. 
In the public and not for profit sectors, where multiple stakeholders and 
ambiguous objective functions, are associated with much weaker incentive 
frameworks the observed relationship between pay and performance, particularly 
financial performance, is weaker than in the private sector. For example, Brickley 
and Van Horn (2002) in an investigation of US hospitals found no difference in the 
relationship between pay and financial performance between for-profit and non-
profit hospitals but observed that the relationship was weaker than elsewhere in the 
private sector. In contrast, in the UK public sector, Ballantine, Forker and 
Greenwood (2008b) found no relationship between CEO pay and performance in an 
investigation of English NHS hospital Trusts over the period 1998-2005. There is, 
however, considerable evidence that there exists a negative association between 
financial performance and CEO turnover, whether in the private or public sector 
(Brickley and Van Horn, 2002; Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach and Wosinska, 
2004; Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood, 2008b). 
3.5.2.5  Income shifting between group entities to reduce the overall tax burden 
Incentives for earnings manipulation can occur not only for group reporting 
entities but also at the level of subsidiary entities. A significant literature exists for 
example which investigates the shifting of income between subsidiary entities in 
response to economic incentives in the form of a lower overall taxation burden. 
Using disclosures on regional profitability from company annual reports a number of 
studies have found evidence consistent with income shifting from high to low 
taxation regimes (see for example: Collins, Kemsley and Lang, 1998; Oyelere and 
Emmanuel, 1998; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993).  
A focus on specific types of transaction has also yielded evidence of income 
shifting. In a study of US multi-nationals, Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), for 
example, find evidence that tax incentives influence where U.S. multinationals 
locate their interest deductions. The international bond offerings of US 
multinationals denominated in overseas currencies during the period 1987–1997, 
either through a foreign subsidiary in that country (yielding a deduction against 
foreign income), or through the U.S. parent or its U.S. financing subsidiary (yielding 
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a domestic interest deduction), were investigated. Consistent with income-shifting 
predictions related to the generation of economic benefits, it was found that bonds 
were more likely to be placed through a foreign subsidiary when there were binding 
foreign tax credit limitations that impaired the firm’s ability to use domestic interest 
deductions, or when they are in domestic tax-loss carry-forward positions. Evidence 
was also found that bonds were more likely to be issued through a foreign 
subsidiary if the subsidiary was located in a country with generally high corporate 
tax rates than in the United States.  
The transfer pricing of the exchange of goods and services between 
subsidiaries has also been identified as a potential mechanism for income shifting. 
In a study of transactions relating to research and development services, for which 
market prices are difficult to establish, Grubert (2003), using data from US Treasury 
corporate tax returns, found that transactions related to research and development 
intangibles represented a high proportion of income shifted from high to low tax 
countries. Further, the allocation of debt among subsidiaries and the shifting of 
research and development based intangible income together accounted for virtually 
all of the observed difference in profitability between high and low tax countries. 
However, as is illustrated by Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001), the value of 
benefits derived from income shifting depends not only on differences in taxation 
regimes but also in the specific institutional features, such as the availability of 
relievable carried forward tax losses. Emmanuel (1999) also shows that the 
absence of a form of taxation, such as withholding tax, can have more impact on the 
value of benefits associated with income shifting than differences in headline 
corporation tax rates, which have formed the basis for many studies. Emmanuel 
(1999) also argues that the potential benefits associated with income shifting can 
also be mitigated by the tensions created by conflicting incentives specific to the 
institutional setting such as those associated with managerial compensation. 
These studies illustrate that, in complex institutional and regulatory settings 
where incentives may be multi-layered, such as those associated with large 
decentralised and multi-national organisations, the importance of grounding 
research in a deep understanding of the institutional setting is critical to obtaining 
further insights into the incidence and impact of the manipulation of financial 
performance through income shifting. 
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3.5.2.6 Income shifting in response to other specific institutional incentives 
Two further studies of relevance to the investigations in this thesis concern 
the manipulation of the performance of individual members of larger groups in 
response to specific incentives grounded in an institutional context which differs 
from the conventional capital market based Anglo-American model of corporate 
groups of companies. The first study is set in Japan (Thomas, Herrmann and Inoue, 
2004). Until March 2000 the primary reporting statements for the Japanese stock 
exchange was not the consolidated financial statements but the parent company 
financial statements. After 2000, although consolidated statements became the 
primary reporting document for the stock exchange, parent company statements 
were also required to be submitted and they remained the only reporting statement 
required for the purposes of Japan’s Commercial Code. For example, dividends and 
directors’ bonuses are based solely on parent company reported earnings and both 
are prohibited where parent company earnings are negative, even though the 
consolidated financial statements show a profit. Financial analysts also provide 
forecasts of both parent and consolidated earnings. Finally, in Japan, there are 
strong cultural pressures to meet expectations and not be seen to fail. In this 
institutional setting, Thomas, Herrmann and Inoue, (2004) predicted that, in addition 
to consolidated earnings, parent company earnings would also be managed, 
through the manipulation of affiliate transactions, in order to meet or exceed a 
number of thresholds. These thresholds were those associated with loss avoidance, 
avoidance of a decline in earnings and avoidance of negative variations from 
forecast. Consistent with the manipulation of affiliate transactions, the manipulation 
of parent company earnings was found to be significantly higher than the 
manipulation of consolidated earnings. This study provides an example of an 
institutional setting, where managerial accountability is associated with parent 
company as well as group profits and which provides incentives not only for 
manipulation of consolidated earnings but also those of individual group entities.  
The second study in this section is also set in a very specific institutional 
context in Finland. In a case study investigation of a Finnish City Council and its 
‘wholly owned’ water utility company, Vinnari and Nasi (2008) describe how 
municipal accounting guidelines provided opportunities for flexibility in the transfer of 
funds out of the utility company and into the City Council which allowed the Council 
to fulfil its statutory duty to break-even. The City’s Water Works was established in 
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1910 and was operated as part of the City’s administration until 1994 when it was 
established as an ‘independent’ profit making enterprise wholly financed by City 
capital. The Finnish Water Services Act (119/2001) stipulated that water services 
charges should cover the running costs and investments of the enterprise over the 
long run and that the charges could include a reasonable return on the owner’s 
capital investment (Compensation for Basic Capital). ‘Reasonable’ was not defined 
and varied widely across the Finnish water industry. Municipal accounting 
guidelines further determined that ‘Compensation for Basic Capital’ should not be 
treated as an appropriation of profit but as a financial expense. In the books of the 
City Council the amount received from the Water Utility was recorded as income 
and, as it was not ring-fenced for reinvestment in water services, was available to 
support general expenditure and to allow the Council to report financial breakeven. 
In the period under review the water company recorded profits very close to zero 
whilst paying out between 20% and 27% of revenue to City Council as 
‘Compensation for Basic Capital’. Further, the authors argue that, accounting 
treatment of ‘Compensation of Basic Capital’ as a financial expense served to 
disguise the extent of the transfer of revenues and undermined the accountability of 
both the Council and the water company. Councillors who ‘like most users of 
accounting information…very obviously monitor and understand first and foremost 
the bottom line figure’ (p.104) were misled about the underlying financial 
performance of the Utility company and of the Council. This case study illustrates 
how sector specific accounting policies can allow flexibility in the structuring of 
transactions to permit the satisfaction of regulatory requirements whilst 
simultaneously demonstrating how accountability can be impaired through the 
presentation of transactions even where there is full disclosure.  
These studies offer novel insights into the manipulation of reported financial 
performance in response to incentives generated by an institutional setting which 
varies from the standard Anglo-American, capital markets oriented, model of 
financial reporting. 
3.5.3 Mechanisms for the manipulation of reported financial performance 
The manipulation of reported financial performance has traditionally been 
regarded as arising either from the discretionary manipulation of accruals, such as 
provisions for depreciation and doubtful debts, and from the manipulation of 
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discretionary expenditure, such as research and development, repairs and renewals 
and training, to achieve financial objectives. Whichever mechanism is used the 
manipulation of financial performance is conventionally regarded as having adverse 
consequences. Managerial accountability is impaired and resource allocation is 
based on misleading information. However, the manipulation of real transactions, 
such as decreasing or increasing research and development or marketing 
expenditure, is regarded as being particularly damaging as it has the potential for 
undermining the future strategic capacity of the entity. Dechow and Schrand (2004) 
go as far as to argue that ‘..such actions can have a significant impact on earnings 
quality and devastating effects on the company’s future performance, and the 
transactions are a form of earnings management’. There are, however, few studies 
on the manipulation of real transactions because its detection can be problematic: 
intentional manipulation of transactions cannot easily be isolated from other, bona 
fide, reasons for variations in the level of expenditure. Nonetheless, Dechow and 
Sloan (1991), for example, showed that research and development intensive 
companies are more likely to cut research and development expenditure prior to the 
CEO’s retirement. In the public sector, in the context of cash constrained budgets, 
the manipulation of real transactions has also been observed to be a frequently 
used tactic for meeting financial objectives. Lapsley (1993), for example, identifies 
that, when English hospitals were controlled via cash budgets, techniques such as 
deferring staff replacements were often used by NHS financial managers to prevent 
budget overspends. Interestingly, however, the US, and not the UK, provides the 
setting for a number of empirical archival studies which investigate the incidence of 
transaction manipulation in a hospital setting. Hoerger (1991) in an investigation of 
US hospitals over the period 1983-1988 found evidence that not for profit hospitals 
managed discretionary spending to meet their earnings objective. In a similar setting 
of US hospitals over the period 1990-2002, Leone and Van Horn (2005) also found 
evidence that non-profit hospitals adjust discretionary expenditure on charity care in 
order to manage earnings towards zero, consistent with their budget constraint. 
Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee and Soderstrom (2007) further found that, in Californian 
hospitals over the period 1997-2003, non-operating and non-revenue generating 
activities were managed to report positive income and that asset sales were 
managed by hospitals with incentives to decrease earnings to avoid regulatory 
scrutiny. However, using an alternative approach to the manipulation of real 
transactions, Kelman and Friedman (2009), in an investigation of English NHS 
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Trusts, found no evidence of effort substitution from the orthopaedics department to 
the accident and emergency department in response to an accident and emergency 
target wait time. Kelman and Friedman do acknowledge however that their measure 
for effort substitution, wait times in orthopaedics, was confounded by a waiting 
target for inpatient treatments for which orthopaedics wait times are a key driver. 
Similarly, however, Propper, Sutton, Whitnall and Windjmeier (2010) find hospitals 
met waiting time targets without diverting activity from other less well monitored 
aspects of health care and without decreasing patient health on exit from hospital. 
These studies all recognise the potential for adverse consequences for patient care 
from the management of real transactions to meet financial objectives. A research 
objective of the economics studies, in particular, was to identify whether such 
adverse consequences could be observed. 
In contrast to the literature on the manipulation of real transactions, the 
literature on the manipulation of accruals is extensive, particularly in US capital 
markets based settings, where the literature is frequently referred to as the 
‘earnings management’ literature. Accruals based earnings management is 
traditionally associated with the manipulation of year-end adjustments to accruals 
such as depreciation, doubtful debt provisions and inventory provisions. However, 
early studies of accruals based earnings management focused on the incidence and 
nature of accruals manipulation and found that revenue/receivables manipulation 
was commonly observed. For example, Dechow and Schrand (2004), in an analysis 
of 1745 SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases identified 294 
companies that had manipulated their accruals and identified the manipulation of 
revenue and receivables as being the most common form of manipulation, occurring 
in 70% of cases. This high incidence of revenue manipulation, which can involve the 
manipulation of real transactions with customers, is also supported by Nelson, Elliott 
and Tarpley (2003) who, in a survey of 253 auditors, found that over 50% of 
attempts at earnings management were identified as involving the adjustment of 
revenue.  
More sophisticated statistical analysis of the incidence of accruals based 
earnings management is however hampered by the fact that it is, by its nature, 
hidden. Considerable effort has thus been put into the development of models to 
detect earnings management but, nonetheless, they remain subject to considerable 
criticism.  
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Jones (1991) developed an early model aimed at identifying abnormal 
accruals as the residual in a regression of total accruals against changes in revenue 
and the gross book value of property, plant and equipment.  
1 2 3. .it it it itACC REV PPE         
Where:      = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets at time   for firm 
 ;        = revenue in time   less revenue in time     scaled by lagged total 
assets;     = gross book value of property plant and equipment scaled by lagged 
total assets; it  is an error term, identified as abnormal accruals.  
However this model has been criticised for its failure to control for growth 
assuming, as it does, that all changes in revenue are non-discretionary. The 
inclusion of a modification to allow for changes in receivables (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney, 1995) increases the precision with which the model detects the 
overstatement of revenue and, as a consequence, the discretionary component of 
accruals as represented by the residual it . The ‘modified Jones model’ is as 
follows: 
1 2 3( )it it it it itACC REV REC PPE          
Where:        = change in receivables scaled by lagged total assets.  
A further development in the aggregate accruals approach was to recognise 
that accruals reverse out over time, shifting or adjusting the recognition of cash 
flows. Using working capital accruals, which reverse out within one year, Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) measure accrual estimation errors as the residuals from a 
regression of changes in working capital on prior year, current year and one-year 
future cash flows from operations as follows:  
 1 2 1 3 4 1it it it it itWC CFO CFO CFO            
Where:        change in working capital defined as change in accounts 
receivable plus change in inventory minus change in accounts payable minus 
change in taxes payable plus change in other assets, for firm   at time        = 
  
 Page 95 
 
cash flow from operations;    is the residual, a measure of abnormal accruals. In 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) all variables are scaled by average total assets. 
Accruals and earnings quality is operationalised as the standard deviation of 
the residuals across a sample of firms, with a higher standard deviation indicating 
lower quality. As with the Jones’ models this model does not isolate, in the residual, 
the components of discretionary accruals that are the consequence of intentional 
manipulation of earnings from those components which are due to bona fide 
estimation errors, for example, in the recoverability of debtors. Indeed, Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) argue that, even in the absence of intentional earnings management, 
accrual quality will vary with firm and industry characteristics with, for example, the 
volatility of operations affecting the accuracy with which accruals are routinely 
estimated. This failure to isolate intentional earnings management from the noise 
arising from routine estimation errors is common to all aggregate accruals models 
but, notwithstanding these limitations, aggregate accruals models are used 
extensively throughout the earnings management literature, including those studies 
set in the healthcare sector (Ballantine, Forker and Greenwood, 2007; Leone and 
Van Horn, 2005).  
McNichols (2000) further argues that, it is difficult to estimate with 
confidence the extent to which accruals are associated with managerial discretion, 
whether intentional or otherwise, because of a limited understanding of the way that 
accruals behave. The Jones model for instance assumes a linear relationship 
between accruals and sales growth, yet there is no evidence to support this 
assumption. As a consequence, McNichols argues that the extensive reliance on 
these models in the literature is impeding further progress in the evaluation of 
earnings management behaviour.  
An alternative widely used method of detecting earnings management is the 
examination of earnings distributions. This method has been most commonly used 
to investigate earnings management in response to a target, such as analysts’ and 
managerial forecasts (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2001 and Kasznik, 1999), 
and the avoidance of losses (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997 and 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). Earnings management explanations for 
observed discontinuities in earnings distributions have however been subject to 
sustained criticism. (Durtschi and Easton, 2009, 2005; Dechow, Richardson and 
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Tuna, 2003; Beaver, McNichols and Nelson, 2007). Alternative explanations for the 
discontinuities include: sample bias, scaling issues and asymmetrical accounting 
treatment of tax gains and losses. In the latest contribution to this debate Durtschi 
and Easton (2009) show that market price per share, a commonly used deflator for 
earnings, does not have a linear relationship with earnings around zero giving rise 
to distortions in the observed frequency distribution. They conclude that the shapes 
of frequency distributions are not, of themselves, evidence of earnings 
management.  
Another response to the limitations of aggregate accruals models is the 
development of a specific accruals method. This method requires researchers to 
identify specific accruals which are susceptible to manipulation, such as loan loss 
provisions in banks (Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas 1999; Beatty, Chamberlain, and 
Magliolo 1995). However, the need to identify specific accruals demands 
considerable understanding of the institutional and regulatory framework within 
which entities operate and has resulted in a literature which is, at present, limited 
and focused on particular industries such as banking and insurance (Dechow and 
Schrand, 2004). This constrains the generalisability of the findings. However, 
notwithstanding this limitation, McNichols (2000) argues that this approach is 
superior to other accruals models and has the potential for the development of tests 
which are well grounded in the institutional specifics of accruals thereby providing 
greater insight into how accruals are managed. 
A more recent contribution to the literature on the detection of earnings 
management comes from Stubben (2010) who develops McNichols argument that a 
specific accruals method has greater potential for identifying earnings management 
than aggregate accruals methods. He builds on the evidence that revenue 
manipulation represents the most common form of earnings management (Dechow 
and Schrand, 2004; Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley, 2003) and develops a model for 
detecting earnings management based on the identification of discretionary 
revenue. The manipulation of revenue and receivables is not specific to one industry 
and so has the potential not only for greater precision in the identification of 
earnings management but also for generating findings characterised by a higher 
degree of generalisability. Stubben’s model estimated a firm’s discretionary 
revenues as the residual from the following equation: 
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1 2it it itAR R        
Where:
 it
AR  is the change in the accounts receivable of firm i  between 
time t  and time 1t  ; R is the change in revenue and  is the residual. 
Stubben applied this model to a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement 
actions for a mix of revenue and expense manipulation and found that it detected 
manipulation when accruals models did not. Similar results were found when he 
simulated manipulation. These findings, he concludes, indicate the revenue model 
is less biased and better specified than accruals models and argues that estimates 
from revenue models could be useful as a measure of revenue management and, 
as a proxy for earnings management, particularly given the predominance of 
revenue adjustments arising from SEC enforcements.  
3.5.4 Manipulation of financial performance: the consequences 
As evidenced by empirical literature, the manipulation of reported financial 
performance is conventionally regarded as leading to adverse consequences: 
stakeholders are misled about the economic performance of the entity thus leading, 
by implication, to misallocation of resources; management avoid the consequences 
of performance measurement or regulatory constraints and, in the case of the 
manipulation of real transactions, the long term strategic objectives of the 
organisation may be undermined through lack of investment or inefficient use of 
resources.  
This negative perception is reflected in the following two definitions of 
earnings management which are taken from two early literature reviews. Schipper 
(1989) defines earnings management as ‘the purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as 
opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)’. Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) extend this view by defining earnings management as occurring 
‘when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported financial performance’. Dechow and Schrand (2004) also describe accruals 
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based earnings management, although not necessarily contrary to GAAP, as 
opportunistically shifting income from one period to another. 
However, although a large empirical literature exists which identifies the 
incidence of earnings management and the incentives which motivate it, few 
empirical studies address the consequences of eamings management. Of this 
limited literature most studies are focused on resource allocation decisions of the 
external stakeholders of public companies. A number of studies, for example, find 
that the market reaction to the disclosure of earnings management is significantly 
negative (Foster, 1979; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney,1996; Beneish, 1997; 
Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 2004).  Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998) also find 
that eamings management contributes to IPO mispricing.  
The question of the consequences of earnings management for internal 
resource allocation is however less well explored. Analytically this question has 
been investigated by Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003), cited in McNichols and Stubben, 
(2008), who argue that earnings management will lead to inefficient investment 
because firms overstating their financial results will be able to obtain cheaper 
financing. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis is found in a recent empirical 
study by McNichols and Stubben (2008) who, using a number of measures of both 
earnings management and excess capital investment, find substantial 
overinvestment in firms engaging in earnings management. The capital investment 
decisions of three groups of firms over a 25 year period were investigated: those 
investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, those which were sued by their 
shareholders for improper accounting and those which restated their financial 
statements. Further, as an alternative proxy for earnings management, discretionary 
revenues (Stubben, 2010) were also used to identify firms which manipulated 
earnings. McNichol’s and Stubben’s findings of inefficient investment in firms 
manipulating reported financial performance indicate that earnings management, 
which is largely viewed as influencing the resource allocation decisions of external 
stakeholders, can also affect internal resource allocation by permitting expenditure 
levels to be maintained at levels that would otherwise not be possible. 
Although the empirical literature adopts a largely negative view of earnings 
management, a more neutral perspective is adopted in the analytical literature. 
Scott (2009) argues for example that manipulation which serves to smooth earnings 
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streams can communicate important decision-relevant inside information to 
investors and thus have positive consequences. Frequently, agents have 
specialised information which is prohibitively costly to communicate to the principal 
(Demski and Sappington, 1987) and manipulation can be used as a means of 
signalling this information (Demski and Sappington, 1990). However there are also 
costs associated with earnings management. A perception that reported income is 
unreliable for resource allocation purposes will give rise to a higher cost of capital 
and reduced profits, which affect both the investor, through lower stock values and 
the manager, through lower compensation. Stocken and Verrechia (2004) show that 
the benefits of earnings management exceed these costs when the amount of 
inside information is high and a firm’s environment is volatile, such that the benefits 
accruing to insider information are also high. Demski, Frimor and Sappington (2004) 
also show that principals may benefit from the manipulation of an accounting 
system where managerial incentives to engage in more damaging responses to the 
monitoring of financial performance, such as could occur with the manipulation of 
real transactions, are reduced. However, for benefits to be realised, accounting 
flexibility should be made available only to skilled managers who will use the 
flexibility in reporting financial performance to work hard on the principal’s behalf. 
This finding is also consistent with Demski (1998) who formally uses accounting 
regulation to ensure that income smoothing requires skill and hard work. Thus, 
Arya, Glover and Sunder (2003) argue that it is the implicit role of regulators to 
make income smoothing challenging but not impossible. They further argue that the 
conventional perceptions of income manipulation and transparency are simplistic in 
that they fail to recognise the ways in which communication is effected across 
today’s large multi-national, multi-layered corporations where total transparency is 
neither possible nor desirable. Instead of trying to eliminate income manipulation 
therefore they suggest that it might be more useful to focus on the accounting 
properties that increase the value of managed accruals. They conclude that the 
appropriate focus for policy debate is the optimal mix of flexibility and rigidity in 
accounting regulation and that the current push for increased transparency in 
corporate financial reporting may be detrimental to shareholder interests. 
Thus some flexibility in an accounting system may be beneficial. This is 
further supported from a contractual perspective as the potential for earnings 
management may protect investors from the consequences of unforeseen events 
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when contracts are rigid and incomplete (Scott, 2009). These benefits may be 
impaired however when the potential for earnings management is too great and the 
incentive to exert effort is reduced. Scott (2009) thus argues that GAAP, which 
typically allows some flexibility in the choice of accounting policy, has a positive role 
to play in allowing some managerial flexibility in the determination of earnings whilst 
simultaneously restricting the scope for managers to shirk.  
Empirical evidence of the impact of tighter accounting regulation aimed at 
greater transparency in financial reporting and the minimisation of manipulation is 
limited. However, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in the US, offers 
an opportunity for such investigation. A number of studies find significant declines in 
both total accruals and discretionary accruals in the period following the passage of 
the Act. (See for example: Jain and Rezaee, 2006; Li, Pincus and Rego, 2008 and 
Iliev, 2010). However, the impact of this reduced accruals based manipulation is 
shown to be associated with an increased incidence of transaction based 
manipulation (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008). Whilst acknowledging that increased 
investor and auditor vigilance may be contributory factors, the authors argue that, 
faced with reduced scope for manipulating accruals, these findings are consistent 
with managers seeking alternative, less easily identifiable, ways of manipulating 
reported financial performance in order to meet financial objectives.  
3.5.5 Summary 
In summary the analytical literature argues that there are benefits to both 
managers and principals from a certain level of income manipulation but that these 
benefits can be eroded if the potential for manipulation is too high. The realisation of 
the benefits of manipulation can, however, be facilitated by a strong framework of 
accounting regulation which permits some flexibility in the management of reported 
financial performance whilst restricting the potential for opportunistic managerial 
behaviour. The empirical literature in contrast focuses on the negative aspects of 
manipulation and has identified such manipulation in both the public and private 
sectors in response to a number of incentives including those relating to 
accountability, the regulatory environment and the incidence of political costs. The 
methods adopted to identify income manipulation have however been the subject of 
some debate. The manipulation of real transactions has been identified in both the 
public and private sectors in response to target income levels and, in the healthcare 
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sector, focuses on the potentially adverse consequences of such manipulation for 
patient care. Accruals based manipulation is perceived as leading to less damaging 
consequences than the manipulation of real transactions but the number of studies 
investigating the consequences of accruals based manipulation is limited and 
largely restricted to the resource allocation decisions of external stakeholders. One 
recent study however (McNichols and Stubben, 2008) investigates the impact of 
earnings management on internal resource allocation and finds that it leads to 
inefficient capital investment decisions in US quoted companies. There are no 
public sector studies which investigate the resource allocation consequences of the 
manipulation of reported financial performance. 
The identification of manipulation, whether transactions or accruals based, is 
problematic because managerial motives are not observable. The analysis of 
earnings distributions provides a method of capturing the combined impact of both 
types of manipulation but these techniques have been subject to considerable 
challenge from alternative explanations for observed discontinuities. However, a 
number of models have been developed for detecting accruals based income 
manipulation, and, as a consequence, studies into accruals based manipulation now 
dominate the literature. Aggregate accruals models have, however, also been 
subject to sustained criticism. As a result, the specific accruals approach, which is 
associated with greater precision in the measurement of discretionary accruals, is 
the one most favoured. Empirical investigations using this approach have, however, 
been largely restricted to the banking and insurance industries. This narrow focus 
may be a consequence of the somewhat demanding conditions for the application of 
this model which not only requires the identification of incentives to manage 
earnings but also needs to be grounded in a deep understanding of the institutional 
setting and the identification of material specific accruals which are exploitable for 
earnings management purposes. A recent development in the specific accruals 
literature, however, which does not suffer from this lack of generalisability, is the 
development of a model for identifying discretionary revenue (Stubben, 2010). This 
model is of particular interest as the manipulation of revenue has been found to be a 
major source of earnings management. No studies in the healthcare literature have, 
to date, used a specific accruals approach, revenue based or otherwise, to 
investigate the manipulation of reported financial performance. 
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The traditional dominant body of earnings management literature focuses 
only on the consolidated financial statements of quoted companies on US stock 
exchanges. Elsewhere, however, there is a strand of literature on income shifting 
between subsidiary companies with the objective of reducing the group’s overall 
burden of taxation. This income shifting is effected through such mechanisms as the 
location of interest payments and through transfer pricing of goods and services 
between group entities. Further interesting studies reveal transaction based 
manipulation of reported financial performance in response to incentives which are 
specific to institutional settings which differ from the Anglo-American capital markets 
dominated model of corporate governance and financial reporting. One particular 
study, set in the Finnish public sector, (Vinnari and Nasi, 2008) reveals income 
manipulation involving transfers of funds between a City Council and a quasi-
independent utility company in order to facilitate the satisfaction of the City Council’s 
statutory breakeven requirement.  
3.6 ACCRUALS ACCOUNTING AND THE APPLICATION OF GAAP IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
3.6.1 History of accruals accounting in NHS hospitals 
Accruals based earnings management exploits flexibilities in GAAP in order 
to manipulate reported financial performance. The application of accruals based 
accounting is, however, a very recent NPM phenomenon in Government 
departments, where its adoption occurred only the early 21st century. Traditionally 
public sector accounting has adopted a cash budgeting approach, with little scope 
for the manipulation of reported financial performance except through the 
manipulation of real transactions (Lapsley, 1993). However NHS hospital Trusts, 
consistent with the NPM principles which informed their establishment, have been 
required to prepare true and fair accruals based financial statements, since their 
inception in 1991 (NHS and Social Care Act, 199012; HM Treasury Financial 
Reporting Manual13 and Department of Health, NHS Finance Manual14). Further, 
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 National Health Service and Community Care Act (1990) available at:  
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1990/Ukpga_19900019_en_1.htm 
 
13
 HM Treasury, Financial Reporting Manual available at:  
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and contrary to common perceptions, NHS hospitals have a long history of accruals 
based accounting arising from their origins, before the establishment of the NHS, in 
the private sector (Robson, 2003). Prior to the establishment of the NHS, hospitals 
operated within the voluntary sector or were run by municipal authorities. As early 
as 1893, and throughout the first half of the twentieth century, accounting 
information in hospitals was guided by Burdett's ‘Uniform System of Accounts for 
Hospitals, Charities, Missions and Public Institutions’. This ‘manual’ required the 
production of an income and expenditure account, balance sheet, and invested 
property account15. Further, driven by the needs of key stakeholders, there also 
developed a tradition of performance measurement, as, for example, in the 
benchmarking of cost per bed information, an early attempt at measuring the cost 
efficiency of hospitals. Adopting a social forces model, Jones and Mellett (2007) 
also argue that hospital and NHS accounting technologies were better developed 
than commonly perceived. They chart the development of accounting in hospitals 
according to three periods: pre-NHS, when the emphasis was on stewardship; 1948 
-1990 when the emphasis was on budgetary control, not only for the hospital as a 
whole but also within individual hospital departments; and 1991 onwards, following 
the introduction of the internal market and the establishment of NHS Trusts, when 
the emphasis has been on efficiency and performance.  
Ellwood (2003) further elaborates on the NHS period prior to the 
establishment of NHS Trusts when, even whilst being managed as cost centres 
within local health authorities, a partial accruals approach was adopted. 
Adjustments were made within the financial statements for receivables, payables 
and movements in inventory and a statement of financial position which showed 
current assets and liabilities. Importantly, however, records for property, plant and 
equipment were isolated and not included in the ‘statement of balances’. The 
exclusion of non-current assets from the financial statements led to accusations of 
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 Department of Health, NHS Finance Manual available at: 
http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/finman.nsf/ManualDownload?OpenView&Start=1&Count
=30&Expand=10#10 
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 The income and expenditure account however did not incorporate depreciation or 
adjustments for inventory. 
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inefficient use of capital stock and these concerns represented one of the principal 
arguments for the introduction of accruals accounting throughout the public sector in 
the early 21st century (Likierman, 1998a,b).  
As in the private sector, compliance with GAAP underpins the public sector 
concept of true and fair. However, adaptations are made where private sector 
GAAP is considered unsuitable for producing financial statements relevant to the 
needs of the public sector (HM Treasury, Financial Reporting Manual, Chapter 2, 
para. 2.116). However, despite the long history of accruals based accounting 
technologies in NHS hospitals, the adoption and adaptation of private sector GAAP 
for public entities, including English hospital Trusts, has been subject to 
considerable critical comment and criticism. This is considered in the following 
section. 
3.6.2 The adoption and adaptation of private sector GAAP  
In a review of GAAP application in the public sector, Ellwood (2003), uses 
examples from the Ministry of Defence, a local authority and an NHS Trust to 
investigate the extent to which UK public sector accounting is consistent with GAAP. 
Using illustrations of asset, liability and income recognition, including PFI (Private 
Finance Initiative) capital projects, she concludes that, as a consequence of these 
adaptations, the public sector interpretation of ‘true and fair’ differs from the private 
sector and further, that adaptations to GAAP vary across these different types of 
public organisation, thus impairing comparability. She also argues that the public 
accountability of public sector entities cannot be delivered by private sector GAAP 
as it was developed with a focus on shareholders as the pre-eminent stakeholder, a 
notion that cannot readily be transferred to public sector entities.  
The transferability of the ‘shareholder’ perspective of GAAP and adaptations 
to fit the public sector are the subject of concerns elsewhere in the literature, 
particularly where adaptations are perceived to have the potential to mislead users. 
(Hodges and Mellett, 2004, 2005; Barton, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005; Newberry and 
Pallot, 2003). In an Australian setting Barton (2005) reviews adaptations to 
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Australian GAAP aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of Australian 
public sector entities and concludes that these adaptations were inadequate to the 
task, such that financial statements can be difficult to interpret and do not always 
report relevant information. Elsewhere, a number of studies utilise the vehicle of PFI 
projects to illustrate the potential impact of public sector variations from GAAP on 
the comparability of financial statements, on service provision and on accountability 
to Parliament. In the UK, Hodges and Mellett (2004) concluded that PFI accounting, 
which follows a Treasury negotiated variation from GAAP, impaired the 
comparability of NHS Trust financial statements and the evaluation of Trust 
performance. Further, they argue that, as a consequence of NHS Trusts’ statutory 
duty to breakeven, the different revenue effects of PFI contracts as compared with 
hospitals financed by public capital have consequences for service delivery. This 
concern that the greater revenue costs associated with PFI projects could lead to 
the reduction of expenditure elsewhere, a form of manipulation aimed at fulfilling 
accountability requirements and financial objectives, is also echoed by Ellwood, 
(2008), in a case study review of GAAP modifications in the financial statements of 
an English hospital Trust. Further, concern that variations from GAAP may impair 
accountability to Parliament by, for example, allowing the debt associated with PFI 
schemes to avoid parliamentary scrutiny, has also been expressed by Edwards and 
Shaoul, (2003) and Newberry and Pallot (2003).  
Elsewhere the process of determining public sector variations from GAAP, 
focusing in particular on accounting for PFI schemes, has been variously interpreted 
from a sociological perspective by Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) using a 
Habermasian framework, by Hodges and Mellett (2005) using the concept of 
omitted influences; by Rutherford (2003) adopting a social constructionist 
perspective and by Broadbent and Laughlin (2002) adopting a Marxist perspective. 
Hodges and Mellet (2002) further use the case study of accounting for PFI projects 
to gain further insights into Walker and Robinson’s (1993) model of accounting 
standard development. 
In summary, the public sector accounting literature on variations from GAAP 
is dominated on the one hand by critical review and commentary and, on the other, 
by interpretive studies, which adopt a variety of theoretical perspectives to examine 
the process of determining and agreeing variations from GAAP. Empirical evidence 
to support the critical commentary has been provided by case study illustrations (as 
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in: Ellwood, 2003, 2008; Hodges and Mellett, 2004), interview based studies as in 
Hodges and Mellett (2005) and contextual analysis (as in Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2002). The impact of variations from GAAP on both the performance and 
accountability of public sector entities has featured as an issue worthy of analysis 
within the wider context of their impact on public sector financial reporting but has 
yet to be the subject of empirical archival investigation.  
3.7 SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTION 
Over the last thirty years the UK public sector has been subject to a wave of 
reforms which has collectively become known as New Public Management. New 
Public Management has been informed by a belief in market based solutions, 
drawing on private sector models of management and governance to address 
concerns about the performance, efficiency and accountability of public sector 
entities. NPM initiatives, such as the separation of the purchasers and providers of 
hospital services in a quasi-market relationship have, since the 1990s, served to 
bring greater emphasis to agency relationships in an environment previously 
characterised by hierarchical modes of governance. In the 21st century further NPM 
initiatives have followed, aimed at the mitigation of agency costs and the 
improvement of both quality and efficiency a quasi-market environment. These 
initiatives have included the introduction of systems of performance measurement 
and management in the form of the Star ratings and the Annual Health Check, and 
the development of a costing system, in the form of the reference costing system, 
which has facilitated both the development of a uniform pricing system for hospital 
services and the benchmarking of Trust cost efficiency. As a means of enhancing 
the accountability of public sector organisations much of the data relating to these 
initiatives has been made publicly available. To date, however, this data remains 
largely unexplored.  
Concerns over the cost efficiency of NHS hospitals have persisted almost 
since the NHS’ inception in 1948 and have been a key driver of NHS reforms 
throughout its history. However, inadequate investment in costing systems impeded 
the operation of the internal market and the benchmarking of Trust cost efficiency 
until the early 21st century, when the new Labour Government made a commitment 
to the development of the reference costing system. To date, public sector 
accounting research has focused on an evaluation of the reference costing system 
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in isolation of other NPM initiatives and has adopted largely critical and case study 
approaches. However, despite being subject to early criticism, reference costs are 
now used by a wide range of users for a wide range of purposes, including 
contracting between purchases and providers, and the UK is regarded as being in 
the vanguard of cost benchmarking for hospitals. 
The systematic collection of reference costs with adjustments for case mix 
and market factors render them a more reliable measure of cost efficiency than 
measures of cost efficiency obtained using frontier analysis techniques, such as 
data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis. Despite a very large 
literature investigating hospital efficiency, these techniques have been subject to 
considerable criticism because of the sensitivity of findings to model specification, 
choice of input and output variables and a failure to explain the relationship between 
variables. Further, the issue of the quality of hospital services in these studies is 
problematic. If quality is a hidden component of costs then the findings from such 
studies could lead to inappropriate policy initiatives which, in the pursuit of 
efficiency, serve to reduce the quality of care. Studies which aim to investigate the 
relationship between cost efficiency and quality have therefore adopted a two stage 
approach where measures of cost efficiency are obtained using frontier analysis 
techniques which are then used in a regression with measures of quality.  
However the investigation of the relationship between quality and efficiency 
has been further impeded by the challenge of measuring quality. Measures of 
quality such as mortality and readmission rates are both narrow and problematic in 
that higher rates are not necessarily indicative of poor quality. However broader 
measures, which necessarily involve bringing together many aspects of care across 
many individual hospitals, have tended to rely on staff and patient perceptions 
obtained using survey instruments. The introduction of multi-dimensional 
performance measurement in the English NHS applied uniformly to all hospital 
Trusts offers an opportunity to develop a more objective and broader measure of 
nonfinancial performance than has hitherto been possible. 
The introduction of multi-dimensional performance systems in the NHS has 
been the subject of a number of studies in the public sector accounting literature. 
These have largely adopted a critical review or interpretive method and have 
focused on the tensions between different modes of governance, the political 
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context in which performance measurement was introduced and the potentially 
adverse consequences for patient care. This last theme is mirrored in a number of 
empirical archival studies which can be found in the economics literature where the 
focus is mainly on the dysfunctional responses to performance measurement and 
the investigation of trade-offs, manipulation and gaming. However, evidence from 
these studies is consistent with a story of performance targets incentivising process 
improvements which have beneficial effects for service standards and quality of 
care throughout the hospital.  
The potential for manipulation of performance measurement systems 
comprises a significant strand of the performance measurement literature in both 
the public and private sectors. Financial measures of performance retain a key 
position in these systems and the manipulation of financial performance measures 
has received extensive attention in the literature. Over the last 20 years however 
this literature has become dominated by the ‘earnings management’ literature which 
is largely concerned with the manipulation of financial performance in US quoted 
companies. This literature has identified earnings management in response to a 
number of incentives of which some are specific to a capital markets context whilst 
others, such as regulatory and political incentives, are common to many institutional 
settings, including the public sector. Elsewhere, however, there are other streams of 
literature which often refer to income smoothing, income shifting or creative 
accounting. These studies include the investigation of the manipulation of financial 
performance in individual group entities, rather than at corporate level, and in 
institutional settings which differ from the conventional Anglo American corporate 
model. The income shifting literature, for example, investigates the manipulation of 
subsidiary financial performance through the structuring of transactions between 
group entities, the ultimate objective of which is an economic benefit in the form of a 
reduction in the overall group tax burden. A small number of studies also 
investigates the manipulation of reported financial performance in different 
institutional settings. One study in particular, (Vinarri and Nasi, 2008) investigates 
income shifting between a Finnish City Council and its ‘wholly owned’ water utility 
company in order to facilitate the satisfaction of the City Council’s statutory 
requirement to breakeven. These studies, whilst set in a different institutional 
context, lend an additional perspective to McNichols (2000) argument that the 
development of tests which are well grounded in the institutional specifics of 
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accruals have the potential to provide greater insight into earnings management 
than the application of conventional accruals based models and distributional 
analysis.  
The empirical literature on the manipulation of financial performance adopts 
a largely negative perspective arguing that such manipulation undermines 
managerial accountability and leads to inefficient resource allocation. The analytical 
literature, in contrast, argues that some flexibility in accounting regulation, which 
permits manipulation of reported financial performance, can generate benefits to 
principals. The facility for smoothing income however must be restricted to ‘good’ 
managers who use the flexibility to work hard in the interests of principals. A strong 
framework of accounting regulation which permits some flexibility in the reporting of 
financial performance whilst restricting the potential for poorer quality managers 
opportunistically to exploit this flexibility is seen as a key mechanism for delivering 
such benefits. In contrast, too much rigidity in the interests of transparency may 
perversely lead to adverse consequences. For example, managers may resort to 
other tactics, which are more damaging to the long term strategic capacity of the 
organisation, in order to meet financial objectives.  
In the public sector a notable NPM development, aimed at improving 
accountability, has been the adoption of accruals accounting based on generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). A considerable literature reviews the merits 
of the adoption of GAAP and its adaptation to fit the public sector setting. Most of 
this literature employs a critical review method. No papers have yet empirically 
investigated the performance impact of variations from GAAP.  
This thesis comprises two main studies: Study 1 investigates firstly, the 
relationship between cost efficiency and service standards in NHS hospitals over 
the period 2003-2008 and secondly, the differential impact on this relationship when 
the Annual Health Check replaced the Star ratings in 2006; Study 2 investigates the 
impact on the performance and accountability of NHS Trusts of an NHS specific 
transaction, known as financial support which operated so as to transfer funds into 
Trusts in financial difficulty from surplus funds elsewhere in the NHS. The 
accounting treatment of financial support, in an approved variation from GAAP, 
permitted flexibility in reported financial performance, often by advancing the 
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recognition of revenue, with the objective of maintaining service standards at a 
higher level than would be possible within the breakeven constraint. 
This thesis makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it makes 
a contribution to the limited number of empirical archival studies in public sector 
accounting research in the UK, Europe and Australasia, particularly in the domain of 
performance measurement where a qualitative paradigm is dominant. Secondly, it 
makes a contribution to the literature on cost efficiency in hospitals by investigating 
the relationship between service standards and cost efficiency in NHS hospitals. 
Thirdly, it contributes to the literature on public sector performance measurement, 
including the balanced scorecard literature, by investigating, in a quasi-experimental 
setting, the relative impact of performance measurement system design on the 
incentivisation of cost efficiency in English hospitals. Fourthly, it makes a 
contribution to the public sector literature on the manipulation of financial 
performance, and to the wider literature on the manipulation of financial 
performance, by investigating whether a form of income manipulation, as manifest 
by the accounting policy for financial support in English acute hospitals, can 
generate benefits to stakeholders in the form of better performance. Fifthly, it adds 
to the literature on the manipulation of financial performance and contributes to our 
understanding of such manipulation, by conducting an investigation in a novel 
setting which is characterised by a complex multi-layering of incentives interacting in 
an institutional context which has been subject to a sustained programme of reform. 
Lastly, it makes a contribution to the literature on accountability and the application 
of UK GAAP in the UK public sector by evaluating the impact of the policy of 
financial support on NHS Trust accountability to Parliament and the public. 
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CHAPTER 4 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
NHS Trusts were established in 1991 as a significant policy innovation 
aimed at improving the efficiency of public sector hospitals. Although subject to 
regulation by the Department of Health, NHS Trusts are publicly funded, quasi- 
independent organisations which mimic private sector organisations in their 
governance arrangements (National Health Service and Community Care Act, 
199017). They generally comprise one or more hospitals whose revenue is derived 
mainly from contractual relationships with healthcare commissioners, Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs), which hold the majority of the NHS budget allocation. NHS Trusts 
generally contract with ten or fewer PCTs although some large Trusts, embracing 
more specialist services, may provide services more widely.  PCTs commission 
acute hospital services for their local health economies through annually negotiated 
service level agreements mainly, though not exclusively18, with NHS Trusts.  
NHS Trusts thus represent a stereo-typical NPM type reform (Hood 1991, 
1995). They were disaggregated from the Department of Health as corporatised 
units; their relationships with commissioners became contractualised rather than 
being hierarchical and their governance was effected by a unitary board modelled 
on best practice in the private sector (Combined Code, 200319; Financial Reporting 
Council, 2006). As a measure to enhance the public accountability of hospitals each 
NHS Trust was subject to a statutory duty to breakeven, satisfaction of which was 
made by reference to their financial statements. In contrast with Government 
departments at the time, NHS Trusts were from their inception in 1992, required to 
                                               
17
 National Health Service and Community Care Act (1990) available at: 
 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1990/Ukpga_19900019_en_1.htm 
 
18
 Primary Care Trusts are expected to commission services for patients from a diverse 
range of providers which include not only NHS Trusts but also Foundation Trusts, (a new 
form of public benefit entity), independent sector treatment centres, private hospitals and 
hospitals overseas. The commitment to enhanced diversity and plurality of provision was 
set out in ‘Delivering the NHS Plan’ (Department of Health, 2002a). Thus NHS Trusts 
compete with a variety of providers to deliver services. 
 
19
 Combined Code (2003): ‘Combined Code on Corporate Governance’ available at:  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf 
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prepare GAAP compliant20 accruals based financial statements. This requirement 
was not imposed on Government departments until the early 21st century. 
However, towards the end of the 1990s there was considerable public 
concern about the performance of the NHS and, following a brief respite in the 
programme of NHS reforms immediately after the election of the Labour 
Government in 1997, the NPM reform agenda continued to be driven forward. 
Consistent with a principal-agent perspective (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) whereby 
agents incur monitoring costs to reduce information asymmetry and to align 
incentives with principal’s objectives, the Government, in the form of the Department 
of Health, acting as agent to Parliament and the public, introduced a number of 
significant reforms aimed at incentivising cost efficiency as a means of delivering 
high service standards. These included the development of a system for measuring 
Trust cost efficiency and, to ensure that cost efficiency was not pursued at the 
expense of quality, the implementation of a multidimensional performance 
measurement system (PMS). The Star ratings system was introduced in 2001-02 
and was replaced by the Annual Health Check (AHC) in 2006. Common features of 
these two PMS facilitate an investigation into the relationship between cost 
efficiency and quality of services in NHS hospitals, a key concern of the literature on 
hospital cost efficiency, during the period 2003-2008. Further, the common 
characteristics of each PMS facilitate an investigation into their relative 
effectiveness at incentivising cost efficiency.  
A key performance indicator in both the Star ratings and the AHC was 
reported financial performance. In the Star ratings, Bevan (2006) identified the 
potential for enhancing a Trust’s performance rating by breaching the requirement 
to breakeven and incurring a deficit in order to improve performance against 
nonfinancial indicators. Deficits in the NHS could however be disguised by 
accessing the system of financial support, which served to manipulate reported 
financial performance by shifting income between NHS organisations and 
accelerating revenue recognition in Trusts in financial difficulty. The system of 
                                               
20
 GAAP compliance was determined by reference to private sector GAAP as interpreted in 
the NHS Accounting Manual
 
as being appropriate and relevant to the NHS. The NHS 
Accounting Manual can be found at:  
http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/finman.nsf/ManualDownload?OpenView 
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financial support was deeply embedded in the institutional structure and history of 
the NHS and allowed a degree of flexibility in reported financial performance in 
order to meet accountability requirements, most notably, the statutory duty to 
breakeven. The operation of the system has, however, been largely hidden from 
public scrutiny.  
The main objectives of this thesis are to investigate the performance and 
accountability consequences of two aspects of performance measurement. The first 
study investigates the relationship between cost efficiency and nonfinancial 
performance over the period 2003-2008 and the relative effectiveness of the Star 
ratings as compared with the AHC in incentivising cost efficiency as a means of 
improving service standards. The second study focuses on the manipulation of 
financial performance through the application of the system financial support and 
investigates the accountability and performance consequences of such a system. 
The main objective of this second study is to evaluate whether financial support, 
which accorded some accounting flexibility in the reporting of financial breakeven, 
generated benefits in the form of better overall performance in those Trusts which 
received it.  
 This Chapter of the thesis sets out the institutional framework which 
provides the setting for these two investigations. Section 4.2 reviews the financial 
accountability of NHS Trusts; Section 4.3 considers the issue of cost efficiency and 
the development of its measurement; Section 4.4 reviews the two performance 
measurement systems which were introduced with the objective of incentivising the 
delivery of cost effective services; Section 4.5 considers the NHS specific 
transaction ‘financial support’ and its impact on Trust performance and 
accountability; Section 4.6 concludes with a summary of the institutional issues 
relevant to the investigations in this thesis.  
4.2 THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF NHS TRUSTS 
Despite notionally operating outside the boundaries of the Department of 
Health, NHS Trusts are financed wholly by public capital, on which an annual 
dividend (capital charge) is paid, and are accountable to the Department of Health 
for their performance. However, in contrast with private sector wholly owned 
subsidiaries, with which they might be compared, the reported financial performance 
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of individual NHS Trusts was accorded particular significance in the satisfaction of 
public accountability. First, Trusts have a statutory duty to breakeven and 
satisfaction of this duty is determined by reference to reported financial performance 
(National Health Service and Community Care Act, 1990). Secondly, the number of 
Trusts in deficit and in breach of their statutory duty is reported to Parliament in the 
annual NHS Summarised Accounts21, prepared by the Department of Health.  
4.2.1 The statutory duty to break-even 
The statutory duty to break even is laid out in the National Health Service 
and Community Care Act, 1990, Section 1022 and requires a Trust ‘to ensure that its 
revenue is not less than sufficient, taking one financial year with another, to meet 
outgoings properly chargeable to the revenue account23’. NHS Trusts normally plan 
to meet their statutory duty by achieving a balanced position on their income and 
expenditure account in each and every year, as required by the Department of 
Health, but the phrase ‘taking one financial year with another’ does provide a 
degree of flexibility about the timescale for matching income with those costs whose 
incidence is uneven, such as the costs associated with the early retirement of staff, 
and when managing the recovery of an NHS Trust with serious financial difficulties. 
The breakeven duty is therefore assumed to have been met if a material cumulative 
deficit position on the income and expenditure account is recovered over a three 
year period (NHS Executive, 1999). A deficit is regarded as material if it exceeds 
more than 0.5% of total annual turnover. Exceptionally, and with the express 
agreement of the relevant SHA, the recovery period can be extended to five years.  
4.2.2 The wider financial accountability of the NHS to Parliament and the 
public 
A key motivation for the introduction of NHS Trusts was the improvement of 
public accountability for hospital performance both to Parliament as a whole and to 
                                               
21
 See NHS Summarised Accounts from 2002-03 available at:  
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0304/nhs_england_summarised_accou.aspx 
 
22
 National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, s.10 available at: 
     http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/19/section/10 
 
23
 In this context the ‘revenue account’ refers to the income statement. 
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local communities. The financial accountability of NHS Trusts is discharged through 
the submission to the Department of Health of annual audited financial statements 
under the provisions of the National Health Service Act, 1977, Section 98(2)24. 
These financial statements are prepared in accordance with the requirements of the 
NHS Accounting Manual and form the basis for the preparation of the Summarised 
Accounts of NHS Trusts25. These accounts are laid before Parliament, as principal, 
by the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Health, (who is also the CEO of 
the NHS), in his role as agent.  
The NHS Accounting Manual26 is prepared in accordance with the 
Treasury’s Financial Reporting Manual27 (FReM), the contents of which are 
determined after consultation with the independent Financial Reporting Advisory 
Board (FRAB). The accounting policies contained in the FReM follow UK generally 
accepted accounting practice for companies (UK GAAP) ‘to the extent that it is 
meaningful and appropriate to the public sector’. 
A further element of the public accountability of NHS Trusts is the 
requirement to present Trust financial statements at an annual public meeting 
(modelled on the private sector annual general meeting). However, attendance at 
these meetings is low, with the number of Trust employees often exceeding the 
number of members of the public (Hodges, MacMiven, Mellett, 2004) and unless 
members of the public attend this meeting they generally do not have access to the 
full audited financial statements which are remitted to the Department of Health. 
Instead, summarised accounts, containing much less information, are made 
available in the Trust’s Annual Report which is generally made more widely 
available, often both electronically on the Trust’s website and in hard copy. 
The financial accountability of the Department of Health, to whom NHS 
Trusts report, is discharged, as for other Government Departments, through the 
                                               
24
 Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/49/contents 
 
25
 Available at: http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/ 
 
26
 Available at: http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/finman.nsf/ManualDownload?OpenView 
 
27
 Available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/frem_previous_manuals.htm 
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submission of annual audited true and fair financial statements to Parliament under 
the provisions of Section 7 of the Government Resources and Accounts Act, 200028. 
These financial statements, submitted to Parliament in addition to the Summarised 
Accounts of the NHS, are prepared in accordance with the requirements of HM 
Treasury’s FReM and consolidate the financial information of bodies operating 
within the Departmental Accounting Boundary, (see Figure 3), most notably PCTs 
(which are budget holders for the majority of the Department’s budget), SHAs and 
the administrative functions of the Department. The Departmental accounting 
boundary is different from the concept of the group in the commercial sector as it is 
based on in-year budgetary control, with Departments being required to live within 
an allocated budget29. NHS Trusts, as provider organisations, lie outside the 
Departmental Accounting Boundary, gaining their revenue not from budget 
allocations but ‘direct from trading activities’ (Department of Health Resource 
Accounts, 2006-07). However the surpluses and deficits of NHS Trusts do 
contribute to a determination of whether the Department has lived within its 
allocated resources (the Departmental Expenditure Limit). The Permanent 
Secretary, in addition to being Accounting Officer for the Department of Health is, 
therefore, also accountable to Parliament for expenditure in NHS Trusts (National 
Health Service Act 1977, s 98(4)), through the submission of ‘Summarised Accounts 
of the NHS’. In a reflection of the significance of the statutory duty to breakeven for 
the public accountability of NHS Trusts, these financial statements include reports of 
the number, but not the identity, of Trusts failing to breakeven, even if, taken 
together, all NHS Trusts achieve financial balance. 
                                               
28
 Government Resources and Accounts Act, 2000 available at:  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/20/contents  
Department of Health resource accounts can be obtained from the Department of Health 
as at:  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGui
dance/DH_081317 
 
29
 See Department of Health Resource Accounts 2006-07 available at:  
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidan
ce/DH_081317 
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4.2.3 Further significance of financial break-even for public accountability 
In addition to having a key role in the discharge of the public accountability 
of NHS Trusts, the achievement of financial breakeven has had further significance 
for the accountability of NHS Trusts as it has been conventionally regarded as a 
proxy measure for Trust cost efficiency. This issue is considered in detail in Section 
4.3 below. It has also played a significant role in determining overall Trust 
performance ratings following the introduction of a multi-dimensional performance 
measurement system in 2001-02. This issue is considered in Section 4.4. 
4.3 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: COST EFFICIENCY 
During the 1980s there was considerable investment in the development of 
costing systems (Ellwood 1996) but, despite this investment, there was very little 
information at the level required to form a basis for cost based pricing between 
purchasers and providers, an integral part of the vision for the internal market 
(Ellwood, 1995). As a result a significant proportion of the contracting between 
purchasers and providers was effected by means of block contracts, where broadly 
based costing information based on historical allocations could be used as the basis 
for negotiation. Further, government measures of cost efficiency during this period 
were subject to considerable criticism (Jacobs, 2001; Street and Jacobs, 2002; 
Street 2003). In this environment, financial breakeven became a proxy for assessing 
Trust cost efficiency. Trusts breaking even were conventionally regarded as being 
efficient and those which incurred a deficit, as being inefficient. In the absence of 
effective costing systems however concerns about variations in performance which 
were considered unacceptable (Department of Health, 2000) persisted. In response, 
the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000) made an explicit commitment to the 
combined pursuit of quality and efficiency (Department of Health, 2000) and the 
development of a Performance Assessment Framework (Department of Health, 
1999). In this Framework efficiency was one of six key aspects of performance that 
would deliver ‘high quality, cost effective services’ (p.8, para 15). New measures of 
efficiency, most notably Trust reference cost indices, were to be developed to 
support both the commissioning of services and the benchmarking of performance. 
Thus, despite longstanding concerns over efficiency in the NHS, a key driver for 
many NPM type reforms, it was only towards the end of the 20th century that 
effective measures of Trust efficiency, Trust reference cost indices, were developed. 
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Reference cost information was first collected in 1997-98. However, early concerns 
about data quality (Department of Health, 2002b; Audit Commission 2004) may 
provide a partial explanation for the omission of reference costs from the multi 
dimensional performance measurement systems, the Star ratings system (2001-02 
to 2004-05) and the subsequent Annual Health Check (2005-06 to 2008-09) which 
were applied to NHS Trusts from 2001. As a consequence, the commitment to 
include measures relating to cost efficiency (Department of Health, 1999) thus 
defaulted to the proxy of financial breakeven despite the susceptibility of reported 
financial performance to manipulation. Substantial investment was subsequently 
made into improving reference costs. This was driven in part by the demands of a 
new hospital payment tariff system which required robust reference costs for 
individual treatments. The introduction of this system, Payment by Results 
(Department of Health, 2002b), which commenced in 2003-04, was in turn 
motivated by the need for an equitable system of hospital payment, uniform across 
all healthcare providers. This was an essential pre-requisite for a key Government 
policy objective: the opening up of the market for providing NHS hospital services to 
a greater diversity of providers, including those from the private sector.(Department 
of Health, 2003a). Consistent with the Government’s objectives, this system 
incentivises the development of a market in quality rather than one based on price 
competition, which could have adverse consequences for patients.  
Under the reference cost system actual costs for individual treatments, 
calculated on a full cost absorption basis, adjusted for case mix and market factors 
arising for example from geographical location, are centrally collected by the 
Department of Health. Trust reference cost indices are weighted aggregate 
measures of Trust cost efficiency based on the actual costs for individual 
treatments30 (Department of Health, 2006a, b). The Reference Cost Index 
represents the cost of a Trust’s aggregate activity compared with the national 
average cost for the same treatments. A reference cost index of 100 represents a 
                                               
30
 For reference to the method of calculation see for example 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/
Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_4133221 and 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/di
gitalasset/dh_118338.pdf 
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Trust operating at the average level of cost efficiency, one of 101 represents 
proportionately higher costs and 99 represents proportionately lower costs. As 
Trusts based in some areas of the country, suffer higher than average costs for staff 
and land and buildings because of external market forces, the reference cost index 
is adjusted by a Market Forces Factor. Where costs are higher than average, as in 
London and the South East, the Market Forces Factor is greater than 1 and 
operates to reduce the Reference Cost Index. Where costs are lower than average, 
as in Cornwall, the Market Forces Factor is less than 1 and operates to increase the 
Reference Cost Index (Department of Health, 2006 a, b). Further, cost data is 
truncated by excluding bed days that fall outside of nationally set lengths of stay 
(trimpoints). The costs of any days beyond these trimpoints are excluded from the 
analysis. This assists in giving a like-for-like comparison of activity and costs. As a 
control measure, Trust reference costs are reconciled to the financial statements to 
ensure that all relevant costs are reported. The weighted aggregate reference cost 
index for each Trust thus represents an inverse measure of relative cost efficiency. 
Trust reference cost indices are independent of the both the Star ratings and the 
AHC, cover most hospital activity and, unlike reported financial performance which 
is subject to the statutory duty to breakeven, do not form a key part of the 
performance management framework. They are therefore relatively robust against 
manipulation and represent a key element in the research design of the two studies 
in this thesis.  
4.4 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SYSTEMS 
4.4.1 Introduction  
During the Thatcher regime of the 1990s, consistent with a general policy of 
deregulation, and the adoption of market based regulatory mechanisms, the 
performance measurement and management of NHS Trusts focused primarily on 
financial performance and the fulfilment of their statutory duty to breakeven. 
However, a parallel initiative with the introduction of NHS Trusts in 1991 was the 
introduction of the `Patient's Charter'. The Charter spoke in terms of patients having 
rights in relation to a limited number of targets mostly related to waiting times for 
treatment. However although there was some reduction in waiting times and in the 
way hospitals conducted themselves, the initiative was one of rhetoric as much as 
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action. (Bristol Enquiry, 2001, Chapter 4 para. 26). By the time the Labour 
Government was elected in 1997 continued pressure on resources for the NHS had 
resulted in considerable public concern about access to services and the NHS Plan 
(Department of Health, 2000) identified a reduction in waiting times as the public’s 
top priority (Department of Health, 2000, Chapter 12). In response the Government, 
consistent with a command and control hierarchical style of governance, (Le Grand, 
2010; Ouchi, 1980) introduced a Performance Assessment Framework (Department 
of Health, 1999), aimed at securing both cost effective and quality healthcare 
services through the setting, implementation and monitoring of national standards 
for treatment. Following the pilot testing of a limited number of performance 
standards (high level performance indicators, HLPIs) in Health Authorities, a multi-
dimensional system of performance measurement, the Star ratings was rolled out 
into NHS hospital Trusts in 2001. Publication of the first Star ratings occurred for the 
year ended 2001-02 with a view to enhancing the public accountability of NHS 
Trusts for their performance (Department of Health, 2002a). This section proceeds 
with a review of the Star ratings (Section 4.4.2) followed by a review of the Annual 
Health Check (Section 4.4.3). It concludes with a summary (Section 4.4.4) of the 
significance of this institutional setting for research investigations. 
4.4.2 The Star ratings 
The Star ratings system delivered a composite measure of performance, the 
Star rating, which represented an overall assessment of performance against a 
number of individual component measures, across a range of perspectives inspired 
by the balanced scorecard. Schwartz et al, (2011) argued such a balanced 
scorecard approach, employing both composite measures, which are useful for 
policy purposes, and individual component measures, which discourage trade-offs, 
may be most effective at incentivising the delivery of high service standards cost 
effectively.  
There were two key elements in the Star ratings system, determined after 
extensive consultation with the public and the professions. First, a limited number of 
key targets was identified as representative of the public’s top priorities for hospital 
services and second, a broader set of measures reflected the wider interests of key 
stakeholders.  
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There were nine key measures in each of the years of the Star Ratings 
(2002-03 to 2004-200531) with the exception of 2005 when there were eight32. 
These measures were linked to Government commitments made in the NHS Plan 
(Department of Health, 2000) and were dominated by measures related to access to 
treatment (waiting times). The five key measures which related to waiting times for 
treatment and were consistent throughout the period of this study were: four hour 
and twelve hour accident and emergency waits; cancer waits; and inpatient and 
outpatient waits. Of the remaining four measures, reported financial performance 
and hospital cleanliness also featured in each year of the Star ratings. The 
remaining key targets were made up of one or two of the following: an ‘improving 
working lives’ measure; a patient appointment booking measure and a cancelled 
operations measure. In addition to the nine key measures there were approximately 
thirty other ‘balanced scorecard’ measures clustered in three perspectives: the 
clinical perspective, the patient perspective and the capacity and capability 
perspective. In contrast with the key measures which were very much driven by the 
priorities of the public as identified by the new Labour Government, these additional 
measures were determined by the independent performance regulator, the 
Commission for Health Improvement, and the Department of Health after further 
consultation with service and other stakeholders. As their collective name suggests, 
these additional measures were inspired by the notion of the balanced scorecard 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a). The patient perspective can be seen to be 
broadly consistent with the customer perspective; the clinical perspective is similar 
in purpose to the internal business process perspective and the capacity and 
capability perspective with the learning and growth perspective. There is, however, 
no financial perspective and no evidence that the causal mapping recommended by 
Kaplan and Norton (1996a) was undertaken. The patient perspective and the 
capacity and capability perspective, consistent with the arguments put forward in 
Ludwig, Van Merode and Groot, 2010 and Schwartz et al., 2011, included not only 
measures such as waiting times for treatment but also measures of service quality 
                                               
31
 The Star ratings system was initially introduced in 2001-02 but the system was not fully 
developed and operational until 2002-03. 
32
 The original intention was that there would be nine key targets in each of the years of the 
Star ratings but in 2005, the Improving Working Lives measure, which was concerned 
with new ways of working was dropped as it was deemed to have been fully 
implemented. 
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based on the results of patient and staff survey data. A full list of the Star rating 
performance indicators can be found in Appendix 1. 
Under the Star rating system, which was devised and regulated by a newly 
formed regulator, the Commission for Health Improvement, performance against the 
key targets was measured against a three point categorical scale, according to 
whether the predetermined target was achieved, underachieved or significantly 
underachieved. A negative scoring system was operated: zero penalties for 
achievement, two for underachievement and six for significant underachievement. 
These scores were aggregated to obtain a total penalty score. Performance against 
balanced scorecard measures, in contrast was scored positively with higher scores 
awarded for achievement of the target. These scores were similarly aggregated and 
then an overall ‘balanced scorecard’ score of between zero (worst) and six (best) 
was awarded based on the Trust’s performance relative to all other Trusts. These 
two main performance scores (for the key targets and the balanced scorecard) were 
then aggregated according to another scoring matrix to determine the final rating of 
the Trust on a scale of zero stars (worst) to three stars (best). Figure 5 shows the 
significance given to the key targets by the Government in this aggregation. The 
limited number of key targets are given a much heavier weighting in the overall 
rating than the much larger number of balanced scorecard targets. This can be 
illustrated by identifying that a two star rating can be achieved by concentrating on 
the nine key targets, where up to two penalty points can be incurred for 
underachievement of one of the performance standards, with little attention to the 
much larger number of balanced scorecard targets. As can be seen, a two star 
rating, which removes the CEO from additional monitoring and threat of dismissal, 
can be obtained with a score as low as one for the balanced scorecard measures.  
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Figure 5: Determination of star rating – scoring methodology33 
 
 Balanced scorecard* points 
9 key targets  –  
total penalty points 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 >12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 7-12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 3-6 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
 0-2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 
*c. 30 indicators across 3 perspectives 
 
Source: Performance ratings methodology for 2003/04 (Acute hospital Trusts), Commission 
for Health Improvement, July 2004.  
 
 
 
 
 
Trust Star ratings were linked to a number of performance management 
mechanisms aimed at incentivising good performance as measured by the PMS 
(Department of Health, 2002c). These included rewards for good performance 
ratings in the form of lower levels of monitoring, the ability to apply for Foundation 
Trust status and reputational gains. Penalties for poor performance included the risk 
of dismissal and reputational damage. The CEOs of zero and one star Trusts were 
given a limited time of as little as three months to improve performance or face the 
possibility of dismissal. In a study of CEO incentives in NHS Trusts during this 
period Ballantine, Forker & Greenwood, (2008) found that CEO turnover was higher 
than that identified in prior private sector and hospital based-studies. 
4.4.2.1 Financial measures in the Star ratings 
Within the Star ratings system there was only one financial measure: 
reported financial performance. This measure acted as a proxy for the cost efficient 
                                               
33
 A more detailed description of the derivation of the scores on the balanced scorecard and 
on the key target penalties can be found in Appendix 2. Further information on the 
performance ratings methodology can also be found at:  
http://ratings2005.healthcarecommission.org.uk/methodology.asp 
 http://ratings2004.healthcarecommission.org.uk/methodology.asp 
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delivery of services and was measured, as for all key Government measures, on a 
three point categorical scale: zero penalty points for breakeven or better; two 
penalty points for a small deficit of up to 1% of revenue and six penalty points for a 
large deficit of more than 1% of revenue. 
4.4.3 The Annual Health Check 
On the 1st April 2004, the Commission for Health Improvement, which was 
established to oversee and manage hospital inspections and performance ratings 
when the Star ratings were introduced, was replaced by the Healthcare 
Commission. The Healthcare Commission brought together, under the management 
of one organisation, several different strands of performance monitoring for the 
purposes of better co-ordination across the NHS. In addition to the work of the 
Commission for Health Improvement the Healthcare Commission also took over the 
work of the National Care Standards Commission, which had regulated NHS 
services delivered in the private and voluntary sectors, and also assumed 
responsibility for the value for money work which had previously been the 
responsibility of the Audit Commission. In 2004-05 the Healthcare Commission 
continued to operate the Star ratings system which it had inherited from the 
Commission for Health Improvement. However, the Commission was concerned 
about growing criticism of the opportunities for manipulation that had been identified 
in the Star ratings (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Bevan 2006) and the need to integrate 
new forms of provider, particularly Foundation Trusts. Consistent with the 
conclusions of Kelman and Friedman (2009) and the findings of Courty and 
Marshcke (2003b, 2007) that gaming of performance measurement is revealed over 
time and that managerial responses lead to evolutionary PMS design, the 
Healthcare Commission introduced a new system, the Annual Health Check in 
2005-06 (Healthcare Commission, 2005a).  
There were two key differences between the Star ratings and the AHC. First, 
the AHC was characterised by additional measurement diversity, incorporating 
approximately 70 nonfinancial measures as compared with less than 40 in the Star 
ratings and second, the weighting given to financial measures was much higher in 
the AHC than in the Star ratings. First, the incentive for trading financial for 
nonfinancial performance was reduced by the non-aggregation of financial 
measures with nonfinancial measures. Instead of one overall rating the Annual 
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Health Check had two components: the ‘Quality of Services’ rating, which captured 
performance against the nonfinancial measures, and the ‘Use of Resources’ rating 
which captured performance against the financial measures. Second, the number of 
financial measures was increased, with the introduction of five perspectives of 
financial performance, resulting in fourteen principal measures of performance. 
Third, for the highest rating, there was a requirement for persistence over a three 
year period in the achievement of financial breakeven whilst a deficit was heavily 
penalised, automatically resulting in the lowest overall Use of Resources rating, no 
matter how good the Trust’s performance on other measures. 
The two principal elements of the Annual Health Check, the ‘Quality of 
Services’ and ‘Use of Resources’ are considered in more depth in the following 
sections.  
4.4.3.1 Nonfinancial measures in the Annual Health Check: Quality of Services  
There were three main components of the Quality of Services rating: 
Existing National Targets (broadly equivalent to the Key Targets in the Star ratings), 
Core Standards (broadly equivalent to the Balanced Scorecard) and New National 
Targets.  
Existing National Targets 
The twelve Existing National Targets were broadly equivalent to the nine 
Key Targets in the Star ratings and represented key Government priorities for 
hospital services. The additional measures: thrombolysis waits, revascularisation 
waits and rapid access to chest pain clinics, had been present in the Star ratings but 
as the lower weighted Balanced Scorecard indicators, rather than as Key Targets. A 
full list of the Existing National Targets can be found in Appendix 3. Performance 
against the Existing National Targets (ENTs) was, as with the Star ratings, 
measured on a three point categorical scale but, in contrast with the Star ratings, 
the scoring was positive: three points for achievement, two for underachievement 
and zero for failure.34 The total ENT score then determined a ranking based on a 
                                               
34
 Scoring methodology for each year of the Annual Health Check can be obtained from: 
http://www.cqc.org.uk/guidanceforprofessionals/nhstrusts/annualassessments/annualhea
lthcheck2005/06-2008/09.cfm 
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four point scale: not met (worst), partly met, almost met and fully met (best). As not 
all Trusts were subject to all twelve targets the scores were scaled to determine this 
overall level of performance. Figure 6 illustrates how the final categorical ranking 
was determined: 
Figure 6: The Annual Health Check: Overall Scoring for Existing National Targets  
 
Number of 
applicable 
targets 
Maximum 
points 
available 
Overall score 
Fully met Almost met Partly met Not met 
12  36  >=33  >=30  >=27  <27  
11  33  >=30  >=27  >=24  <24  
10  30  >=27  >=24  >=21  <21  
9  27  >=25  >=22  >=19  <19  
8  24  >=22  >=20  >=17  <17  
7  21  >=19  >=17  >=15  <15  
6  18  >=17  >=15  >=13  <13  
5  15  >=14  >=12  >=11  <11  
4  12  >=11  >=10  >=9  <9  
3  9  >=9  >=8  >=7  <7  
 
Core standards 
The Core Standards were broadly equivalent to the Balanced Scorecard of 
the Star ratings but the number of perspectives was increased to seven: safety; 
clinical and cost effectiveness; governance; patient focus; accessible and 
responsive care; care environment and amenities, and public health. There were 24 
measures in total spread across these perspectives but many of these had 
subsidiary measures resulting in a total number of measures in excess of 40. A full 
list of Core Standards can be found in Appendix 3. Performance against each 
individual core standard was measured on a bi-modal scale of 0 for compliant and 1 
for ‘Not met’. The number of targets not met then determined overall performance 
on a four point categorical scale, as with the Existing National Targets, of Not met 
(worst) to Fully met (best).  
New National Targets 
New National Targets were Government measures of performance that 
reflected developing priorities as Trusts moved beyond the standards reflected in 
core and existing standards. A full list of New National Targets can be found in 
Appendix 3. Performance against New National Targets was as for the Existing 
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National Targets with each indicator being scored on a 3 point categorical scale of 3 
for achieved, 2 for underachieved and 0 for failed. These scores were then summed 
and the total score, depending on the number of applicable targets determined the 
overall scoring on a four point scale of Weak (worst), fair, good and excellent (best). 
The Quality of Services rating: 
The final Quality of Services rating was derived by aggregating the scores 
against each of existing national targets, core standards and new national targets 
according to the matrix shown in Figure 7. In this figure the rankings have been 
changed into a four point numerical ranking as follows: Not met (ENTs and Core 
Standards) or Weak (New National Targets) =4; Partly met or Fair =2; Almost met or 
Good =3; and Fully Met or Excellent =4. 
 
 
Figure 7: Derivation of the final Quality of Services rating 
 
Measurement 
scale 1-4
35
  
Existing 
National 
Targets 
(12) 
Core 
Standards 
 
(24) 
New National 
Targets (NNTs)  
 
(13) 
Quality of 
Services rating 
 
49 
Aggregated 
Performance 
score
 
1      OR 1  Weak 
2     AND 2  Fair 
3     AND 3     AND 3 Good 
4      AND 4     AND 4 Excellent 
 
As can be seen the AHC required progressively greater coverage of 
activities in order to progress from a lower to a higher rating. This design feature 
reduced the incentive to concentrate resources on a narrow range of measures as 
was observed in the Star ratings where it was possible to obtain a high performance 
rating of two stars by concentrating resources on a narrow range of nine key 
Government targets. As can be seen from Figure 5 the equivalent rating of Good 
                                               
35
 Performance across each dimension of Existing National Targets, Core Standards and 
New National Targets has been converted into a numerical score of 1 (worst) to 4 (best) 
as follows. Existing National Targets and Core Standards: 1=Not met; 2= Partly met 
3=Almost met; 4 = Fully met. New National Targets: 1= Weak; 2= Fair; 3=Good; 4= 
Excellent. 
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requires not only good performance against the Existing National Targets but also 
against the Core Standards and the New National Targets. 
4.4.3.2 Financial measures in the Annual Health Check: Use of Resources 
In the Annual Health Check performance against financial measures was not 
aggregated with nonfinancial measures, as in the Star ratings, but was assessed 
separately. Further, in contrast with the Star ratings, which included only one 
financial measure, that of reported financial performance, the Annual Health Check 
included a range of measures in five main perspectives: financial reporting, financial 
management, financial standing (which incorporated the measure of reported 
financial performance), internal control and value for money.36 Each individual 
measure was assessed on a four point scale of one to four by the Audit Commission 
(to whom this function was delegated by the Healthcare Commission) who provided 
the relevant information for determining a Trust’s Use of Resources rating to the 
Healthcare Commission. These scores were then aggregated into an overall Use of 
Resources rating as in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Derivation of the Use of Resources rating 
 
 Financial 
standing 
Financial 
Management 
Value 
for 
Money 
Financial 
Reporting 
Internal 
Control 
Use of 
Resources 
rating 
Number of 
measures 
2
37
 3 4 2 3 14 
Performance 
Measurement 
scale  
1-4 
1   OR 1   OR 1   WEAK 
2    AND 2   AND 2   FAIR 
3    AND 3   AND 3  AND 2  AND 2 GOOD 
AT LEAST TWO SCORES OF 4 
AND 
3  AND 3 EXCELLENT 
 
 
                                               
36
 The scoring methodology was published for each year of the Annual Health Check and 
can be obtained from: 
http://www.cqc.org.uk/guidanceforprofessionals/nhstrusts/annualassessments/annualhea
lthcheck2005/06-2008/09.cfm 
37
 Financial breakeven is a critical indicator. Failure to breakeven results in a score of one for 
Financial Standing, thereby guaranteeing a WEAK Use of Resources rating. 
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.A list of the individual measures (14), most of which have subsidiary 
measures making up around 40 measures in total) can be found in Appendix 4.  
Key features of this scoring system as compared with the Star ratings are 
the increased coverage of financial activities and the increased emphasis on the 
achievement of financial breakeven. As can be seen, similar to the Quality of 
Services rating, increasing coverage of activities combined with increasing levels of 
performance are required to progress from one rating level to another. Further, 
Financial standing in particular has a very influential place. There is only one 
measure for financial standing which is broken down into only two subsidiary 
measures, one of which is financial breakeven, the other being financial projections. 
Incurrence of a deficit of whatever size results in a financial standing score of 1 (the 
lowest) which then gives rise to an overall Use of Resources score of Weak, 
whatever  the Trust’s performance against the other measures. Further, in contrast 
with the Star ratings which only concerned itself with current year performance, in 
the Annual Health Check financial breakeven must be achieved in each of the 
previous three financial years if a score of 4 is to be achieved for financial standing. 
Both of these factors reduce the incentive to incur a short term tactical deficit in 
order to improve the quality of services rating and illustrate the continuing 
significance which is attached in the Annual Health Check to the financial breakeven 
objective. 
4.4.3.3 Summary of key similarities between the Star ratings and the Annual 
Health Check  
Although there are distinctive differences between the Star ratings and the 
Annual Health Check there remain some key common features.  
1. Performance against a limited number of key Government 
performance measures (Key Targets in the Star ratings and the 
Existing National Targets in the Annual Health Check) was influential 
to the overall rating in both systems. 
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2. In each of the PMS, performance against each of these key 
Government measures was scored on a three point categorical scale 
relative to a predefined target. 
3. The scores in all perspectives were aggregated using a scoring 
matrix to arrive at an aggregated performance rating measured on a 
four point scale of zero to three stars in the Star ratings and Weak to 
Excellent in the Annual Health Check. 
4. Reported financial performance and the achievement of financial 
breakeven was an influential measure for the overall performance 
rating under both PMS 
In addition, both PMS were linked to a number of performance management 
mechanisms aimed at incentivizing good performance ratings. These included 
rewards for good performance in the form of lower levels of monitoring, more 
commercial freedom including the ability to apply for Foundation Trust status and 
reputational gains (Department of Health, 2002c). Penalties for poor performance 
included the risk of dismissal and reputational damage.  
In summary, the distinguishing features of the AHC, compared with the Star 
ratings, were a much wider range of measures, both financial and nonfinancial, and 
an increased emphasis on financial performance. However a number of common 
features characterise both systems and it is these common features which are 
exploited in the investigations in this thesis to derive uniform measures of financial 
and nonfinancial performance for all Trusts across the period of study.  
4.4.4 Significance of the Star ratings and the AHC for research 
investigations 
The Star ratings and the AHC were uniform systems of performance 
measurement that were applied to NHS acute hospital Trusts over the period 2003-
2008. This setting, as in Ittner, Larcker and Randall’s (2003) choice of the financial 
services industry, provides more homogeneous setting for exploring the relationship 
between nonfinancial and financial measures of performance (in this case, cost 
efficiency), than multi industry settings and mitigates the need to control for 
variations in incentives, organisation form etc. Further the availability of consistently 
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applied nonfinancial measures in the Star ratings and AHC mitigates the need for 
the use of self-reported measures of performance as, for example, in Hall (2008) 
and Hoque and James (2000). Further, the juxtaposition of the Star ratings and the 
AHC offers the opportunity for a quasi-experimental study, as in Propper, Sutton, 
Whitnall and Windjmeier (2010), which compares the impact of the AHC in 
comparison with the Star ratings on the relationship between nonfinancial 
performance and cost efficiency. Further, the two systems offer the opportunity of 
investigating the performance impact of increased measurement diversity and 
improved balance in the weightings given to financial and nonfinancial measures in 
balanced scorecard inspired PMS (Ittner and Larcker, 1998a) applied in a public 
sector setting, a setting which has received little attention in the empirical archival 
literature. 
4.5 REPORTED FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT: FLEXIBILITY AND 
MANIPULATION 
4.5.1 Introduction 
One common feature of both the Star ratings and the AHC is the importance 
attached to reported financial performance. In the Star ratings it represented one of 
only nine key Government targets that were influential in determining a Trust’s 
ultimate performance rating, and in the Annual Health Check failure to achieve 
financial breakeven attracted the maximum penalty and the lowest rating for ‘Use of 
Resources’. As has already been identified, reported financial performance and the 
break-even duty, represented key mechanisms for discharging Trusts’ public 
accountability. However, during the 1990s underdeveloped costing systems, which 
impeded effective contracting, created an environment in which accounting 
mechanisms associated with the previous hierarchical regime and which offered 
flexibility in the reporting of financial breakeven, were retained. These included 
capital to revenue transfers which were withdrawn when the Government introduced 
accruals accounting to Government Departments; the ability to defer patient 
treatment, which became severely constrained when the Star ratings system was 
introduced and the system of financial support, in which surplus funds from 
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elsewhere in the NHS were transferred into NHS organisations in financial 
difficulty38. Other mechanisms such as accruals manipulation or the deferral of 
expenditure such as repairs and maintenance offered some scope for flexibility but 
were limited in their effectiveness for dealing with large deficits which might arise, 
for example, because of book losses on asset sales and as a consequence of 
heavy one off revenue expenditure such as might be associated with early 
retirement settlements or with large capital projects. In other instances, large deficits 
may arise as a consequence of poor management and the provision of financial 
support might be negotiated on the appointment to a Trust in financial difficulty of a 
new Chief Executive or Director of Finance.  
This section of the thesis proceeds as follows. First the operation of the 
system of financial support is described. Second, the purpose of financial support is 
reviewed and the incentives not to apply it for the benefit of the public and patients 
but to use it opportunistically to avoid the consequences of performance 
measurement are considered. Third, the accounting policies relating to the provision 
of financial support are outlined. Finally the impact of the system of financial support 
on public accountability is reviewed. A number of case studies, taken from Audit 
Commission publications, are provided to illustrate certain aspects of financial 
support and these are referenced where appropriate. 
4.5.2 How the financial support system worked 
Financial support was an NHS specific transaction whereby surplus funds 
could be transferred as additional revenue into Trusts in financial difficulty. It was 
defined in the NHS accounting manual39 as: ‘additional income during the year, 
provided wholly to assist in managing financial problems’ (Audit Commission, 
2006a, para. 2.16). Financial difficulty is defined in the Department of Health’s 
                                               
38
 The longstanding availability of financial support was confirmed by Rt. Hon Kevin Barron 
MP, Chairman, Health Select Committee who, in the Health Committee’s review of NHS 
Deficits (House of Commons, 2006b) referred to financial support (otherwise referred to 
as brokerage) as having been in existence ‘for years and years’ (p. Ev54). 
39
 NHS Accounting Manual available at:  
http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/finman.nsf/ManualDownload?OpenView 
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financial statements as being a deficit of more than £1m or more than 1% of 
revenue (as in the NHS Summarised Accounts, 2006 para. 42.40) 
Financial support could be sought from a number of sources. First, a Trust’s 
main commissioner (PCT) might agree to provide additional funds from its own 
unallocated resources; second, a Primary Care Trust might seek to reallocate funds 
from other Trusts within their commissioning area, on the understanding that these 
funds would be returned in future years; third, funds might be sought from other 
Primary Care Trusts within the remit of the local Strategic Health Authority; and 
finally, funds could be sought from other (English) Strategic Health Authorities. From 
2002, these largely informal arrangements were given a greater degree of structure 
when funding sourced from other Strategic Health Authorities became administered 
and co-ordinated by the newly created NHS Bank, essentially a mutual organisation 
of SHAs (Department of Health, 2003c) whose purpose ‘is to support NHS 
organisations in maximising the use of resources across the NHS and over different 
financial years’ (Audit Commission, 2005, p.49; 2006a, p.80). In this way the 
informal arrangements were institutionalised. The NHS Bank was allocated £100m 
of NHS central funds (the Special Mutual Assistance Fund) in each of the three 
years to 2005-06 (Department of Health, 2003c) to be allocated by way of a non-
recurring grant to SHAs in need41.  
The NHS Bank also co-ordinated the brokerage of financial support beyond 
the £100m Special Mutual Assistance Fund between SHAs on a similar, but more 
formal basis than previously. Local arrangements for brokerage of funds between 
NHS organisations within an SHA continued, on an essentially informal basis, as 
previously. Where funds were needed to support NHS Trusts, the conditions upon 
which financial support was provided to the NHS Trust was subject to agreement 
between the Trust, the SHA and the local PCT. A general condition of the provision 
of financial support was the submission and agreement of a recovery plan which 
incorporated an agreed schedule of repayment of the funds advanced. Some 
                                               
40
 NHS Summarised Accounts are available at:  
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/nhs_summarised_accounts_07-08.aspx 
 
41
 The Mutual Support Assistance Fund essentially reflected a top slicing of the income 
allocated to PCTs and acted as a form of compulsory contribution towards the support of 
Trusts in financial difficulty. 
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categories of additional revenue costs associated with the early years of PFI 
projects were, however, routinely supported from NHS Bank funds on a temporary 
basis42 through the provision of non-recurring grants.  
The avenues through which funds could flow to NHS Trusts in the form of 
financial support are illustrated in Figure 9 below.  
                                               
42
 Further information on the systems used to allocate financial support for PFI projects can 
be found in NHS Bank guidance for 2005-06. 
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Figure 9: Avenues for transferring funds into NHS Trusts as financial support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 Accountability of PCTs 1, 2 and 3 to SHA 3 
 Service level agreements between NHS Trusts 3A, 3B and 3C with PCT 3 
 Boundary of the Department of Health 
Transfers of funds, ‘financial support’ between SHAs, brokered by the NHS 
Bank, subsequently transferred to PCTs 
Transfers between PCTs, brokered by the SHA 
Transfers between NHS Trusts in the same commissioning area as PCT 3, 
brokered by the PCT 
  
NHS Bank 
SHA 1 SHA 2 SHA 3 
PCT 1 PCT 2 PCT 3 
NHS Trust 3A NHS Trust 3B NHS Trust 3C 
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Financial support was available to both Primary Care Trusts and to NHS 
Trusts but whilst Primary Care Trusts operate within the departmental boundary of 
the Department of Health, NHS Trusts are quasi-independent organisations that 
operate outside the Department’s accounting boundary. As such financial support 
provided to NHS Trusts was always provided via the local commissioning PCTs and 
not directly for example from other NHS Trusts. Recovery of financial support in 
future periods was also effected through the local PCT.  
4.5.3 The purpose of financial support 
Some indication of the purpose of financial support is given by its definition 
in the NHS accounting manual43 as: ‘additional income during the year, provided 
wholly to assist in managing financial problems’ (Audit Commission, 2006a, para. 
2.16). More bluntly the National Audit Office (2004, p19) describes it as ‘a tool used 
by the Department (of Health) to help NHS organisations achieve financial balance’.  
Further insight is given into its purpose by the proceedings of the Health 
Select Committee’s investigation into the origins of NHS deficits (House of 
Commons 2006a, b). Phil Taylor, Chairman of the Healthcare Financial 
Management Association described the purpose of financial support as follows: 
“If a trust was opening a new facility, in the first year or two it is much more 
expensive when you open a new facility and so you need to pass a little extra bit of 
funding to that organisation in order to get over that hump. There could be other 
reasons for moving brokerage (financial support) round the system, but the intention 
always was not to make the system less transparent but to oil the wheels to make 
the NHS able to cope with local difficulties”.  
The significance of deficits for patient care is illustrated in the following 
extract from the Audit Commission’s review of the NHS Summarised Accounts for 
2004-05: 
“Managing and recovering deficits can have a far-reaching impact on NHS 
bodies, potentially affecting their ability to deliver services, meet binding 
                                               
43
 NHS Accounting Manual available at:  
http://www.info.doh.gov.uk/doh/finman.nsf/ManualDownload?OpenView 
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commitments, manage major initiatives and achieve the criteria for Foundation Trust 
status……. Pressure to recover a deficit and avoid breaching financial duties will 
mean NHS bodies are faced with difficult decisions, the results of which can impact 
on service delivery. This can include reducing capacity, for example through staff 
cuts, vacancy freezes or ward closures, or generating income through non-recurrent 
measures such as property disposals. Such measures, while providing temporary 
relief to financial pressures, may well impact on the body’s performance against 
other key targets, such as access to services and waiting times” (Audit Commission 
2006a p33). 
The pressure to avoid a deficit was however strong. Ballantine, Forker and 
Greenwood (2008b) found that deficits were significantly associated with CEO 
turnover. Case study evidence is also provided by the Audit Commission’s work on 
NHS financial statements. Case Study 1 describes the experience of the Mid 
Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust and illustrates how the Director of Finance was also 
under threat of dismissal. Further more desperate measures are illustrated by Case 
Study 2 which describes how the Scarborough and North East Yorkshire NHS Trust 
resorted to inappropriate accounting adjustments in an attempt to report financial 
break-even. Key points arising from the case studies are highlighted in bold and 
accompanied by explanatory text in an adjacent text box.  
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Case Study 1: The Mid-Yorkshire NHS Trust 
In 2003-04, the Mid Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust reported an in-year 
deficit of £18.6 million, the largest deficit of all NHS bodies in 2003-04. The 
Trust and the local health economy have long-standing service and financial 
issues, which the Trust had been able to manage in previous years through 
the receipt of one-off financial support and a variety of other non-
recurrent solutions. However, these measures did not address the 
underlying problems. The Trust, in conjunction with their auditors, has 
identified the main contributors to the deficit in 2003-04 as: failure to 
adequately manage recruitment and retention difficulties leading to the use 
of high-cost bank and agency staff; the cost of meeting key NHS Plan 
waiting-time targets through premium-rate waiting list initiatives, 
including the use of the private sector; and the historic lack of adequate 
budget-setting and monitoring procedures, making it more difficult to identify, 
monitor and manage cost pressures. Progress has been made in this area 
during 2003-04 and beyond, but by this time the deficit had already arisen. 
The timeline below shows the deterioration of the Trust’s financial position 
May 2003:  Trust Board approves budget for 2003-04 which identifies 
savings requirement of £19 million to achieve financial 
balance. 
June 2003:  Year end deficit of £8.7 million predicted. 
August 2003:  New Director of Finance takes up post. 
October 2003: Director of Finance’s review of financial position shows that 
year-end deficit could be as high as £34 million. 
January 2004:  Trust agrees plan to reduce year end deficit to £18 million. 
July 2004: The Trust’s 2003-04 annual accounts show a deficit of £18.6 
million (£30.6 million if external support is removed). 
September 2004: Auditor issues Section 8 public interest report because in 
his opinion insufficient progress had been made on the 
actions identified in his February letter. The auditor 
stresses the urgency of agreeing a recovery plan with the 
Department and the Strategic Health Authority. 
Audit Commission 2005 p.16 
Trade off of 
financial for 
nonfinancial 
performanc
e 
Financial 
support to 
allow time 
to address 
financial 
problems 
Consequences 
for finance 
director 
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Case Study 2: Scarborough and North East Yorkshire NHS Trust 
Scarborough and North East Yorkshire Healthcare NHS Trust has had 
financial difficulties for a number of years. In 2004-05, the Trust was in 
year three of a financial recovery plan agreed with its main 
commissioner and the local Strategic Health Authority. Over the last 
four years the Trust had received financial support totalling £10 million 
from the Strategic Health Authority; in each case, the Trust had repaid 
this support in the year following its receipt. With this support, the 
Trust met its key NHS Plan waiting time targets for each year and its 
financial break-even target until 2004-05.  
……… 
… during 2004-05 the Trust also considered a number of further 
measures to break even. These included a number of accounting 
adjustments. Before the accounts were prepared, the appointed auditor 
provided guidance that the proposed adjustments would not comply 
with accounting standards as set out in the NHS Trust Manual for 
Accounts.  
The Director of Finance chose to disregard the auditor’s view and prepared 
a balanced set of accounts. The draft accounts submitted for audit in 
May 2005 reported a year-end surplus of £20,000 and contained a 
number of inappropriate accounting adjustments and errors. Despite 
the existence of clear rules on large adjustments related to purchases made 
in previous years, the Trust hoped it could reduce in-year spending by 
reclassifying previously purchased medical instruments as stock and fixed 
assets. The accounts also contained examples of incorrect accounting 
treatment and inadequate checking procedures leading to significant errors. 
In the Public Interest Report, the auditor reported that a number of 
adjustments employed by the Trust were a device to achieve financial 
balance, rather than improve the accuracy of the accounts, and did not 
comply with accounting standards. 
Audit Commission 2006a, p52 
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Finally Case Study 3 illustrates the concerns of the Audit Commission about 
the late provision of financial support in the Royal Cornwall NHS Trust.  
 
Case Study 3: Royal Cornwall NHS Trust 
Even where proper disclosure is made, unplanned support is sometimes used 
as a last-minute ‘fix’ to prevent bodies breaching statutory financial duties. 
In 2004-05, Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust received £15.5 million of 
unplanned support in addition to £10.9 million of planned support. This was 
precisely the figure required to eliminate its cumulative deficit of £13.6 million and 
hence meet its statutory duty to break even within four years (including an agreed 
extension). Although this arrangement was fully disclosed in the Trust’s annual 
accounts, it is evident that the current regime allows bodies to receive financial 
support at short notice to avoid breaching statutory duties. 
Audit Commission, 2006a, p.22 
 
These case studies illustrate that the potentially opportunistic application of 
financial support required the collaboration of several layers of NHS management. 
The incentives for the avoidance of NHS Trust deficits lay in the different roles each 
organisation played. The SHA, in its role as performance manager for all NHS 
Trusts and PCTs in its area, may wish to avoid scrutiny of its possible failure to 
exercise this role effectively. Similarly, the PCT might wish to avoid questions about 
its own operations and allocation of funds to hospital services. If the PCT was 
struggling to balance its own books an adjustment to hospital service level 
agreements might serve only to transfer a deficit from the hospital to the PCT, and 
could set a precedent for higher future levels of funding, an outcome that might be 
particularly undesirable if there were concerns that hospital management was not 
pursuing realisable efficiency savings with sufficient vigour. Evidence of the 
opportunistic use of the financial support system was provided by Dr. Doug 
Naysmith MP as part of the proceedings of the Health Select Committee’s review of 
NHS Deficits (House of Commons, 2006, b).   
 ‘My experience of that system (financial support) was that it was sometimes 
used to cover up deficits and then, at an appropriate time, the money was moved 
Opportunistic 
application of 
financial 
support 
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back again to where it had come from without any real effort being put into sorting 
out why the deficit arose in the other organisation first.’ (House of Commons, 2006b: 
Q476). 
However, as is illustrated by Case Studies 1 to 3, the use of financial support 
without adequate recovery plans became an, increasing concern for the Audit 
Commission:  
 ‘Much has been written about such support and brokerage and the culture 
of dependence that this creates. We found that in failing organisations the 
dependence on brokerage was absolute, with recovery planning focusing to an 
unhealthy degree on the precise profiling of future borrowing and the schedule of 
repayments’. (Audit Commission, 2006b, para. 76).  
Financial support was not however meant to allow flexibility in the reporting 
of breakeven where deficits arose in the context of routine trading transactions. 
Where deficits arose for example because of a higher level of patient referrals 
treatment than was anticipated in the Trust’s service level agreement with the PCT, 
amendments to that agreement could be negotiated between the two parties. Case 
Study 4 illustrates a number of features of the system of financial support and the 
means by which Trusts could address deficits, including the renegotiation of service 
level agreements. Other features illustrated by the Case Study include: the provision 
of financial support to facilitate the reporting of financial breakeven; SHAs and PCTs 
as sources of financial support; the trading off of financial performance for 
nonfinancial performance prior to the receipt of financial support; the anticipated 
improvement in subsequent underlying financial performance; and the presence of a 
recovery plan and of process improvements which permit financial recovery whilst 
simultaneously improving service standards. 
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Case Study 4: North Bristol NHS Trust 
 
In the year to 31 March 2003, North Bristol NHS Trust reported the 
largest ever deficit in the NHS of £44.6 million. In the year to 31 March 
2004, the Trust reported an in-year surplus of £20,000 after 
receiving £32.2 million of external financial support (£18.1 million 
from the NHS Bank and £14.1 million from Primary Care Trusts). 
Stripping out the external support, the Trust managed to reduce its 
deficit for the year from £44.6 million to £32.2 million, an 
improvement of £12.4 million. The improvement was net of new cost 
pressures of £3.8 million, so the actual savings achieved were £16.2 
million. The Trust notes that the main contributing factors to the 
reduction in deficit were: reduction in agency staff costs (£5 million); 
reduction in expenditure on private sector treatment to meet 
access targets (£2 million); reduction in depreciation charge (£1 
million);additional income received for exceeding service level 
agreement activity level (£1 million);rates rebate (£1 million)……... It 
plans to make further savings in 2004-05 of £19.3 million..… The 
largest individual contributors to the planned £19.3 million savings are: 
£2.5 million from increasing the Trust’s capacity in orthopaedics 
through efficiency improvements thereby reducing the use of the 
private sector and waiting list initiatives to treat patients…..£1.0 
million from bed reductions through reducing the length of 
patients’ stay in hospital; £1.0 million from procurement 
savings……Features of how the Trust is managing its recovery 
programme include the following:…  
 Realistic savings targets: Savings targets are set by 
taking account of the best available information on the 
scope for savings, including benchmarking information, 
reference cost comparisons, and known savings 
opportunities… 
 Improvements in patient care processes: There is a 
focus  on sustainable improvements in patient care 
processes that increase quality of care as well as 
reducing costs  
Audit Commission 2005, p.27 
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4.5.4 Accounting for financial support  
Financial support was credited in the books of the receiving Trust as 
revenue (Audit Commission, 2005). As such it was treated in the books of account 
in a way which was consistent with its definition as ‘additional income during the 
year’. However, consistent with the tension between hierarchical and market modes 
of governance, and the origins of financial support in the budget reallocations 
between cost centres within a hierarchy represented by the local health authority, 
the accounting transaction of ‘financial support’ between PCTs and NHS Trusts was 
characterised by a high degree of ambiguity.  
The majority of financial support transactions took place on the basis that a 
surplus of one organisation would temporarily be released for the benefit of another 
organisation in the expectation that the funds transferred would be ‘repaid’ in future 
years. This, for example, is illustrated in Case Study 2: Scarborough and North East 
Yorkshire NHS Trust. Prima facie, therefore, these transactions had the 
characteristics of ‘loans’. However, unlike a loan, financial support was credited to 
revenue rather than liabilities. Further in a throwback to hierarchical modes of 
governance where hospitals were treated as cost centres, repayments were 
effected not by an expense line in the income and expenditure account, but by the 
top slicing of revenue agreed under the terms of the following years’ service level 
agreements44. From a hierarchical perspective this treatment can be regarded as 
being similar to the recovery of previous budget reallocations. However, from a 
market based perspective financial support can also be seen to result in an 
advancement of revenue from a future period to the present and to be similar in its 
effects on reported financial performance as the manipulation of revenue accruals in 
the private sector. An illustration of this effect can be found in Figure 10 below. 
  
                                               
44
 See for example, the NAO’s report on the NHS Summarised Accounts for 2002-03 which 
describes the movement of financial support between NHS organisations as follows: 
“Underspends in other parts of the health system may be used to provide additional 
resources to those NHS organisations that require additional funds. This is via an 
adjustment to a service level agreement and the increase in funding may be reversed in 
the following year subject to the discretion of the Strategic Health Authority. (National 
Audit Office, 2004, p20) 
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Figure 10: Case study illustration of the impact of financial support on reported 
revenue 
 
A hospital Trust has revenue of £200m per annum and has historically 
broken even in each and every year. It is about to open a new 
accident and emergency unit and the additional one-off costs of 
transition from the old to the new unit are estimated at £6m. The Trust 
therefore has a choice between maintaining service standards and 
incurring a deficit or breaking even and allowing service standards to 
deteriorate, for example by extending waiting times for treatment. To 
avoid the adverse consequences to patients of reduced service 
standards, or the adverse reputational damage of a deficit, 
management could, as an alternative, seek financial support of £6m to 
allow the Trust to breakeven and maintain service standards. The 
Trust management prepares a case for financial support and agrees to 
repay the £6m over a period of two years out of the efficiency savings 
which are anticipated from the new unit. 
 
Thus the revenue of the Trust appears as follows: 
 
 Year 0 Year 1  Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Earned revenue £200m £200m £200m £200m £200m 
Financial support £0m £6m -£3m -£3m £0m 
Reported revenue £200m £206m £197m £197m £200m 
 
4.5.5 Impact on accountability 
The effect of financial support on contemporaneous reported financial 
performance was unambiguous: it served to reduce or eliminate an underlying 
deficit allowing Trusts in many cases to report financial breakeven in their financial 
statements and to fulfil their statutory duty to breakeven. The requirement to 
produce audited, true and fair financial statements has represented a key element in 
the public accountability of NHS Trusts since their inception and for these purposes 
the treatment of financial support as revenue was, in the context of the NHS setting, 
interpreted as being UK GAAP compliant (HM Treasury, Financial Reporting 
Manual, Chapter 2; NHS Accounting Manual). As a consequence, financial support 
often resulted in improved performance ratings and the avoidance of a breach of the 
breakeven duty. The accounting treatment of financial support meant that there was 
an increase in reported revenue in the year(s) that it was received and a reduction 
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in reported revenue in years that it was ‘repaid’. The reverse occurred for Trusts 
releasing funds for brokerage as financial support to Trusts in financial difficulty. 
They reported reduced revenue in the year of release and increased revenue in the 
year(s) of ‘repayment’. 
Prior to 2004 there was no requirement to disclose financial support in Trust 
financial statements with the result that its impact was completely hidden. However, 
following the Audit Commission’s repeated concerns about the impact of financial 
support on Trust accountability (Audit Commission, 2005) those Trusts in receipt of 
financial support were required, from 2002-03, to disclose the amount received and 
whether it was sourced from the NHS Bank or from the local health economy. 
Compliance with this requirement was however patchy in 2002-03 and it was not 
until 2003-04 that the standard of reporting improved. Notwithstanding its material 
impact on Trust financial performance, the disclosure of financial support was by 
way of note (Note 7, NHS Accounting Manual, Chapter 7) rather than on the face of 
the income statement. Further, the reporting of financial support was asymmetrical 
in that ‘repayments’ were not subject to a disclosure requirement nor were Trusts 
which released funds for brokerage required to make equivalent disclosures. 
Disclosure did not, however, affect the flattering effect of financial support on 
the satisfaction of the statutory duty to breakeven and it continued to reduce the 
number of breaches of the duty reported to Parliament. Similarly Trust performance 
ratings, which were held out as a measure by which the public could judge the 
performance of a hospital Trust, also continued to be flattered.  
However, where such transfers offered little threat to the Department of 
Health’s primary accountability of overall breakeven across the healthcare system 
there were potential benefits to patient care in smoothing income and expenditure 
across individual organisations and across time as a means of managing the 
recovery of Trusts in financial difficulty. The institutionalisation of financial support 
through the approved accounting policy, which was considered appropriate to the 
NHS setting, and through the setting up of the NHS Bank to co-ordinate major 
transfers across regional health economies is an indication of a wider institutional 
perception of such benefits. However, in 2006 the Department of Health 
acknowledged that the accounting treatment of financial support was serving to 
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mask underlying financial problems (Audit Commission, 2006a; House of 
Commons, 2006a, Department of Health,2007).  
In 2006-07 the system of financial support was abandoned in favour of 
leaving deficits where they arose. This move however was not primarily driven by 
concerns about accountability, which was problematic even after the disclosure 
requirements introduced in 2002, but by an increasing momentum towards market 
based mechanisms. These included the introduction of Foundation Trusts, for which 
there was no access to financial support, and the opening up of hospital service 
provision to private sector providers. The cash problems that potentially arise from a 
Trust being in deficit are now addressed by a system of interest bearing loans45 
(Audit Commission, 2006a), mimicking the system of resource access that is 
available to Foundation Trusts and commercial providers. As these funds are not 
credited to revenue but to liabilities, the accountability issues associated with the 
system of financial support are addressed. However, from an incentive perspective, 
by not being credited to revenue the new system does not address the possible 
adverse consequences of Trusts attempting to report financial breakeven through 
short term cost cutting. From a wider system perspective, the achievement of 
overall financial balance across a health economy, a key performance indicator for 
SHAs, is now facilitated through a contingency reserve held by the SHA. This 
reserve is held centrally by the SHA and not allocated out to individual Trusts whose 
deficits are reported where they arise (Department of Health, 2007). Thus the 
potential benefits to patient treatment in NHS Trusts arising from the flexibility 
afforded by financial support in achieving financial balance are no longer available.  
4.5.6 Financial support: summary 
In the NHS, the system of financial support operated to transfer funds into 
Trusts in financial difficulty from surplus funds elsewhere in the NHS. This system, 
which permitted flexibility in the reporting of financial break-even for Trusts in 
                                               
45
 Such a system, formerly referred to as cash brokerage, has always run alongside the 
system of financial support, to address liquidity problems. Transfers of cash into a Trust 
receiving cash brokerage were debited to cash and credited to liabilities. This is in 
contrast to financial support which was otherwise known as ‘resource brokerage’ and 
was credited to revenue rather than liabilities. The current system of interest bearing 
loans replaces the previously informal arrangements to transfer cash between NHS 
organisations. 
  
 Page 147 
 
financial difficulty, was deeply embedded in the institutional structure and history of 
NHS and its evolution from hierarchical towards market modes of governance. As a 
form of income shifting it acted both across the NHS and, for individual 
organisations, across time by advancing the recognition of revenue. Manipulation of 
revenue has been identified as a common form of earnings management in the 
private sector (Dechow and Schrand, 2004) and has also been identified in the 
public sector (Vinnari and Nasi, 2008). Consistent with Demski, Frimor and 
Sappington (2004), financial support was applied with the intention of delivering 
benefits to patients by avoiding the adverse consequences of addressing deficits 
through short term cost cutting to achieve financial breakeven. The system of 
financial support was applied selectively and was not available to all Trusts in 
deficit. Consistent with Demski (1998) and Demski, Frimor and Sappington (2004), 
where benefits arising from income manipulation only arise where flexibility in 
reporting is restricted to ‘good’ managers, the requirement to produce a recovery 
plan served to act as a selection mechanism such that only highly skilled managers 
with credible recovery plans were given access to financial support.  
Financial support was a form of income shifting that did not affect the overall 
consolidated results of the NHS but did affect the reported financial performance of 
NHS Trusts, for whom reported financial performance and Trust performance 
ratings were key mechanisms for discharging their public accountability. In this 
respect the setting is similar to that found for Japanese quoted companies in 
Thomas, Herrmann and Inoue, (2004) where parent company financial statements 
were manipulated, consistent with internal income shifting, even though there was 
no impact on the corporate financial statements.  
The accounting treatment for financial support, although compliant with the 
official guidance in the NHS Accounting Manual, served to disguise the impact of 
financial support on the underlying financial performance of NHS Trusts and to 
impair their accountability in a way which was similar to that found in Finnish 
municipal authorities (Vinarri and Nasi, 2008). The complex interaction of incentives 
and accountability within the NHS, however, also led to concerns that financial 
support was being applied opportunistically and not generating benefits in the form 
of higher standards of service. Rather, it was being used to flatter reported financial 
performance and Trust ratings and to avoid breach of the statutory duty to 
breakeven. Although there is some anecdotal evidence of this there is no systematic 
  
 Page 148 
 
empirical evidence at present to identify whether such opportunistic application of 
financial support was significant or whether, on balance, it did deliver benefits to 
stakeholders in the form of higher service standards. 
Despite the formal institutionalisation of the system of financial support, as 
evidenced by the role of the NHS Bank, the flexibility in the reporting of financial 
breakeven was withdrawn in 2006-07, not because of the concerns around its 
impact on accountability, which was problematic throughout its existence, but 
because of the need to demonstrate that all hospitals, whether public or private 
sector, were being remunerated for their services in an equitable manner. (Audit 
Commission 2006a)This issue became particularly pertinent on the opening up of 
the market for hospital services to private sector providers in 2006.  
4.6 SUMMARY 
This Chapter sets out the institutional context which provides the setting for 
two investigations of this thesis. It reviews the position of NHS Trusts within the 
wider setting of the commissioning and delivery of hospital services in England, and 
summarises their accountability to Parliament and the public for their financial 
performance, particularly the fulfilment of the statutory duty to break even, through 
the preparation of true and fair accruals based financial statements. It also sets out 
the context in which nonfinancial performance and cost efficiency, both of which are 
matters of public concern, are incentivised and controlled through mechanisms, 
such as multi-dimensional performance measurement systems and cost efficiency 
measures, which, particularly in the case of the performance measurement 
systems, provide a basis for performance management.  
The characteristics and features of each of the Star ratings and the Annual 
Health Check are outlined and their differences and similarities highlighted. 
Specifically the wider measurement diversity and greater balance between financial 
and nonfinancial measures in the Annual Health Check as compared with the Star 
ratings is identified. These characteristics facilitate an investigation of a key policy 
aim of these systems, the relative effectiveness of Annual Health Check as 
compared with the Star ratings in incentivising cost efficiency as a means of 
delivering quality hospital services. This question is of interest to policy makers, 
service users and taxpayers.  The juxtaposition of these two PMS also offers the 
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opportunity of investigating the relative impact of PMS design on the opportunities 
for manipulation. In this thesis the focus is on the manipulation of financial 
measures and, in the first study, the differing incentives built into each PMS facilitate 
an examination of their impact on the propensity to trade financial for nonfinancial 
performance.  
Reported financial performance represented the basis for determining 
whether a Trust had fulfilled its statutory duty to breakeven, and was also influential 
in determining a Trust’s performance rating in both the Star ratings and the AHC. In 
the final section of this Chapter, a system of transactions, known as financial 
support, which shifted income between NHS organisations and which was deeply 
embedded in the institutional structure and history of the NHS, is reviewed. 
Financial support allowed a degree of flexibility in reported financial performance 
and the fulfilment of the statutory duty to breakeven for Trusts in financial difficulty 
by reducing or, in most cases, eliminating deficits. Its purpose was to avoid the 
adverse consequences to patient services of short run tactics to report financial 
breakeven but the complex multi-layering and evolving interactions of incentives 
within the NHS led to concerns that it was being used opportunistically to disguise 
poor financial performance without generating any associated benefits. In the 
second study in this thesis the impact of the system of financial support on service 
standards and on Trust accountability is investigated.  
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter comprises three main sections. Section 1 reviews the research 
methodology adopted for this thesis and the following two sections proceed to 
outline the research design for each study. 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis adopts a positivist paradigm informed by an agency perspective. 
The Government has, since the early 1990s, been progressively moving hospital 
management from hierarchical modes of governance to market based modes of 
governance.  This process has brought agency relationships increasingly into focus. 
It is appropriate therefore that an approach which is consistent with the policy 
direction of the Government is used to evaluate its policy initiatives. Further, 
although infrequently used in the accounting literature, this approach is common in 
the health economics literature which has a strong interest in performance 
measurement and management. Studies adopting this perspective to investigate the 
impact of performance targets on service delivery include, for example, Propper, 
Sutton, Whitnall and Windjmeier, (2010) and Kelman and Friedman, (2009) both of 
which generate findings of interest and relevance to the interpretation of the two 
studies in this thesis. The adoption of this research paradigm also permits the 
exploitation of a wealth of publicly available data, generated by the Government’s 
policy initiatives which is to date, relatively unexplored (Goddard, 2010). 
The adoption of an interpretive research paradigm is an equally valid 
approach to the investigation of performance measurement. This approach 
generates different insights into the impact of performance measurement systems, 
about how they are used, and about the institutional and political context in which 
they are developed and implemented. Institutional theory, for example, has been 
used as a vehicle to interpret the impact of performance measurement in the NHS 
by, for example, Ballantine, Brignall and Modell, (1998) and by Chang (2006, 2007, 
2009).  Ouchi’s (1979, 1980) modes of governance (markets, hierarchies and clans, 
were also used by Aidemark (2001) to investigate the application of a balanced 
scorecard in Swedish hospitals.   
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Interpretive studies generally adopt interview, survey and case study methods 
as vehicles for their investigations. However, such methods would present 
considerable challenges for the purpose of investigating organisation wide 
performance characteristics such as Trust cost efficiency, an assessment of which 
requires systematic collection of data and an appropriate measurement metric. 
Notwithstanding this, there is scope for investigating whether perceptions of cost 
efficiency are aligned with the data. The Department of Health’s investigations 
(2010) suggest, for example, that perception of data quality for Trust cost efficiency 
is based on early experience of the system of reference costs rather than reflecting 
the current state. Perceptions of levels of hospital efficiency might similarly be at 
odds with the evidence of Reference Cost Indices.  
Although not explored in this thesis, alternative research paradigms are 
potentially useful to investigate the evolution of policy towards gaming and 
manipulation of performance measurement in the English NHS.  The application of 
qualitative paradigms would be appropriate to further investigate, for example, 
official policy responses to flexibility in reporting financial performance and the 
evolution of accounting policy in response to NPM initiatives.  
5.3 STUDY 1:  PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DESIGN AND THE 
INCENTIVISATION OF COST EFFICIENCY 
The first study of this paper investigates the relationship between cost 
efficiency and service standards during the period of study and the relative 
effectiveness of the AHC as compared with the Star ratings in incentivising cost 
efficiency as a means of improving service standards. 
5.3.1 Introduction 
A key concern of policy makers, taxpayers and users is the efficiency with 
which health services are delivered. Efficiency is important because for a given level 
of resources a higher level of efficiency permits more and better services to be 
delivered. Increasing life expectancy and developments in medical technology have 
for many years created increasing demands for health services and a corresponding 
demand for increased efficiency to offset the potential increases in costs. However a 
focus primarily on financial performance during the 1980s and 1990s led to 
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concerns about service quality, particularly access to care. The Labour Government 
elected in 1997 remained committed to the delivery of cost effective services, 
introducing and developing reference costs and Trust reference cost indices from 
1998, but also made a commitment, in the NHS Plan, to improve service quality 
(Department of Health, 2000, p.5). A key mechanism for incentivising the cost 
efficient delivery of healthcare was the Performance Assessment Framework 
(Department of Health, 1999, p.1). The Star ratings system was introduced in 2001-
02 and was replaced by the Annual Health Check in 2005-06. This juxtaposition of 
these two performance measurement systems provides the setting for an 
investigation of the relationship between service standards and cost efficiency and, 
further, which of these two systems was most effective at incentivising cost 
efficiency. This is the subject of this first study of this thesis.  
5.3.2 Research design 
The research design for this study draws on both the NHS Plan (Department 
of Health, 2000) and the Performance Assessment Framework (Department of 
Health, 1999), both of which make a commitment to drive up service quality through 
improved efficiency. A key feature of this study is the characterisation of the 
objective function of NHS Trusts as the maximisation of nonfinancial performance in 
the context of a financial resource constraint represented by its revenue, negotiated 
with its commissioners in service level agreements. Thus nonfinancial performance 
is characterised as being a function of cost efficiency, subject to the achievement of 
financial breakeven.  
( , )NFP f e r    (1)
 
Where: NFP
 
is a measure of nonfinancial performance;  e  is a measure of 
Trust cost efficiency and r is a measure of reported financial performance, which 
measures the extent to which there is a variation from financial break-even.  
This characterisation of the objective function permits the use of production 
possibility frontier analysis to derive predictions about the extent to which the AHC 
as compared with the Star ratings incentivised cost efficiency as a means of 
improving service standards. These predictions are derived by considering the 
output decisions of a stylised hospital Trust with a limited number of outputs. First, 
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the output decision of a hospital delivering a combination of two outputs, 
emergency treatments and elective inpatient treatments is considered by reference 
to Figure 11.  
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Figure 11 : PMS design – incentivising hospital cost efficiency (1) 
P
P
● y
● x
● z
Emergency treatment
Inpatient treatment
Q
Q
● w
 
PP is the production possibility frontier of efficient combinations of two outputs in the 
presence of a financial resource constraint. y is the efficient goal congruent combination of 
outputs for a Trust breaking even and maximizing stakeholder utility; x is an inefficient 
combination of outputs for a Trust breaking even; z is the combination of outputs that would 
be delivered by an efficient Trust if the resource constraint were relaxed to QQ. w is a 
combination of outputs on PP which is efficient but not goal congruent. The incentive effects 
of PMS design on an inefficient Trust at x can be summarized: 
A. A Trust subject to a PMS based only on an aggregated measure of reported 
financial performance would remain at x and not be incentivized to move to y.  
B. A PMS based only on an aggregate measure of nonfinancial would incentivize 
movement towards the combination of outputs y, either by increasing efficiency or 
by relaxing the resource constraint, and temporarily going into deficit, to a point 
where an efficient Trust would deliver a combination of outputs z.  
C. A PMS based only on an aggregate measure of cost efficiency would incentivize 
movement towards PP but not necessarily to y. An output combination at w for 
example would maximize the Trust’s performance rating but not be goal congruent.  
  
  
 Page 155 
 
In Figure 11 efficient combinations of these two outputs are represented by 
the production possibility frontier PP. However, in the absence of a stakeholder 
utility function and the existence of multiple stakeholders, there is little to guide the 
Trust as to the combination of outputs that maximises stakeholder utility. In such a 
setting a PMS such as the Star ratings or the AHC, which were both subject to 
extensive public and professional consultation, can serve to articulate stakeholder 
objectives. Trust performance ratings can then be considered as a proxy for the 
extent to which stakeholder objectives are met and, when linked to performance 
management mechanisms, act to incentivise goal congruent outcomes. Thus the 
Trust producing the efficient combination of outputs w , in Figure 11, would receive 
a lower rating than a Trust with the goal congruent output combination of y and the 
Trust CEO would be incentivised to transfer resources to emergency services from 
elective inpatient services. Points within the frontier, such as output combinations x, 
are possible but not efficient. In the absence of a multidimensional performance 
measurement system a Trust with this combination of outputs is meeting its financial 
objective of breaking even but is not incentivised to improve its efficiency and 
increase its output to combination y. Activity levels and service standards will 
remain inferior. This was essentially the situation which in the 1980s and 1990s 
when regulation was largely restricted to financial performance. As a consequence 
service standards, particularly access to care, remained a cause for public concern 
and when the Labour Government came to power in 1997 the reduction of waiting 
lists was identified as being the public’s top priority for the NHS (NHS Plan, 2000). If 
however a performance measurement system is introduced into this scenario which, 
in addition to the achievement of financial balance, specifies the desired 
combination of outputs y and links this combination to performance incentives then 
a Trust with output x will be incentivised to move to y by improving its efficiency. 
Balancing the incentives in the performance measurement system is however 
important. If, in the overall performance rating, the achievement of financial balance 
is given a lower weighting than the production of output combination y, then a short 
term perverse incentive is created whereby the Trust’s performance rating can be 
improved by sacrificing financial performance in order to improve nonfinancial 
performance. Thus, a Trust producing x could move to y not only by improving cost 
efficiency but also by dysfunctionally moving into deficit, effectively relaxing the 
resource constraint to position QQ where an efficient Trust would produce output 
equal to z. In the NHS, this strategy can only provide short term benefits as the 
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incurrence of persistent deficits attracts considerable reputational damage. The 
heavy emphasis on nonfinancial measures in the Star ratings suggests that 
performance ratings could be improved by the incurrence of a deficit to improve 
performance against nonfinancial measures (Bevan, 2006). Figure 12 illustrates a 
number of strategies whereby a Trust could achieve such an outcome.  
 
Figure 12: Strategies for enhancing a Trust’s Star rating by incurring or increasing a 
deficit 
 
Total penalties 
 on key government 
measures
# 
 (excluding reported 
financial performance)  
Maximum achievable Trust Star rating given reported 
financial performance of: 
Breakeven or 
better  
(0 penalty points) 
Small deficit 
<=1% total 
revenue
46
 
(2 penalty points) 
Large deficit 
>1% total income 
(6 penalty points) 
0 3* 3* 2* 
2 3* 2* 1* 
4 2* 2* 1* 
6 2* 1* 1* 
8 1* 1* 0* 
10 1* 1* 0* 
12 1* 0* 0* 
# 
Two penalty points were incurred for underachievement and six for significant 
underachievement against each performance standard. 
Strategies to improve performance rating: 
A. Incur expenditure to ensure achievement of non-financial targets, such as 
waiting times, and incur a small deficit (of up to c. £2m)  
B. For Trusts already in deficit, incur expenditure to ensure achievement of 
non-financial targets, such as waiting times, and increase deficit up to 1% of 
revenue (c. £2m)  
C. For Trusts already with a small deficit, incur expenditure to ensure 
achievement of nonfinancial targets, such as waiting times, and increase 
deficit to more than 1% of revenue (c. £2m)  
D. For Trusts already with a large deficit of more than 1% of revenue, incur 
further expenditure to ensure achievement of non-financial targets, such as 
waiting times, and increase deficit without limit. 
                                               
46
 1% of revenue represents approximately £2m for a Trust with average revenue. 
A 
C
 
B D
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Taking Strategy A in Figure 12 as an illustration, a Trust which is expecting 
to breakeven but to be awarded only one star because it is expecting not to meet 
one or more waiting targets, could invest in waiting list initiatives, such as putting on 
extra theatre sessions. Even if the cost of these initiatives takes the Trust into 
deficit, its overall performance rating can be improved, to as much as three stars. 
Similarly, if a Trust is already in deficit, strategies B, C and D, which serve to 
increase the deficit, also result in an improved rating and once a deficit exceeds the 
threshold of 1% of revenue (i.e. about £2m for a Trust with average revenue) no 
further penalty is incurred. An additional incentive for the use of this strategy, was 
the potential availability of financial support, which, if approved, could serve to 
eliminate the adverse consequences associated with a deficit. In the AHC, in 
comparison, the incentive to incur a deficit to improve the performance rating was 
significantly reduced by isolating financial measures from nonfinancial measures, 
giving the lowest ‘Use of Resources’ rating for a deficit however small, and by 
requiring persistence in financial breakeven over a period of three years in order to 
achieve the highest rating. Further, under the AHC financial support was only 
available in its first year of operation, thus further reducing the incentive to 
overspend. 
On the basis of this stylised example it is predicted that the AHC, will 
incentivise cost efficiency more effectively than the Stars by reducing the power of 
the incentive to go into deficit to achieve nonfinancial performance standards.  
To progress this analysis further an additional output, outpatient 
appointments, is added to the stylised production possibility frontier. In the presence 
of this third output the production possibility frontier becomes the plane identified by 
PQM (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: PMS Design – incentivising cost efficiency (2) 
P
Q
● y
● y’
Emergency treatments
Inpatient treatments
M
Outpatient appointments● x’
m’
m’’
● y’’
 
PQM is the production possibility frontier of efficient combinations of three outputs in 
the presence of a financial resource constraint; y’ is the goal congruent efficient 
combination of these three outputs, associated with outpatient output m’, for a Trust 
breaking even; y is a non-goal congruent efficient combination of the three outputs, 
associated with outpatient output at m’’; x’ is an inefficient combination of the three 
outputs. A PMS which includes all three measures of output will incentivize 
movement from x’ to y’. A PMS which includes only inpatient and outpatient 
measures, will the highest rating to the combination of outputs which lies on the line 
yy’’. For inefficient Trusts a high performance rating may therefore be achieved by 
moving through improved cost efficiency to y’ or less efficiently by, effectively, 
reducing the output of outpatient appointments to m’’.  
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In Figure 13, a PMS which fully reflects stakeholder priorities by 
incorporating measures for all three outputs, awards the highest performance rating 
to output combination y’ where outpatient appointments are equal to m’. An 
inefficient Trust with output combination x’, which operates within its financial 
resource constraint, will be incentivised by this PMS to improve cost efficiency and 
move to y’. However, if the PMS is only partial in its coverage of outputs, measuring 
only inpatient and emergency outputs, then any point on the line yy’’ will attract the 
highest performance rating, including output combination y where the output of 
outpatient appointments, at m’’ is lower than m’. This analysis reflects the adage, 
attributed to Peter Drucker, that what gets measured gets managed and that good 
performance on measured activities may be at the expense of those not measured. 
For the Trust at x’ the efficiency improvements required to maximise the 
performance rating by moving to y are less than the efficiency improvements 
required to move to y’ because, effectively, resources have been transferred out of 
outpatient appointments (reduction in output from m’ to m’’) and into elective and 
emergency treatments. The Star ratings were subject to considerable criticism 
(Bevan and Hood, 2006) regarding the extent to which a Trust’s performance rating 
could be improved by concentrating on a narrow range of activities represented by 
the Government’s key targets as compared with the much broader based balanced 
scorecard indicators. However in the AHC the increased coverage of activities 
required to achieve the highest performance ratings reinforces the previous 
prediction that the AHC will incentivise cost efficiency as a means of improving 
service standards more effectively than the Star ratings.  
In summary, the two distinctive characteristics of the AHC: increased 
measurement diversity and a better balance between financial and nonfinancial 
measures, signal a reduced potential for manipulation. First, the potential for 
improving a Trust performance rating through the trading off of financial for 
nonfinancial performance is reduced. Secondly, the potential for improving ratings 
through the concentration of resources on a narrow range of activities to the 
detriment of those not measured or with a lower weighting is also reduced. 
Prediction: The AHC will incentivise cost efficiency to achieve performance 
standards more effectively than the Star ratings. 
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5.3.3 The performance comet 
The two key features of the AHC as compared with the Star ratings that 
have been identified through previous analysis are, first, an increased emphasis on 
financial measures which result in a better balance between financial and 
nonfinancial measures, and secondly, increased coverage of activities which reduce 
the potential for neglecting unmeasured activities. As an aid to visualising the 
impact of these differences on the observed distribution of performance against 
nonfinancial measures and reported financial performance, a stylised illustration is 
provided in Figure 14. Figure 14 predicts that, in the presence of a PMS dominated 
by nonfinancial measures, (PMS A), Trusts operating efficiently on the production 
frontier and those which transfer resources from unmeasured activities will form a 
cluster of Trusts recording high levels of nonfinancial and financial breakeven. 
These Trusts are positioned in the ‘head’ of the comet. For PMS A there will also be 
a tail of Trusts recording high levels of nonfinancial performance but reporting a 
deficit. This tail comprises inefficient Trusts that maximise their performance rating 
by incurring a deficit in order to improve performance against nonfinancial 
measures. The Star rating system, by weighting performance against limited 
number of nonfinancial measures, much more highly than reported financial 
performance can be considered to be analogous to PMS A. PMS C on the other 
hand, is dominated by financial measures and therefore the ‘tail’ is characterised by 
Trusts which report financial breakeven but much more variable nonfinancial 
performance. This tail would comprise inefficient Trusts which achieve breakeven by 
allowing service standards to deteriorate. The performance measurement regime of 
the Thatcher era in the UK could be regarded as being similar to PMS C. PMS B 
has a better balance between the weightings given to nonfinancial measures and 
reported financial performance and also has greater coverage of activities. As the 
potential for resource transfer from unmeasured activities is reduced, the head of 
the comet comprises only efficient Trusts operating on the production frontier. All 
inefficient Trusts are now to be found in the tail of the comet. By virtue of the 
improved balance between financial and nonfinancial measures, the benefits of 
trading off financial more nonfinancial performance is more difficult to compute and 
the distribution of Trusts within the tail is therefore more dispersed. The AHC, as 
compared with the Star ratings is characterised by additional measurement diversity 
and a better balance between the weightings given to reported financial 
performance and nonfinancial performance. As a consequence, in comparison with 
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the Star ratings, the performance comet predicts that the distribution of nonfinancial 
performance and reported financial performance in the AHC will be more like PMS 
C than PMS A.  
Multi-dimensional performance measurement systems have been applied to 
hospital systems not only in England but also in a number of other countries, 
notably Denmark (Aidemark, 2001) and Canada, an early innovator in balanced 
scorecard inspired measurement systems. The performance comet analysis is 
extended in Figure 15 which illustrates, in an elemental fashion, the positioning 
across the spectrum from A to C of a number of performance measurement 
systems that have been applied internationally to hospital systems.  
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Figure 14: The Performance Comet 
 
An illustration of the impact of PMS design on observed performance against 
nonfinancial standards and reported financial performance in a public sector setting. 
 
Reported financial performance
NFP
PMS C dominated 
by financial 
measures
PMS A dominated by 
non-financial measures
A
B
C
0
Deficit Surplus
Head of Comet
Efficient trusts on the 
production possibility 
frontier plus inefficient Trusts 
transferring resources from 
unmeasured activities
Inefficient Trusts relaxing resource 
constraint and going into deficit
PMS B with better balance in the 
weightings given to financial and 
non financial measures. 
Inefficient Trusts allowing 
nonfinancial performance to 
remain poor in order to 
achieve financial breakeven
 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance. 
  
The Performance Comet illustrates the predicted distribution of reported financial 
performance and performance against an aggregate measure of nonfinancial 
performance in the presence of three PMS: PMS A is dominated by nonfinancial 
measures and offers scope for improving the performance rating by incurring a 
deficit and from the transfer of resources from unmeasured activities; PMS B is 
characterised by better balance in the weightings given to financial and nonfinancial 
measures and reduced scope for transferring resources from unmeasured activities; 
PMS C is dominated by financial measures and incentivises Trusts to report 
financial breakeven whilst allowing nonfinancial performance to remain variable. 
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Figure 15: PMS design -  International comparisons 
 
Illustrative examples of the location of international multidimensional healthcare 
PMS on the Performance Comet ‘spectrum’ 
 SIMILAR TO PMS IN 
OPERATION IN: 
TIME 
PERIOD 
CHARACTERISTICS: 
PMS 
unbalanced in 
favour of 
nonfinancial 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PMS 
unbalanced in 
favour of 
reported 
financial 
performance 
 
World Health 
Organization:  
Performance 
Assessment Tool 
for Quality 
Improvement in 
Hospitals (PATH) 
From 2003 Pilot performance framework with 
primary aim to facilitate international 
comparisons of hospital care quality 
and intended to sit within national 
frameworks. (World Health 
Organization Europe, 2003a,b; Arah et 
al., 2003; Groene et al., 2008) 
English Star 
Ratings System  
2002-2005 Comprised c.40 measures, all 
nonfinancial with the exception of one 
financial measure, financial break-
even. Dominated by nine key 
government measures. Performance 
aggregated into a single score ranging 
from zero to three stars 
English ‘Annual 
Health Check’  
From 2005 Two separate aggregated categories 
of performance: ‘Use of Resources’ (5 
financial performance measures) and 
‘Quality of Services’ (c. 70 measures). 
Canada from 1999 Ontario Hospital Association: Hospital 
Report, a BSC inspired PMS covering 
146 hospitals and comprising more 
than 30 indicators over four 
perspectives: system integration and 
change (12 indicators), patient 
satisfaction (4 indicators), clinical 
utilization and outcomes (9 indicators) 
and financial performance and 
condition (9 indicators). (Figures in 
parentheses relate to 2007). 
(Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, 2007; Pink et al, 2001; 
Groene et al., 2008; Arah et al., 2003). 
UK  
Patient’s Charter  
1990s Emphasis on financial measures. 
Patient’s Charter measures were 
nonfinancial but were largely outside 
control framework. (Mayston, 1985).  
UK 1980s Heavy emphasis on financial 
measures. 
 
 
 
  
  
 Page 164 
 
5.3.4 Data and sampling  
To investigate the relationship between service standards and efficiency and 
whether the AHC better incentivises cost efficiency as a means of improving 
nonfinancial performance, the objective function of Equation 1 is revisited and 
extended as in Equation 2.  
( , , , , )NFP f e r p s t                 (2) 
Where: NFP
 
is a measure of nonfinancial performance; e  is a measure of 
Trust cost efficiency;   r    is a measure of reported financial performance;  s   is a 
measure of Trust size;  p  is an indicator variable for PMS identity; t  is an indicator 
variable for the year in which performance is measured. 
Trust cost efficiency, e , is measured using Trust reference cost indices 
(REF) which are independent of the two performance measurement systems and 
which are adjusted for both case mix and market factors affecting cost levels.  
Reported financial performance is measured in four ways. First, a 
continuous variable of reported financial performance scaled by total revenue (FP) 
is adopted. However, reported financial performance is subject to noise from 
transactions such as asset sales and the public capital dividend. So, to test the 
robustness of the results obtained using FP, operating surplus scaled by total 
revenue (OS) is used as a second measure of financial performance. Thirdly, 
underlying financial performance (UFP), defined as reported financial performance 
minus financial support, reflects an adjustment for the flexibility offered by financial 
support in the reporting of financial performance. Finally, for non-parametric 
analysis, the three-way categorical measure of reported financial performance used 
in the Star ratings is adopted and applied to reported financial performance in the 
AHC, where there was no distinction between large and small deficits. The three 
categories are breakeven or better; a small deficit of up to 1% of revenue; and a 
large deficit of more than 1% of revenue.  
Size is measured as the log of Trust total revenue (SIZE) and, as more 
complex clinical cases tend to be treated in large regional centres the log of Trust 
total revenue represents an additional control variable for variations in case mix and 
complexity. 
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Finally, a measure of nonfinancial performance, NFP, which is uniform 
across both the Star ratings and the AHC, is constructed. This measure represents 
a key feature of this thesis, representing a broader and more objective measure of 
nonfinancial performance than has been possible in previous studies. NFP exploits 
common features of both performance measurement systems, specifically the key 
Government measures and the three point categorical system. Performance against 
the limited number of key Government measures, (Department of Health, 1999, 
2000), forms the basis of NFP, performance against which is measured using the 
scoring system of the AHC which awards three points for achievement, two points 
for underachievement and zero for failure. The positive scoring system of the AHC 
is adopted as, in contrast to the Star ratings, a system of scaling already exists in 
the AHC for Trusts which are not subject to all measures (see Figure 6 Section 
4.4.3.1,The Annual Health Check)47. This scoring system is applied to the key 
Government measures in the Star ratings so that a comparable sum score is 
obtained for all Trusts across the study period. Then, as the number of measures 
varies by PMS, by year and by Trust48 this sum score is normalized to the 
equivalent of 12 measures (the maximum number in the AHC) as follows. In 2003 
and 2004 when the number of key government nonfinancial measures was 8 the 
factor applied to the aggregated performance score was 12/8. In 2005 when there 
were seven key measures the factor applied was 12/7. There were ten trust 
observations out of a total of 441 in the Star ratings period for which a rating was 
produced for five to seven measures and the factor applied to these was adjusted 
accordingly. In the AHC all general (non-specialist) Trusts had between 10 and 12 
measures. A Trust measured against 10 indicators would have its score inflated by 
a factor of 12/10. So a Trust which scored 30 points over 10 indicators (the 
maximum score) would have an NFP score of 36, the maximum NFP score. 
Similarly a Trust scoring 20 points over 10 indicators would have an NFP score of 
24. The impact of this alignment of scores for Trusts measured against different 
                                               
47
 The Star Ratings were based on penalty points of zero for achievement, two for 
underachievement and six for significant underachievement. This compares with positive 
scoring in the AHC of three points for achievement, two for underachievement and zero 
for failure. 
48
 There are eight Government imposed nonfinancial measures in the Star Ratings (with the 
exception of 2005 when the Improving Working Lives measure was dropped) compared 
with 12 in the AHC. In the Star ratings there is minimal variation in the number of 
measures applied to each individual Trust. 
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numbers of measures has the effect of giving greater dispersion to the NFP score 
for the Stars system. The resulting NFP score has a potential range of scores of 
zero to 36.  
All data were accessed from publicly available sources. Data on 
performance against PMS measures was accessed from the websites of the 
Commission for Health Improvement and its successor the Healthcare Commission; 
data on Trust reference cost indices were obtained from the Department of Health 
and data on reported financial performance and operating surpluses were obtained 
from the Laing and Buisson database of NHS financial performance.  
The sample selected includes only English NHS acute hospital Trusts as 
hospitals in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland operate under different regulatory 
regimes. It is restricted to acute hospital Trusts and does not include mental health 
Trusts, primary care or community hospital services whose performance was 
subject to a different set of performance measures. The sample excludes acute 
hospital Foundation Trusts which, although subject to the same nonfinancial 
measures as acute NHS Trusts, were subject to a different regime of financial 
regulation and, in particular, are not bound by a statutory duty to break-even. As 
specialist hospitals have been identified in previous studies as having significantly 
lower efficiency than general hospitals, the sample is further sub-divided into 
general and specialist Trusts, to identify whether there are any significant 
differences. Finally, it is arguable that policy makers are most interested in the 
impact of performance measurement systems on poor performers, those in the tail 
of the performance comet, and whether, for these Trusts, manipulation of the 
system rather than the improvement of cost efficiency is incentivised. A further 
subsample therefore excludes the best performing Trusts, which are identified using 
the proxy of those Trusts which converted to Foundation Trust status during the 
study period.  
5.3.5 Non-parametric analysis 
Both the production possibility frontier analysis and the performance comet 
predict that PMS design will impact the extent to which financial performance is 
sacrificed in order to improve overall performance ratings. As a precursor to 
regression analysis, non-parametric chi-squared tests are conducted to provide 
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further insight into the impact of the incentive to trade financial for nonfinancial 
performance. The aim of these chi square tests is to establish the extent to which 
failure to break even in each PMS was greater than failures on other measures.  
5.3.6 Modelling 
To facilitate the investigation into the relationship between NFP and cost 
efficiency, NFP is modelled as a linear function of Trust reference cost indices 
(REF) and financial performance. In the first instance, reported financial 
performance (FP) is used, but to test for the robustness of the findings, operating 
surplus (OS) is subsequently substituted. Variations in case mix are accommodated 
in the Trust reference cost index (REF) and by the SIZE control variable. Finally, 
variation in nonfinancial performance standards across the early years of the study, 
and other issues such as increasing levels of NHS funding, are accommodated by 
the inclusion of an indicator variable, YEAR, coded one to six for each of the years 
2002-03 to 2007-08. The following pooled, cross-sectional OLS regression is then 
applied, first to the whole study period (2003-2008) and then, to identify differences 
between the Star ratings and the AHC, to the separate periods of 2003-2005 and 
2006-2008. 
0 1 2 3
n
it it it it l i it
l m
NFP REF FP SIZE YEAR e    

        (3)
 
Where: itNFP  is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on 
performance against key Government measures for Trust i  in each year t  of the 
study; REF  is the Trust reference cost index, a measure of cost efficiency; FP  is 
reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; SIZE  is the natural log of 
Trust total revenue; YEAR is an indicator variable which is coded 1 to 6 for the years 
2003-2008 for the whole study period; and 1 to 3 for each of the periods 2003-2005 
(the Star ratings) and 2006-2008 (the AHC); e is an error term.  
Finally, to test the robustness of the results from Equation 3 operating 
surplus is substituted for reported financial performance and the following 
regression applied to the same samples: 
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0 1 2 3
n
it it it it l i it
l m
NFP REF OS SIZE YEAR e    

        (4)
 
Where: OS is operating surplus scaled by total revenue. 
For the next stage in the analysis interaction effects are introduced in order 
to identify whether any differences between the Star ratings and the AHC observed 
from the above regressions are significant. Interactions are effected through the 
introduction of an indicator variable (PMS) coded 1 for the Star ratings and 0 for the 
AHC. The following OLS regression is applied: 
2007
0 1 2 3 4 5
2003
* *it it it it it l i it
l
NFP REF PMS REF FP PMS FP SIZE YEAR e      

         (5)
 
Where: PMS  is an indicator variable coded 1 for the Star ratings (2003-
2005) and zero for the AHC (2006-2008); * itPMS REF is the differential impact on 
REF of the Star ratings as compared with the AHC;  * itPMS FP is the differential 
impact on FP of the Star ratings as compared with the AHC. 
As for the individual regressions, operating surplus (OS) is then substituted 
for reported financial performance (FP) and the regressions re-run. Finally, the 
impact of financial support on the relationship between NFP and REF is tested by 
substituting underlying financial performance (UFP), defined as reported financial 
performance minus financial support received, for reported financial performance 
(FP). 
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5.4 STUDY 2: THE PERFORMANCE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT. 
This study develops the theme of the manipulation of reported financial 
performance to investigate the performance and accountability consequences of 
financial support and to identify whether such manipulation can be in the interests of 
stakeholders. 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The system of financial support involved the shifting of income from NHS 
organisations with surplus funds to those in financial difficulty. Financial support 
often served to advance the recognition of revenue for Trusts in financial difficulty 
and was an approved variation from conventional UK GAAP. In contrast with the 
empirical literature which largely views the manipulation of performance 
measurement systems as opportunistic, the analytical literature on the manipulation 
of financial performance has explored more fully the question as to whether 
manipulation can be beneficial to stakeholders, for example, by countering the 
incentive to engage in more damaging responses to the achievement of financial 
objectives (Demski, Frimor and Sappington, 2004; Demski, 1998; Demski and 
Sappington, 1990; Scott, 2009). This study investigates the question as to whether 
the system of financial support generated benefits, as was intended, in the form of 
better performance.  
In terms of the current period’s performance, the provision of additional 
funds in the form of financial support should lead to better service standards, 
particularly as its provision is conditional upon a credible recovery plan. In these 
circumstances the additional funds contribute towards the maintenance of service 
standards whilst protecting the Trusts against the adverse consequences of 
reporting a deficit. Further, financial support could beneficially impact the future 
service standards of Trusts receiving it. This could occur through inertial delays in 
translating the receipt of financial support into service initiatives but, more 
significantly, could occur because the receipt of financial support allows Trusts time 
to implement initiatives which improve their processes and which take time to be 
reflected in service standards. Financial support was generally provided on a non-
recurrent basis and Trusts were expected to address their financial difficulties such 
that they restore their ability to achieve financial balance, without further assistance. 
A final aspect of the provision of financial support is thus that Trusts receiving it 
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should demonstrate improved underlying financial performance in the year following 
receipt.  
The alternative view of financial support, however, was that the system of 
financial support system was being used opportunistically to disguise poor financial 
performance without any accompanying improvement in service standards. In the 
context of a complex layering of accountability and an evolving incentive framework, 
concerns grew that the selection criterion of a credible recovery plan was being 
suspended such that ‘poor’ managers were given access to financial support. These 
managers may not have the skills to implement the necessary actions for a 
significant improvement in performance to be observed and may be similar to those 
managers in the failing Trusts identified by the Audit Commission (2006b) as 
becoming dependent, year after year, on financial support.  
Three empirical questions are investigated in Study 2. First, whether 
financial support led to an improvement in service standards in the year of its 
receipt; second, whether the benefits accruing to the receipt of financial support 
continued to flow through into the service standards of the following year and third, 
whether, in line with its policy aims, financial support allowed time for Trusts to 
address their financial problems, thus leading to an improvement in underlying 
financial performance in the following year.  
Research question 1: Did the receipt of financial support improve the 
contemporaneous level of nonfinancial performance?  
Research question 2: Was the subsequent change in nonfinancial 
performance positively associated with the receipt of financial support? 
Research question 3: Was there a positive association between receipt of 
financial support and the subsequent change in underlying financial 
performance? 
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5.4.2 Research question 1: Did the receipt of financial support improve the 
contemporaneous level of nonfinancial performance? 
The research design draws on the objective function of equation (2)  
( , , , , )NFP f e r p s t  
Where: NFP  is a measure of nonfinancial performance; e  is a measure of 
Trust cost efficiency;  r   is a measure of financial performance;  s   is a measure of 
Trust size; t  is an indicator variable for the year in which performance is measured. 
As in Study 1, NFP  is a measure of nonfinancial performance constructed 
by reference to performance against Government service standards; Trust cost 
efficiency e  is measured by reference to the Trust reference cost index and Trust 
size s  is measured as the natural log of Trust total revenue. In this study, however, 
underlying financial performance, UFP), defined as reported financial performance 
minus financial support, is substituted for reported financial performance. This 
amended objective function (equation 6) provides the basis for modelling 
nonfinancial performance as a function of cost efficiency and underlying financial 
performance controlling for year and size effects. The following pooled cross-
sectional OLS regression is estimated for the period, 2004-2006, when financial 
support was disclosed in Trust financial statements.  
2006
0 1 2 3
2005
ijt ijt ijt ijt l l ijt
l
NFP REF UFP SIZE YEAR e    

         (6) 
Where: ijtNFP  is a measure of nonfinancial performance representing 
service standards for Trust i  in year t  for the reference group j ; REF  is a 
measure of Trust cost efficiency; UFP  is underlying financial performance, which in 
the case of Trusts not in receipt of financial support is equal to reported financial 
performance;
 
SIZE  is a control variable measured as the log of total assets; YEAR  
is an indicator variable coded 1 to 3 for the years 2003-04 to 2005-2006 and e  is an 
error term.  
In the first stage of the investigation this regression is applied to a 
benchmark group of Trusts unaffected by financial support (reference group j ). As 
  
 Page 172 
 
financial support was applied selectively to Trusts in financial difficulty this 
benchmark group is identified as being Trusts with reported deficits not in receipt of 
financial support. The regression is estimated for these Trusts in order to obtain a 
benchmark level of nonfinancial performance for a given level of underlying financial 
performance.  
Coefficients from equation (6) are obtained and these are then applied to 
Trusts receiving financial support in order to generate a performance adjusted 
benchmark level of nonfinancial performance which the Trust should achieve based 
on its underlying financial performance. This benchmark level of nonfinancial 
performance is then compared with actual performance to establish whether actual 
performance is significantly different. The regression coefficients 0 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,     from 
equation (6) and year effects are then applied to the explanatory variables of Trusts  
( k ) receiving financial support, all of which had an underlying deficit, to obtain a 
benchmark level of nonfinancial performance.  
2006
0 1 2 3
2005
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆikt ikt ikt ikt l l
l
NFP REF UFP SIZE YEAR    

     
 
(7) 
where: iktUFP  is the underlying financial performance of Trust k  in year t
measured as reported financial performance less financial support. 
The residual from equation (8) then provides a measure of whether actual 
nonfinancial performance is better or worse than the benchmark level. 
ˆ
ikt ikt iktNFP NFP resNFP        (8) 
 
 For the purposes of investigating research question 1, whether financial 
support leads to an improvement in contemporaneous NFP, the null hypothesis of 
no difference between actual performance and benchmark performance is then 
tested: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, resNFPequals zero. 
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5.4.3 Research question 2: Was the subsequent change in nonfinancial 
performance positively associated with the receipt of financial 
support? 
The second research question investigates whether benefits to NFP 
associated with the receipt of financial support continue to flow through into the 
following period. 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, there is no association between a Trust’s 
subsequent change in nonfinancial performance and the receipt of financial support.  
Equation (9), adapts the objective function from equation (6) to investigate 
the change in nonfinancial performance as a function of financial support controlling 
for changes in the other explanatory variables: cost efficiency and financial 
performance, size and year effects: 
2007
0 1 ( 1) 2 3 4
2005
kt k t kt kt kt l kt
l
NFP FS REF UFP SIZE YEAR e     

          
 
 (9) 
Where:
 
1kt kt ktNFP NFP NFP     is nonfinancial performance for Trust k  in 
year t  less nonfinancial performance in year 1t  ;
 
1kt kt ktREF REF REF     
is the 
change in Trust cost efficiency; 1kt kt ktUFP UFP UFP     is the change in underlying 
financial performance; ( 1)kt kt k tSIZE SIZE SIZE     is the change in the log of Trust 
total assets;YEAR  is an indicator variable coded 1 to 4 for the years 2004-2007 and 
e  is an error term.  
5.4.4 Research question 3: Was there a positive association between receipt 
of financial support and the subsequent change in underlying financial 
performance? 
The impact of financial support on underlying financial performance in the 
year of receipt is unequivocal: it serves to reduce, and often eliminate, an underlying 
deficit and can be measured with precision. The third research question however 
focuses on the proposition that financial support allows trusts time to address 
underlying financial problems by investigating the association between the receipt of 
financial support and Trusts’ subsequent changes in underlying financial 
performance:  
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Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, there is no association between financial 
support and the Trust’s subsequent change in underlying financial performance. 
Underlying financial performance (UFP) is modelled (Model 3) as a function 
of financial support (FS) controlling for changes in nonfinancial performance (NFP), 
cost efficiency (REF), size and year effects. The following OLS regression is 
estimated:  
2007
0 1 ( 1) 2 3 4
2005
kt k t kt kt kt l kt
l
UFP FS REF NFP SIZE YEAR e     

          
 (10)  
5.5 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
This Chapter has developed the research questions to be investigated in this 
thesis and the models to be used to facilitate the investigations.  
Study 1 focuses on a key policy objective of PMS design in the NHS, the 
incentivisation of cost efficiency as a means of improving service standards. The 
availability of data on Trust cost efficiency and on nonfinancial performance 
facilitates the investigation of the relationship between cost efficiency and service 
standards. This question is a key concern of the literature on cost efficiency 
because of the potential for trading off service standards in the pursuit of cost 
efficiency. Further, the replacement of the Star ratings system by the Annual Health 
Check in 2006 provides the conditions for a natural experiment which compares the 
extent to which the AHC was better at incentivising cost efficiency than the Star 
ratings. The prediction that the AHC will be more effective than the Star ratings in 
incentivising cost efficiency is predicated on an analysis of the two performance 
systems and the identification that there is greater scope for manipulation of the 
Star ratings system than the AHC. A key aspect of manipulation that is identified is 
the manipulation of financial performance. The potential for this form of manipulation 
is more exaggerated in the Stars, not only because there are stronger short run 
incentives for going into deficit, but also because, throughout the whole period of the 
Star ratings, the policy of financial support was in operation.  
In contrast, financial support was only available to Trusts in financial difficulty 
in the first year of the AHC, after which the policy was abandoned.  Study 2 focuses 
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on the manipulation of reported financial performance arising from the accounting 
policy adopted for financial support and investigates whether such manipulation, 
which represents a form of income shifting and which in the majority of cases serves 
to advance the recognition of revenue in Trusts receiving financial support, can 
have beneficial consequences for stakeholders. Specifically this study investigates 
first, whether financial support leads to an improvement in nonfinancial performance 
(NFP) in the year of its receipt; second, whether any benefits to NFP flow through 
into the subsequent period; and thirdly, whether, consistent with its policy aims, 
financial support allows a Trust time to address underlying financial difficulties with 
the result that underlying financial performance improves in the subsequent period. 
To facilitate these two studies, an objective function which draws on 
Government policy as encapsulated in the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000) 
and the Performance Assessment Framework (Department of Health, 1999) is 
generated. This objective function, which characterises nonfinancial performance in 
the presence of a financial resource constraint as a function of cost efficiency, is 
applied in the context of production possibility frontier analysis to two stylised 
hospital scenarios in order to generate predictions about the impact of PMS design 
on the relationship between nonfinancial performance, cost efficiency and reported 
financial performance. This analysis is applied to the Star ratings and the AHC to 
derive a prediction that the AHC will be more effective at incentivising cost efficiency 
as a means of improving service standards than the Star ratings. Common 
characteristics of the Star ratings and the AHC are then exploited in order to 
construct a uniform measure of nonfinancial performance, based on key 
Government measures, across both PMS for the whole study period.  
The availability of data on Trust cost efficiency, in the form of the reference 
cost index and the availability of data on nonfinancial performance which facilitates 
the construction of a uniform measure of nonfinancial performance across all Trusts 
for the period of study, facilitates the investigation through non parametric and 
regression analysis of the main research questions in this thesis: first: the 
relationship between service standards and cost efficiency and whether the AHC 
was more effective at incentivising cost efficiency as a means of improving service 
standards than the Star ratings, and second: whether benefits accrued to 
stakeholders as a consequence of the policy of financial support.  
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CHAPTER 6 FINDINGS 
This Chapter commences with a review of the characteristics of NHS acute 
hospital Trusts as revealed by descriptive statistics. It continues with the findings 
from the two studies: Study 1, an investigation of the relationship between service 
standards and cost efficiency incorporating the relative impact of the Star ratings 
and the AHC; and Study 2, an investigation of the performance impact of financial 
support, a form of income shifting between NHS organisations, whose accounting 
policy served to manipulate reported financial performance and undermine public 
accountability.  
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics illustrating the economic significance of NHS acute 
hospitals in terms of reported total revenue during the study period are reported in 
Table 1.  
Panel A show that the full sample of Trusts (854 Trust years) reported mean 
revenue of £191m representing total revenue of more than £160bn over the study 
period. Mean revenue in 2008 was 67% higher than in 2003 and the largest Trust 
had revenue of £838m in 2008. The mean reported revenue during the period of the 
Star ratings was £170m as compared with £220m for the AHC. The number of 
observations in the sample declines steadily over the period from 176 in 2003 to 
100 in 2008 as a result of mergers and, from 2004-05, from Trusts converting to 
Foundation Trust status. Foundation Trusts, being subject to a different regulatory 
regime, have been excluded from the sample. As specialist Trusts were identified as 
a special category of acute Trust in the Star ratings system (see, for example, 
Healthcare Commission, 2005b) and as specialist Trusts have been identified by 
prior frontier analysis research as having significantly lower efficiency than general 
Trusts, the sample is subdivided into general and specialist Trusts in Panels B and 
C respectively. The identity of the specialist Trusts is determined in accordance with 
the Healthcare Commission’s classification (Healthcare Commission, 2005). Panel 
B shows that the mean reported revenue of general Trusts (769 observations) was 
somewhat bigger at c.202m than the mean for the full sample and Panel C shows 
that the mean reported revenue of specialist Trusts (85 observations) was much 
lower at £87m.   
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Table 1: Trust Total Revenue 2003-2008 
 
Panel A: Full sample  
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn Min. Max Median
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000
2003 176 156,103     96,048          11,198       596,678       125,602       
2004 173 170,710     104,591       11,523       627,148       138,895       
2005 148 186,083     108,684       12,981       677,981       156,772       
2006 140 200,914     118,671       42,855       721,415       164,455       
2007 117 217,468     129,787       47,868       757,446       177,619       
2008 100 250,003     155,863       67,043       838,148       194,297       
2003-2008 854 191,006     119,993       11,198       838,148       157,992       
Star ratings 497 170,115     103,417       11,198       677,981       139,446       
AHC 357 220,089     134,690       42,855       838,148       177,619       
 
Panel B: General acute Trusts  
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn Min. Max Median
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000
2003 157 166,974       95,124          51,114       596,678       133,500       
2004 154 183,025       103,357       56,286       627,148       147,409       
2005 132 198,679       107,150       64,201       677,981       164,863       
2006 126 212,412       118,324       68,162       721,415       172,997       
2007 107 227,119       130,176       70,300       757,446       182,029       
2008 93 258,486       157,036       73,006       838,148       196,207       
2003-2008 769 202,511       119,637       51,114       838,148       165,053       
Star ratings 443 182,001       102,264       51,114       677,981       148,465       
AHC 326 230,383       135,082       68,162       838,148       182,218       
 
Panel C: Specialist Trusts
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn Min. Max Median
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000
2003 19 66,273          41,463          11,198       163,350       56,762          
2004 19 70,899          43,742          11,523       176,682       60,532          
2005 16 82,169          50,760          12,981       196,007       64,804          
2006 14 97,427          56,051          42,855       220,075       74,421          
2007 10 114,197       67,581          47,868       247,048       82,022          
2008 7 137,288       82,338          67,043       270,693       89,371          
2003-2008 85 86,917          56,351          11,198       270,693       65,959          
Star ratings 54 72,610          44,788          11,198       196,007       60,223          
AHC 31 111,838       65,858          42,855       270,693       81,122          
Total revenue reported in acute hospital NHS Trust financial statements  
Source: Laing and Buisson 
Star ratings: 2003-2005 
AHC: Annual Health Check 2006-2008 
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Tables 2-4 provide descriptive statistics for each of the main variables, NFP, 
a measure of nonfinancial performance (Table 2); REF, a measure of Trust cost 
efficiency (Table 3) and FP, reported financial performance scaled by total revenue 
(Table 4). In each case results are reported for the full sample (Panel A, 854 
observations), general Trusts (Panel B, 769 observations) and specialist Trusts 
(Panel C, 85 observations). 
In Table 2 Trust nonfinancial performance (NFP) is measured with respect to 
performance against key Government measures and has a maximum value of 36. 
The minimum observed level of NFP is 5, recorded by a specialist Trust. The 
minimum level of NFP for a general Trust (Panel B) is 17. The mean of 33.2 for the 
full sample (Panel A) is consistent with the clustering predicted by the production 
possibility frontier analysis and the performance comet. This clustering is predicted 
to arise from efficient Trusts operating on the frontier, those which transfer 
resources out of unmeasured activities and those that trade financial for 
nonfinancial performance (Figure 14). The difference between specialist and 
general NFP scores is minimal, with a mean for specialist Trusts of 33.12 compared 
with 33.18 for general Trusts. The higher mean and median, in Panels A and B, for 
the Star Ratings (34 and 36 respectively) as compared with the Annual Health 
Check (32 and 32) are consistent with the narrower range of measures and the 
greater scope for manipulation in the Star ratings. The higher standard deviation of 
3.6 in the AHC as compared with 3.1 in the Star ratings also points to the AHC 
being more discriminating of performance.  
To determine whether the distribution of NFP is different across PMS a test 
of the null hypothesis of no difference in the distribution of nonfinancial 
performance, NFP, in the Star ratings compared to the AHC using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic (not tabulated) is rejected (D = 0.481; p = 0.000). 
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Table 2: Nonfinancial performance 
 
Panel A: Full sample
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 176 34.26 2.95 21 36 36
2004 173 34.54 2.75 17 36 36
2005 148 33.95 3.62 5 36 34
2006 140 31.50 3.28 20 36 32
2007 117 32.28 3.64 12 36 33
2008 100 31.14 3.88 17 36 32
2003-2008 854 33.17 3.56 5 36 34
Star ratings 497 34.26 3.11 5 36 36
AHC 357 31.66 3.60 12 36 32
NFP
 
 
Panel B: General Trusts
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 157 34.15 3.04 21 36 36
2004 154 34.50 2.75 17 36 36
2005 132 33.98 2.81 21 36 34
2006 126 31.51 3.26 20 36 32
2007 107 32.44 3.17 22 36 33
2008 93 31.33 3.52 17 36 32
2003-2008 769 33.18 3.31 17 36 34
Star ratings 443 34.22 2.88 17 36 36
AHC 326 31.76 3.33 17 36 32
NFP
 
 
Panel C: Specialist Trusts
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 19 35.11 1.97 30 36 36
2004 19 34.89 2.81 24 36 36
2005 16 33.69 7.69 5 36 36
2006 14 31.43 3.57 22 36 31
2007 10 30.60 7.01 12 36 33
2008 7 28.57 7.09 19 36 31
2003-2008 85 33.12 5.34 5 36 36
Star ratings 54 34.59 4.63 4.8 36 36
AHC 31 30.52 5.62 12 36 31
NFP
 
NFP : Trust nonfinancial performance measured against key Government measures 
on a scale of zero to 36: Source: Healthcare Commission/Commission for 
Health Improvement. 
Star ratings: 2003-2005; AHC: Annual Health Check 2006-2008  
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Descriptive statistics for REF, an inverse measure of relative Trust cost 
efficiency, are shown in Table 3. The mean reference cost over the study period 
was 100.8, with a standard deviation of 10.9 and a range of 75 – 162. However 
there are notable differences between the reference costs of non-specialist Trusts 
(Panel B) and specialist Trusts (Panel C). The mean reference cost of non-specialist 
Trusts is 98.9, with a minimum of 78 and a maximum of 138. Both the mean and the 
range are smaller than for specialist Trusts which have a mean of 118 and a range 
of 75-162. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (not tabulated) of D = 0.054 (p = 
0.000) indicates that there is no difference in the distribution of Trust reference cost 
indices as between the Star ratings and the AHC.  
Descriptive statistics for reported financial performance as a percentage of 
revenue are shown in Table 4. With the exception of 2008, a mean deficit was 
reported in each year of the study period (Panel A). This mean deficit increased in 
the period from 2002-03 to 2005-06, when it reached a maximum of 2.6% of 
revenue, thereafter steadily reducing with a mean surplus of 0.9% of revenue being 
recorded in 2008. The maximum deficit of 28% of revenue was recorded in 2006, 
this being a general Trust (Panel B). Consistent with the statutory duty to breakeven 
the median financial performance was a small surplus, for both specialist and 
general Trusts. The overall mean for specialist Trusts is however positive at 0.17% 
of revenue as compared with a mean deficit for general Trusts of -0.95%. A test of 
the null hypothesis of no difference in the distribution of financial performance in the 
Star Ratings compared to the AHC (Panel A) using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic (not tabulated) is rejected (D = 0.371; p = 0.000).  
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Table 3: Cost efficiency  
 
Panel A: Full sample 
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 176 100.4 11.0 78.5 159.1 99.4
2004 173 100.5 10.2 79.2 146.7 99.4
2005 148 100.2 10.1 75.2 149.0 99.4
2006 140 101.2 10.1 83.0 153.4 100.1
2007 117 101.9 12.7 80.7 158.1 100.9
2008 100 101.1 12.1 81.2 161.9 99.7
2003-2008 854 100.8 10.9 75.2 161.9 99.7
Star ratings 497 100.4 10.4 75.2 159.1 99.4
AHC 357 101.4 11.6 80.7 161.9 100.2
REF
 
 
Panel B: General Trusts 
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 157 98.6 7.9 78.5 126.2 98.6
2004 154 98.5 7.2 79.2 118.4 98.5
2005 132 98.6 7.5 77.8 115.8 99.0
2006 126 99.4 7.0 83.0 119.3 99.6
2007 107 99.7 9.5 80.7 138.0 100.2
2008 93 98.8 7.2 81.2 114.7 98.3
2003-2008 769 98.9 7.7 77.8 138.0 98.9
2003-2005 443 98.6 7.5 77.8 126.2 98.6
2006-2008 326 99.3 8.0 80.7 138.0 99.6
REF
 
 
Panel C: Specialist Trusts
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 19 115.1 19.3 82.2 159.1 110.3
2004 19 116.4 16.2 86.3 146.7 113.7
2005 16 113.1 17.4 75.2 149.0 114.9
2006 14 117.3 17.9 87.1 153.4 115.8
2007 10 126.2 16.6 104.2 158.1 126.1
2008 7 132.1 20.8 101.6 161.9 128.8
2003-2008 85 118.1 18.2 75.2 161.9 118.2
Star ratings 54 115.0 17.4 75.2 159.1 113.5
AHC 31 123.5 18.6 87.1 161.9 121.5
REF
 
 
REF: Trust cost efficiency measured (inversely) by the Trust reference cost index. Mean 
efficiency = 100. Source: Department of Health 
Star ratings: 2003-2005; AHC: Annual Health Check 2006-2008 
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Table 4: Reported Financial Performance Scaled by Total Revenue 
 
Panel A: Full sample
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 176 -0.298 2.440 -20.481 6.596 0.007
2004 173 -0.547 1.485 -7.517 3.026 0.004
2005 148 -1.382 3.157 -19.934 6.501 0.002
2006 140 -2.589 4.959 -28.027 4.367 0.003
2007 117 -0.794 3.343 -18.456 4.920 0.073
2008 100 0.929 3.279 -21.967 7.998 1.075
2003-2008 854 -0.836 3.340 -28.027 7.998 0.011
Star ratings 497 -0.708 2.454 -20.481 6.596 0.004
AHC 357 -1.015 4.276 -28.027 7.998 0.073
FP
 
 
Panel B: General Trusts
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 157 -0.380 2.513 -20.481 5.738 0.007
2004 154 -0.580 1.507 -7.517 3.026 0.003
2005 132 -1.498 3.278 -19.934 6.501 0.001
2006 126 -2.931 5.110 -28.027 4.367 0.000
2007 107 -0.915 3.433 -18.456 4.920 0.069
2008 93 0.919 3.392 -21.967 7.998 1.071
2003-2008 769 -0.947 3.469 -28.027 7.998 0.010
Star ratings 443 -0.783 2.535 -20.481 6.501 0.004
AHC 326 -1.171 4.429 -28.027 7.998 0.056
FP
 
 
Panel C: Specialist Trusts
Year No. obs Mean Std. Devn. Min. Max Median
2003 19 0.381 1.610 -2.069 6.596 0.020
2004 19 -0.280 1.291 -5.514 0.785 0.004
2005 16 -0.430 1.651 -6.190 1.390 0.009
2006 14 0.497 0.682 -0.650 1.705 0.376
2007 10 0.493 1.794 -3.593 2.817 0.499
2008 7 1.065 0.980 0.030 2.570 1.319
2003-2008 85 0.169 1.451 -6.190 6.596 0.023
Star ratings 54 -0.092 1.532 -6.190 6.596 0.009
AHC 31 0.624 1.191 -3.593 2.817 0.397
FP
 
 
FP = surplus/deficit reported in acute hospital NHS Trust financial statements scaled by total 
revenue expressed as a percentage. Source: Laing and Buisson 
Star ratings: 2003=2005; AHC: Annual Health Check 2006-2008  
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Finally, as notable differences between general and specialist Trusts are 
observed in Tables 1-4, two tailed tests of means are performed to establish 
whether the difference in means is significant. The results of these t-tests are shown 
in Table 5. The mean revenue, cost efficiency and reported financial performance 
for specialist Trusts are all significantly different from those of general Trusts. 
Consistent with their narrower range of services, specialist Trusts were significantly 
smaller, (mean revenue £87m as compared with £202m, Panel A), had higher 
reference costs (mean REF 118 as compared with 99, Panel C) and better reported 
financial performance (+0.17% of revenue as compared with -0.95%, Panel D). 
There is no significant difference however in NFP (Panel B). Particularly notable is 
the significant difference in cost efficiency. The Trust reference cost index at 118 
suggests that specialist Trusts are 18% less efficient than average. These findings 
are consistent with the findings of frontier analysis research which suggests that 
specialist hospitals are less efficient than general acute hospitals, perhaps because 
they are unable to exploit economies of scale and scope. The fact that specialist 
Trusts generally break-even also suggests that their higher cost base is recognised 
by commissioners when service level agreements are negotiated.  
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Table 5: Two tailed tests of means: general and specialist Trusts 
 
Panel A: Trust total revenue
No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
£000 £000 £000
General 769 202,511      4,314        119,637      
Specialist 85 86,917        6,112        56,351        
Total 854 191,006      4,106        119,993      
diff 115,595      13,140      
t 8.797
p 0.000  
 
Panel B: Nonfinancial performance 
NFP No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
General 769 33.2           0.1           3.3
Specialist 85 33.1           0.6           5.3
Total 854 33.2           0.1           3.6
diff 0.1             0.4           -0.7 
t 0.152
p 0.879  
 
Panel C: Cost efficiency 
REF No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
General 769 98.9 0.3 7.7
Specialist 85 118.1 2.0 18.2
Total 854 100.8 0.4 10.9
diff -19.2 1.1 -21.3 
t -18.092
p 0.000  
 
Panel D: Reported financial performance as a % of revenue 
FP No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
General 769 -0.947 0.125 3.469
Specialist 85 0.169 0.157 1.451
Total 854 -0.836 0.114 3.340
diff -1.116 0.380 -1.862 
t -2.938
p 0.003  
 
NFP: Trust nonfinancial performance measured against key Government measures on a 
scale of zero to 36; REF: Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust cost 
efficiency, average efficiency =100 (Source: Department of Health); FP: surplus/deficit 
reported in acute hospital NHS Trust financial statements scaled by total revenue expressed 
as a percentage (Source: Laing and Buisson)  
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The best performing Trusts were gradually converting to Foundation Trusts 
from 2004-05 onwards, Table 6 provides further insight into the characteristics of 
these converting Trusts. To ensure a like for like comparison, between converters 
and non-converters specialist Trusts are excluded from the sample. Not only do 
they have different characteristics from the rest of the sample but proportionately 
more specialist Trusts converted during the study period (45% of all specialist 
observations) period than for the general Trusts (25% of all general observations). 
As compared with non-converters, Trusts which converted to Foundation Trust 
status during the study period were smaller (mean revenue £177m as compared 
with £211m) and, consistent with the requirement for generally high levels of 
performance, were characterised by higher nonfinancial performance (mean NFP 
35.0 as compared with 32.6), lower reference costs (mean REF 96.7 as compared 
with 99.6) and better reported financial performance (mean  -0.03% of revenue as 
compared with -1.25%). The differences between converters and non-converters 
although significant are much smaller than the differences between specialist and 
general Trusts.  
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Table 6: Two tailed tests of means – Trusts converting to Foundation Trust status 
 
Panel A: Trust total revenue
No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
£000 £000 £000
Non converters 578 210,904      5,265        126,574      
Converters 191 177,114      6,607        91,316        
Total 769 202,511      4,314        119,637      
Difference 33,790        9,917        14,323        
t 3.407
p 0.000  
 
Panel B: Nonfinancial performance 
NFP No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Nonconverters 578 32.6           0.1           3.5
Converters 191 35.0           0.1           1.8
Total 769 33.2           0.1           3.3
Difference -2.5 0.3 -3.0
t -9.422
p 0.000  
 
Panel C: Trust cost efficiency 
REF No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Nonconverters 578 99.6 0.3 7.9
Converters 191 96.7 0.5 6.8
Total 769 98.9 0.3 7.7
Difference 2.8 0.6 1.6
t 4.474
p 0.000  
 
Panel D: Reported financial performance as a % of revenue 
FP No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Non converters 578 -1.252 0.163 3.920
Converters 191 -0.026 0.066 0.915
Total 769 -0.947 0.125 3.469
Difference -1.225 0.286 -1.787
t -4.279
p 0.000  
 
NFP: Trust nonfinancial performance measured against key Government measures on a 
scale of zero to 36, (Source: Healthcare Commission); REF: Trust reference cost index, an 
inverse measure of Trust cost efficiency, average efficiency =100 (Source: Department of 
Health); FP: surplus/deficit reported in acute hospital NHS Trust financial statements scaled 
by total revenue expressed as a percentage (Source: Laing and Buisson)  
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The above descriptive analysis of the full sample of NHS acute Trusts 
provides the basis for an investigation of the impact of the Star ratings and the AHC 
on the incentivisation of cost efficiency as a means of improving service standards. 
First, the full sample which includes specialist Trusts is investigated but as specialist 
Trusts exhibit very different characteristics from general Trusts, an important sub-
sample for investigation is that of general Trusts only . Further, as a robustness test, 
for the impact of PMS design on weaker Trusts, a further sub-sample which 
excludes, as a proxy for the best performing Trusts, those which converted to 
Foundation Trust status during the period of study, is also investigated.  
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6.2 FINDINGS STUDY 1: PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DESIGN AND THE 
INCENTIVISATION OF COST EFFICIENCY 
6.2.1 Non parametric analysis 
As a precursor to multivariate analysis insight into the extent to which Trusts 
responded to the incentives to incur a deficit as a short term tactic for enhancing 
their performance rating is considered for each PMS. Using the Star ratings 
categorisation of reported financial performance of breakeven or more, a small 
deficit of up to 1% of revenue and a large deficit of more than 1% of revenue, a 
categorical analysis of reported financial performance and NFP is reported for the 
Star ratings and the AHC in Table 7, Panels A and B respectively. To ensure a like-
for-like comparison those Trusts which converted to Foundation Trust status during 
the period of study are excluded from the sample. The result is a total sample of 625 
observations. 
Panel A shows that, in the Star ratings, consistent with a clustering predicted 
by the production possibility frontier analysis and the performance comet (Figure 
14), 42% (134/318) of Trusts achieve the maximum NFP score of 36. Of these, 85 
(64%) reported break-even or better. A further 49 Trusts (36%) achieve NFP=36 but 
record a deficit. In 32 cases this deficit was a large deficit which, for a Trust with 
average revenue, would amount to about £2m. The very tight clustering of NFP 
scores at NFP=35 and NFP=36 is consistent with the performance comet analysis 
(Figure 14, Section 4.4.3.1) and the incentives identified in Figure 12. (Section 
1.1.1). Panel B shows that the AHC was more discriminating of performance than 
the Star ratings with a reduced clustering of NFP scores. This wider dispersion is 
consistent with the lower scope for focusing on a narrow range of indicators and the 
greater emphasis on financial performance which offers less scope for improving a 
Trust’s overall performance rating by incurring a deficit to improve NFP.  
Table 7 also shows that the proportion of Trusts achieving breakeven or 
better increased from 58% in the Star ratings to 68% in the AHC and that this was 
achieved by a reduction in small deficits from 12% to 2%. The proportion of Trusts 
reporting a large deficit remained largely unchanged (30% in the Star ratings, 29% 
in the AHC). These findings are consistent with the much heavier penalties in the 
AHC for incurring a deficit which, prima facie, appears to have reduced the incentive 
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to incur a small deficit. The unchanged proportion of large deficits is consistent with 
no further penalty in the AHC once a deficit is incurred. 
Table 8 shows the same categorical analysis but excluding specialist trusts 
as well as Trusts converting to Foundation status. This results in a total number of 
observations of 578. Specialist Trusts are identified by reference to the Healthcare 
Commission’s classification of acute Trusts as can be found for example in the 
2004-05 Star ratings (Healthcare Commission, 2005). The results are very similar to 
those in Table 7: the percentage of Trusts with large deficits (> 1% revenue) in both 
the Star ratings and the Annual Health is similar at 31% as compared with 30%; 
there is a similar reduction in the percentage of small deficits (up to 1% revenue) 
from 12% in the Stars to 2% in the AHC; and the percentage in Trusts achieving 
breakeven or better rises from 56% in the Stars (comparator 58%) to 67% in the 
AHC (comparator 68%). The difference in dispersion between the NFP scores in the 
AHC as compared with the Star ratings is also evident, with the main difference 
being in the proportion of Trusts achieving the highest score of 36, which falls from 
42% to 40%. 
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Table 7: Categorical analysis of reported financial performance and nonfinancial 
performance excluding Trusts converting to Foundation Trust status during 
the study period 
Panel A: Star ratings 
NFP Large deficit Small deficit Total
>1% revenue <=1%revenue
No. obs No. obs No. obs No. obs
5 1 0 0 1 0.31%
17 1 0 0 1 0.31%
21 4 0 0 4 1.26%
24 1 0 2 3 0.94%
26 3 1 1 5 1.57%
27 2 2 2 6 1.89%
29 5 1 5 11 3.46%
30 7 2 9 18 5.66%
31 3 0 5 8 2.52%
32 3 5 15 23 7.23%
33 13 3 12 28 8.81%
34 14 3 21 38 11.95%
35 6 5 27 38 11.95%
36 32 17 85 134 42.14%
Total 95 39 184 318 100.00%
% of  obs. 29.87% 12.26% 57.86% 100.00%
Breakeven or 
more
% of total 
obs.
 
 
Panel B: Annual Health Check 
NFP Large deficit Small deficit Total
>1% revenue <=1%revenue
No. obs No. obs No. obs No. obs
12 0 0 1 1 0.33%
17 0 0 1 1 0.33%
19 0 0 1 1 0.33%
20 1 0 0 1 0.33%
21 0 0 1 1 0.33%
22 1 0 1 2 0.65%
23 3 0 4 7 2.28%
24 1 0 4 5 1.63%
25 4 0 1 5 1.63%
26 4 0 3 7 2.28%
27 4 1 4 9 2.93%
28 7 2 9 18 5.86%
29 6 1 15 22 7.17%
30 3 1 8 12 3.91%
31 10 2 25 37 12.05%
32 10 0 34 44 14.33%
33 14 1 21 36 11.73%
34 9 0 24 33 10.75%
35 7 0 36 43 14.01%
36 5 0 17 22 7.17%
Total 89 8 210 307 100.00%
% of obs. 28.99% 2.61% 68.40% 100.00%
Breakeven 
or more
% of total 
obs.
 
 
NFP: Trust nonfinancial performance measured against key Government measures on a 
scale of zero to 36. 
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Table 8: Categorical analysis of reported financial performance and nonfinancial 
performance excluding specialist Trusts and Trusts converting to 
Foundation Trust status  
Panel A: Star ratings 
NFP Large deficit Small deficit
>1% revenue <=1%revenue
No. obs No. obs No. obs No. obs % total obs.
17 1 0 0 1 0.34%
21 4 0 0 4 1.36%
24 1 0 1 2 0.68%
26 3 1 1 5 1.70%
27 2 2 2 6 2.04%
29 5 1 5 11 3.74%
30 6 2 8 16 5.44%
31 3 0 5 8 2.72%
32 3 5 15 23 7.82%
33 13 3 12 28 9.52%
34 13 2 18 33 11.22%
35 6 5 27 38 12.93%
36 31 16 72 119 40.48%
Total 91 37 166 294 100.00%
% total obs. 30.95% 12.59% 56.46% 100.00%
Breakeven or 
more
Total
 
 
Panel B: Annual Health Check
NFP Large deficit Small deficit
>1% revenue <=1%revenue
No. obs No. obs No. obs No. obs % total obs.
17 0 0 1 1 0.35%
20 1 0 0 1 0.35%
22 1 0 0 1 0.35%
23 3 0 4 7 2.46%
24 1 0 3 4 1.41%
25 4 0 1 5 1.76%
26 4 0 3 7 2.46%
27 4 1 4 9 3.17%
28 7 2 9 18 6.34%
29 6 0 14 20 7.04%
30 3 0 7 10 3.52%
31 10 2 23 35 12.32%
32 10 0 32 42 14.79%
33 13 1 19 33 11.62%
34 9 0 22 31 10.92%
35 7 0 35 42 14.79%
36 5 0 13 18 6.34%
Total 88 6 190 284 100.00%
% total obs. 30.99% 2.11% 66.90% 100.00%
Breakeven 
or more
Total
 
 
NFP: Trust nonfinancial performance measured against key Government measures on a 
scale of zero to 36 
 
Specialist Trusts are identified by reference to the Healthcare Commission’s classification of 
acute Trusts. Trusts converting to Foundation Trust status are identified by reference to 
Monitor, the Foundation Trust regulator and the Laing and Buisson database of NHS 
financial statements.  
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To provide additional insight into the impact of the incentive to trade financial 
for nonfinancial performance a non-parametric chi-square test using the full sample 
of 854 observations is provided in Table 9 (Star ratings) and Table 10 (AHC). 
Performance against each key Government measure is classified according to the 
three way classification characteristic of both systems. To allow inspection of the 
contribution of each individual measure to the overall chi square statistic the actual 
and expected frequencies for each measure is reported in addition to its contribution 
to the overall statistic. The full sample includes both specialist Trusts and Trusts 
which converted to Foundation Trust status during the study period, both of which 
exhibited significantly better financial performance than non-converting general 
Trusts. The results from this analysis will therefore present a conservative estimate 
of the incidence of Trusts’ failure to achieve the breakeven target as compared with 
their failure to meet other targets.  
The actual frequencies for the Star ratings reported in Table 9 reveal the 
very high level of achievement of all targets, both financial and nonfinancial (3701 
out of 4194 observations, 88%). A similar picture for the AHC is revealed by Table 
10 where the concentration of target achievement at 78% remains high (3193/4105) 
Consistent with the strong short run incentive in the Star ratings for a Trust to move 
into deficit to enhance nonfinancial performance, Table 9 shows that the largest 
contributor to the chi square statistic of 526 (p = 0.000) is the financial breakeven 
measure where the actual frequency of 148 Trusts reporting a deficit compares with 
the predicted frequency of 59. Particularly notable is the number of large deficits, 
106, compared with the predicted 25. The contribution of the other (nonfinancial) 
measures is generally small, except for the four hour wait for accident and 
emergency treatment (AE4).  
Table 10 shows that in the AHC the discrepancy between the actual and 
predicted number of deficits is much lower, with actual deficits at 101 compared with 
predicted deficits of 80. This reduction is mainly a consequence of the reduction in 
small deficits. Indeed the number of small deficits (9) is actually less than predicted 
(52). The incidence of large deficits remains comparable with the Star ratings at 92 
actual observations compared with the predicted 28. Untabulated median tests for 
the Star Ratings and the AHC were also performed for financial and nonfinancial 
measures and the null hypotheses of no difference for both were rejected. A further 
observation is that, in contrast with the Star ratings, financial breakeven no longer 
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contributes the major part of the chi-square score. Cancelled operations (CanOps, 
326) is much higher than the breakeven contribution of 188, and Thrombolysis 
(Thromb, 156) is comparable.49 These findings are consistent with the prediction 
that the Star ratings, as compared with the AHC, incentivised the incurrence of 
deficits in order to enhance performance against non-financial measures as a result 
of lower measurement diversity and weighting given to financial measures as 
compared with the AHC.  
The production possibility frontier analysis (Section 5.3.2) predicts that, 
where the relative weighting given to financial measures is low, inefficient Trusts are 
incentivised to go into deficit to improve their nonfinancial performance. T-tests 
(untabulated) of the reference costs of deficit and surplus Trusts however show no 
significant differences, whatever sample is selected. The deficits of Trusts with 
reference costs of more than 100 (i.e. greater than average) are, however, 
significantly greater than the deficits of Trusts with reference costs of less than or 
equal to 100 for samples which exclude specialist Trusts. The absence of significant 
differences for samples which include specialist Trusts are consistent with the 
descriptive statistics which show that specialist Trusts have significantly higher 
reference costs than the rest of the sample but that on average, in contrast with the 
rest of the population, they report a small surplus for the study period.  
                                               
49
 The contribution of cancelled operations contribution to the chi square statistic is 
interesting. In the tighter performance measurement environment of the AHC, where a 
more balanced weighting is given to financial performance, the cancelled operations 
statistic is consistent with the focus of manipulation moving elsewhere. Manipulation of 
the cancelled operations target can serve to improve performance against waiting times, 
for which there is more than one target. (See, for example, Audit Commission, 2003). If 
such manipulation were taking place this would represent an example of a tighter 
financial measurement regime resulting in adverse consequences for service standards. 
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Table 9: Performance against key Government measures in the Star rating system 2003-2005 
 
DERIVATION OF THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AE4 CAN2W Inpatient Outpatient CanOps AE12 Clean IWL Booking Financial 
breakeven
Total 
Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq.
Failed 23 5 32 15 1 13 0 9 4 106 208
Underachieved 87 44 25 30 7 19 19 1 11 42 285
Achieved 343 418 440 452 161 415 478 339 306 349 3701
Total 453 467 497 497 169 447 497 349 321 497 4194
Predicted frequency
Failed 22 23 25 25 8 22 25 17 16 25 208
Underachieved 31 32 34 34 11 30 34 24 22 34 285
Achieved 400 412 439 439 149 394 439 308 283 439 3701
Total 453 467 497 497 169 447 497 349 321 497 4194
Chi-square derivation
Failed 0 14 2 4 7 4 25 4 9 268 337
Underachieved 103 5 2 0 2 4 6 22 5 2 152
Achieved 8 0 0 0 1 1 4 3 2 18 37
Total 111 19 4 5 9 9 35 29 16 289 526
Actual frequency
 
 
KEY: AE4 = 4 hour accident and emergency wait; CAN2W = 2 week cancer waits; Inpatient = inpatient waiting time; Outpatient = outpatient waiting time; CanOps = 
number of cancelled operations (2003 only); AE12 =12 hour accident and emergency waits for admission; Clean= cleanliness of hospitals; IWL = implementation of the 
Improving Working Lives program (2003 and 2004 only); Booking = implementation of patient booking system (2004 and 2005 only). 
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Table 10: Performance against key Government measures in the Annual Health Check 2006-2008 
 
DERIVATION OF THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  Financial 
Break 
even 
TOTAL 
Actual 
Frequency 
AE4 CAN2W Inpatient Outpatient CanOps CAN1M CAN2M THROM REVAS CHEST Del.Trans Choice  
Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq.  Freq. Freq. 
Failed 23 3 24 11 84 1 15 14 6 12 13 19  92 317 
Underachieved 53 5 49 16 136 7 56 110 2 41 41 70  9 595 
Achieved 257 333 284 330 136 346 268 141 95 276 203 268  256 3193 
Total 333 341 357 357 356 354 339 265 103 329 257 357  357 4105 
                
Predicted 
Frequency 
               
Failed 26 26 28 28 27 27 26 20 8 25 20 28  28 317 
Underachieved 48 49 52 52 52 51 49 38 15 48 37 52  52 595 
Achieved 259 265 278 278 277 275 264 206 80 256 200 278  278 3193 
Total 333 341 357 357 356 354 339 265 103 329 257 357  357 4105 
                
Chi-square 
derivation 
               
Failed 0 21 0 10 116 25 5 2 0 7 2 3  151 343 
Underachieved 0 40 0 25 138 38 1 133 11 1 0 6  35 430 
Achieved 0 17 0 10 72 18 0 21 3 2 0 0  2 144 
Total 1 78 1 45 326 82 6 156 14 10 3 9  188 917 
 
KEY: AE4= 4hr accident and emergency wait; CAN2W = 2 week cancer waits; Inpatient = inpatient waiting time; Outpatient = outpatient waiting time; CanOps= no. of 
cancelled operations; CAN1M = I month cancer waits; CAN2M = 2 month cancer waits; THROM = time to thrombolysis; REVAS = time for revascularization; CHEST = access 
to rapid access chest pain clinic; Del.Trans = delayed transfers into a care setting; Choice = Government’s patient choice program
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6.2.2 Multivariate analysis 
As a precursor to multivariate analysis, further insights into the relationships 
between NFP, REF and financial performance are provided by the Pearson 
correlation coefficients reported in Table 11. Financial performance has been 
measured in three ways, all scaled by total revenue: first, reported financial 
performance (FP); second, operating surplus (OS) which being unaffected by 
transactions such as asset sales and the public dividend is less noisy than reported 
financial performance and thirdly, underlying financial performance defined as 
reported financial performance less disclosed financial support (UFP). UFP is a 
measure of underlying financial performance is necessarily crude in that financial 
support was not disclosed in 2002-03 and the reporting in other years, until its 
cessation in 2006-07, was asymmetrical: those Trusts releasing funds for brokerage 
and Trusts repaying financial support were not required to make equivalent 
disclosures. The result is that the underlying surpluses of some Trusts in the years 
up to 2006-07 may be higher than reported. Nonetheless the adjustment for 
financial support does reflect underlying deficits more accurately. Panel A shows the 
results for the full sample (854 observations), Panel B shows the results for general 
Trusts (769 observations) and Panel C shows the results for the sample excluding 
Trusts which converted to Foundation Trust status during the study period (625 
observations).  
The association between nonfinancial performance NFP and the other 
variables is first considered. All panels of Table 11 show that there is a negative 
relationship between NFP and REF (0.227, Panel A). Trusts with lower costs (REF) 
and therefore higher cost efficiency have higher NFP, with NFP falling by 1 point for 
a 4-5 point increase in reference costs. There are also significant results between 
NFP and all three measures of financial performance. However, the effects are 
small (coefficient range 0.14-0.24). A deterioration in financial performance of over 
4% of revenue (approximately £8m for a Trust with mean revenue of £200m) would 
be required to lose one NFP point. To put this in perspective the mean deficit for the 
sample is 0.9% and the standard deviation is 3.5%. This result reflects the wide 
variation in financial performance associated with the clustering of NFP at high 
levels, particularly in the Star ratings (see Table 7). Finally, there is a negative 
association between Trust size (SIZE) and nonfinancial performance (NFP) 
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indicating that larger Trusts, consistent with a more complex case mix, generate 
lower NFP. 
For the sample of general Trusts (769 observations) there is also a negative 
association between Trust reference costs and all three measures of financial 
performance, but again the coefficients are small (c. -0.09) and the significance is 
lost if the full sample (854 observations) or the sample which excludes Trusts 
converting to Foundation Trust status (625 observations) are used. For an average 
Trust with £200m revenue a deficit of over £20m would be required to predict an 
increase from 100 to 101 in reference costs. To put this into perspective, the mean 
deficit of Trusts with mean revenue of £200m is approximately £2m with a standard 
deviation of £7m.  
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Table 11: Pearson correlation co-efficients 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
NFP REF FP OS UFP SIZE
NFP 1
REF -0.2268* 1
FP 0.2128* -0.0076 1
OS 0.2271* -0.0215 0.9320* 1
UFP 0.1913* -0.0060 0.8927* 0.8438* 1
SIZE -0.1561* -0.0284 0.0141 0.0323 0.0035 1
No. obs . 854  
 
Panel B: General Trusts 
NFP REF FP OS UFP SIZE
NFP 1
REF -0.2059* 1
FP 0.2369* -0.0865* 1
OS 0.2513* -0.0838* 0.9334* 1
UFP 0.2211* -0.0952* 0.8973* 0.7206*  1
SIZE -0.1685* 0.2794* 0.0584 0.3241*  0.0517 1
No. obs . 769  
 
Panel C: Full sample excluding Trusts converting to Foundation Trust status
NFP REF FP OS UFP SIZE
NFP 1
REF -0.2368* 1
FP 0.1812* -0.0002 1
OS 0.1991* -0.0034 0.9457* 1
UFP 0.1409* 0.0068 0.8910* 0.8531* 1
SIZE -0.1145* 0.0322 0.0576 0.0718 0.0615 1
No. obs . 625  
*  Significant at 5% 
 
Key: NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key 
Government measures; REF is the Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust 
cost efficiency; FP is reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; OS is operating 
surplus/deficit scaled by total revenue; UFP is underlying financial performance defined as 
reported financial performance less financial support, scaled by total revenue; SIZE is the 
natural log of Trust total assets. 
Specialist Trusts are identified by reference to the Healthcare Commission’s classification of 
acute Trusts. Trusts converting to Foundation Trust status are identified by reference to 
Monitor, the Foundation Trust regulator and the Laing and Buisson database of NHS 
financial statements.  
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To identify the relationship between performance against Government 
targets and cost efficiency in each PMS NFP is regressed on Trust reference costs 
(REF), reported financial performance scaled by total revenue (FP), and size 
measured by the log of total assets (SIZE) for the whole study period (1) and then 
for each of the Star ratings (2) and the AHC (3).  
0 1 2 3
l n
it it it it l i it
l t
NFP REF FP SIZE YEAR e    


     
  
(11) 
Where: for (1), covering the whole study period, t=2003 and n =2008; for (2), 
covering the period of the Star ratings, t=2003 and n=2005; and for (3), covering the 
period of the AHC, t= 2006 and n =2008. 
The results for the whole sample are shown in Table 12 Panel A and for the 
sample of general Trusts in Table 12 Panel B. For each variable the point estimate, 
the robust standard error (in parentheses) and, italicized, the p value are reported. 
Panel A shows that over the whole period there is a significant negative 
relationship between NFP and Trust reference costs (coefficient -0.069, p= 0.000) 
indicating that increased cost efficiency is associated with better performance 
against Government targets whichever PMS is in place. This result is consistent 
with Deily and McKay (2006) and Ludwig, Van Merode and Groot (2010) and 
indicates that the pursuit of higher standards of nonfinancial performance is 
associated with improved cost efficiency. However there are notable differences in 
the Star ratings (2) (coefficient -0.050, p=0.000) and the AHC (3) (coefficient -0.089, 
p=0.000). These results provide evidence that in the AHC, a reduction in cost 
efficiency is associated with a much higher loss of NFP than in the Star ratings. In 
the AHC an increase in REF of 10 points is predicted to lose almost 1 point in NFP 
as compared with 0.5 in the Star ratings. 
The relationship between nonfinancial performance (NFP) and financial 
performance also shows differences between the two PMS. The coefficient on FP 
for the whole period is 0.231 (p=0.000). In the AHC however the coefficient is lower 
at 0.152 (p=0.000) and in the Stars it is higher at 0.394 (p=0.000). These results are 
consistent with the greater ease with which measured performance can be 
manipulated in the Star ratings. Panel B shows the results for the sample which 
excludes specialist Trusts. There are no notable differences in the results. The main 
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coefficient of interest is that on cost efficiency (REF) which is -0.067 (comparator -
0.069) for the full sample, -0.047 (-0.050) for the Star ratings and -0.088 (-0.089) for 
the AHC. All results significant at the 1% level.  
A robustness test of the results from Table 12 is provided in Table 13 which 
substitutes operating surplus (OS) for reported financial performance (FP). Once 
more there are no notable differences in the results. The coefficient on REF for the 
full sample remains at -0.069 for the full period, -0.049 for the Star ratings and -
0.090 for the AHC. For the sample which excludes specialist Trusts the coefficients 
are only slightly different at -0.065, -0.043 and -0.088. Again all results are 
significant at the 1% level of significance. 
These results indicate a strong and positive relationship between service 
standards and cost efficiency during the period of study which is robust to sample 
construction and choice of financial measure. The result for the Star ratings is lower 
than that of the AHC and is consistent with greater opportunities in the Star ratings 
for delivering higher levels of nonfinancial performance other than by improving cost 
efficiency. 
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Table 12: Relationship between nonfinancial performance and cost efficiency – 
individual regressions 
 
Panel A: Full sample (854 observations) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full period Star ratings AHC 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP 
    
REF -0.069*** -0.050*** -0.089*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FP 0.231*** 0.394*** 0.152*** 
 (0.033) (0.054) (0.044) 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 
SIZE -0.490*** -0.436** -0.523* 
 (0.174) (0.204) (0.309) 
 0.005 0.033 0.091 
Year effects YES YES YES 
    
Constant 47.02*** 44.54*** 47.16*** 
 (2.299) (2.759) (4.026) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 854 497 357 
R-squared 0.235 0.139 0.132 
 
Panel B: General Trusts (769 observations) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full period Star ratings AHC 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP 
    
REF -0.067*** -0.047*** -0.088*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) 
 0.000 0.009 0.000 
FP 0.219*** 0.334*** 0.163*** 
 (0.032) (0.052) (0.042) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE -0.376* -0.239 -0.564* 
 (0.204) (0.249) (0.340) 
 0.065 0.338 0.098 
Year effects YES YES YES 
    
Constant 45.22*** 41.69*** 47.49*** 
 (2.410) (2.985) (4.022) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 769 443 326 
R-squared 0.231 0.115 0.129 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, in parentheses; p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key Government 
measures; REF is the Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust cost efficiency; FP is 
reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; SIZE is the natural log of Trust total assets. 
 
Full period: 2003-2008; Star ratings: 2003-2005; AHC: Annual Health Check 2006-2008; Specialist 
Trusts as defined by Healthcare Commission; Converting Trusts are identified by reference to Monitor, 
the Foundation Trust regulator and the Laing and Buisson database of NHS financial statements.  
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Table 13: Relationship between nonfinancial performance, cost efficiency and 
operating surplus  
Panel A: Full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full period Star ratings AHC 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP 
    
REF -0.069*** -0.049*** -0.090*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OS 0.231*** 0.342*** 0.170*** 
 (0.034) (0.052) (0.046) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE -0.561*** -0.556*** -0.566* 
 (0.175) (0.206) (0.309) 
 0.001 0.007 0.068 
Year effects YES YES YES 
    
Constant 46.91*** 44.41*** 47.37*** 
 (2.300) (2.785) (4.018) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 854 497 357 
R-squared 0.234 0.123 0.137 
 
Panel B: Sample excluding specialist Trusts 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full period Star ratings AHC 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP 
    
REF -0.065*** -0.0433** -0.0885*** 
 (0.014) (0.0182) (0.0230) 
 0.000 0.018 0.000 
OS 0.224*** 0.296*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0507) (0.0441) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE -0.461** -0.365 -0.620* 
 (0.205) (0.253) (0.340) 
 0.025 0.150 0.069 
Year effects YES YES YES 
    
Constant 45.22*** 41.69*** 47.84*** 
 (2.409) (3.007) (4.011) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 769 443 326 
R-squared 0.231 0.102 0.136 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key Government 
measures; REF is the Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust cost efficiency; FP is 
reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; SIZE is the natural log of Trust total assets. 
 
Full period: 2003-2008; Star ratings: 2003-2005; AHC: Annual Health Check 2006-2008; Specialist 
Trusts as defined by Healthcare Commission; Converting identified by reference to Monitor, the 
Foundation Trust regulator and the Laing and Buisson database of NHS financial statements.  
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Tables 12 and 13 show that there is a difference between the Stars and the 
AHC in their effectiveness to incentivise cost efficiency to improve service 
standards. To identify whether these differences are significant an indicator variable, 
PMS, coded 0 for the AHC and 1 for the Star ratings, is used to introduce interaction 
effects for reference costs (PMS*REF) and financial performance (PMS*FP) (see 
equation 12) to measure the differential impact of the Star Ratings as compared 
with the AHC. 
2007
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(12) 
Table 14 shows the results for three samples. Panel A shows the results for the full 
sample, Panel B excludes specialist Trusts and Panel C additionally excludes 
Trusts which convert to Foundation Trust status during the study period. In each 
panel, Model 1 represents the main model with reported financial performance (FP) 
as the measure of financial performance. Models 2 and 3 offer robustness checks 
for Model 1 by substituting operating surplus (OS, Model 2) and underlying financial 
performance (UFP, Model 3) for reported financial performance. Underlying financial 
performance is measured as reported financial performance minus financial support 
disclosed in Trust financial statements. All measures of financial performance are 
scaled by total revenue. For each variable the point estimate is first reported; 
secondly, the robust standard error (adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering), 
and thirdly, italicized, the p value.  
In Panel A, the full sample, the coefficient on REF for the principal model, 
Model 1, is -0.09. This is the coefficient for the PMS which is coded 0, and so 
represents the relationship between NFP and REF for the AHC. The coefficient is 
consistent with the results for the individual regression where the coefficient was 
also found to be -0.09 (See Tables 12 and 13, Panels A and B) and is robust to 
choice of financial measure (Models 2 and 3). The coefficient of 0.04 on PMS*REF 
indicates the differential impact of the Star ratings as compared with the AHC. 
Summing the coefficients on REF (the coefficient on the AHC) and on the 
interaction, PMS*REF, (the differential impact of the Star ratings) gives the 
coefficient on the Star ratings. From Table 14 this can be computed as being equal 
to - 0.09+0.04=-0.05. This coefficient is consistent with the results for the individual 
regression for the Star ratings where the coefficient was -0.05 (See Tables 12 and 
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13, Panels A and B). However the interaction is not significant for any of Models 1, 2 
and 3 indicating that the relationship between service standards and Trust cost 
efficiency was not significantly different in the AHC than in the Stars. For Model 1 
there is a significantly positive relationship between NFP and FP (coefficient in the 
AHC = 0.152, p=0.005) and the difference between the Stars and the AHC is also 
significant (coefficient = 0.242, p =0.022). This result indicates the relationship 
between NFP and FP is significantly stronger in the Stars as compared with the 
AHC. This result is robust to alternative measures of financial performance (Models 
2 and 3). 
However, when specialist Trusts are excluded, (Panel B) a different picture 
emerges. The coefficient on REF remains at -0.09 but the interaction effect 
(PMS*REF) is now slightly bigger at 0.05 and is significant at about 10% (Model 1, 
p=0.104; Model 2, p= 0.083; Model 3, p= 0.093). These results show that the 
relationship between NFP and REF in the AHC is significantly different from that in 
the Star ratings and is robust to choice of financial performance measure. 
The relationship between nonfinancial and financial performance in Table 14 
Panel B is more volatile. In model 1 the coefficient on FP is 0.16 and the interaction 
coefficient, which is significant at the 10% level, is 0.17, consistent with a coefficient 
of 0.33 in the Star ratings. However both the size of the coefficient and the 
significance of these results is sensitive to choice of financial performance measure.  
Table 14 Panel C shows the results of the regressions for a sample which 
excludes both specialist Trusts and those which converted to Foundation Trust 
status during the period (578 observations). The coefficients on REF for Model 1 is, 
as in previous panels, -0.09. This is significant at the 1% level of significance and is 
robust to choice of financial performance measure (Models 2 and 3). The coefficient 
on the interaction is higher at 0.06 than in Panels B (0.05) and A (0.04). These 
results are indicative that the relative effect of the AHC is increased for the poorer 
performing Trusts in the tail of the performance comet. As in Panel B (all general 
Trusts) the result is significant at about 10% and is robust to choice of financial 
performance measure.   
In summary Table 14 shows that there was a significantly positive 
relationship between service standards and cost efficiency in NHS acute hospital 
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Trusts over the period 2003-2008. Further, for general Trusts, this relationship was 
significantly stronger for the AHC than for the Star ratings and was stronger still for 
the weaker Trusts which did not convert to Foundation Trust status during the study 
period.  
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Table 14: The relationship between nonfinancial performance and Trust cost 
efficiency -  the Star ratings as compared with the AHC 
Panel A: Full sample 
Dep. Variable NFP Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
VARIABLES (FP) (OS) (UFP) 
    
REF -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.089*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PMS*REF 0.038 0.041 0.037 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
 0.240 0.207 0.264 
FP 0.152***   
 (0.053)   
 0.005   
PMS*FP 0.242**   
 (0.105)   
 0.022   
OS  0.170***  
  (0.052)  
  0.001  
PMS*OS  0.172*  
  (0.096)  
  0.073  
UFP   0.122*** 
   (0.045) 
   0.006 
PMS*UFP   0.200** 
   (0.079) 
   0.011 
SIZE -0.468*** -0.560*** -0.437** 
 (0.172) (0.173) (0.172) 
 0.007 0.001 0.011 
PMS -0.536 -2.027 -0.134 
 (3.133) (3.200) (3.186) 
 0.864 0.527 0.967 
Year effects  YES YES YES 
    
Constant 45.70*** 46.48*** 45.30*** 
 (2.550) (2.553) (2.558) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 854 854 854 
R-squared 0.248 0.243 0.245 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, in parentheses; p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key Government 
measures; REF is the Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust cost efficiency ; FP is 
reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; OS is operating surplus/deficit scaled by total 
revenue; UFP is underlying financial performance defined as reported financial performance less 
financial support, scaled by total revenue; PMS is an indicator variable coded 0 for the AHC (2006-
2008) and 1 for the Star ratings. PMS*REF is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of 
the Star ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance 
and cost efficiency; PMS*FP  is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star ratings 
as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and reported 
financial performance: PMS*OS is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star 
ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and 
operating surplus/deficit: PMS*UFP is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star 
ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and 
underlying financial performance.  
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Table 14: The relationship between nonfinancial performance and Trust cost 
efficiency -  the Star ratings as compared with the AHC 
Panel B: General Trusts 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP 
    
REF -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.092*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PMS*REF 0.048 0.051* 0.049* 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
 0.104 0.083 0.093 
FP 0.160***   
 (0.053)   
 0.003   
PMS*FP 0.176*   
 (0.102)   
 0.084   
OS  0.182***  
  (0.052)  
  0.001  
PMS*OS  0.118  
  (0.095)  
  0.218  
UFP   0.136*** 
   (0.045) 
   0.002 
PMS*UFP   0.161** 
   (0.079) 
   0.041 
SIZE -0.374* -0.472** -0.361* 
 (0.196) (0.202) (0.195) 
 0.058 0.020 0.064 
PMS -1.802 -2.855 -2.001 
 (2.867) (2.872) (2.880) 
 0.530 0.320 0.487 
Year effects YES YES YES 
    
Constant 44.82*** 45.57*** 44.65*** 
 (3.194) (3.217) (3.207) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 769 769 769 
R-squared 0.240 0.237 0.242 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, in parentheses; p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key Government 
measures; REF is the Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust cost efficiency ; FP is 
reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; OS is operating surplus/deficit scaled by total 
revenue; UFP is underlying financial performance defined as reported financial performance less 
financial support, scaled by total revenue; PMS is an indicator variable coded 0 for the AHC (2006-
2008) and 1 for the Star ratings. PMS*REF is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of 
the Star ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance 
and cost efficiency; PMS*FP is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star ratings 
as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and reported 
financial performance: PMS*OS is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star 
ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and 
operating surplus/deficit: PMS*UFP is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star 
ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and 
underlying financial performance.  
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Table 14: The relationship between nonfinancial performance and Trust cost 
efficiency -  the Star ratings as compared with the AHC 
Panel C: General Trusts excluding those converting to Foundation status 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP 
    
REF -0.0908*** -0.0903*** -0.0909*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PMS*REF 0.0556 0.0573* 0.0546 
 (0.0346) (0.0344) (0.0348) 
 0.109 0.096 0.117 
FP 0.137**   
 (0.0558)   
 0.014   
PMS*FP 0.145   
 (0.108)   
 0.179   
OS  0.160***  
  (0.0553)  
  0.004  
PMS*OS  0.106  
  (0.101)  
  0.292  
UFP   0.111** 
   (0.0485) 
   0.022 
PMS*UFP   0.127 
   (0.0884) 
   0.152 
SIZE -0.461* -0.559** -0.442* 
 (0.239) (0.245) (0.237) 
 0.054 0.023 0.063 
Year effects YES YES YES 
    
    
Constant 45.79*** 46.56*** 45.59*** 
 (3.652) (3.683) (3.659) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 578 578 578 
R-squared 0.187 0.189 0.182 
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering, in parentheses; p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key Government 
measures; REF is the Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust cost efficiency ; FP is 
reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; OS is operating surplus/deficit scaled by total 
revenue; UFP is underlying financial performance defined as reported financial performance less 
financial support, scaled by total revenue; PMS is an indicator variable coded 0 for the AHC (2006-
2008) and 1 for the Star ratings. PMS*REF is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of 
the Star ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance 
and cost efficiency; PMS*FP is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star ratings 
as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and reported 
financial performance: PMS*OS is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star 
ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and 
operating surplus/deficit: PMS*UFP is an interaction effect to identify the differential impact of the Star 
ratings as compared with the AHC on the relationship between Trust nonfinancial performance and 
underlying financial performance.  
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6.2.3 Summary of findings: Study 1 – the impact of PMS design on the 
incentivisation of cost efficiency 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of PMS design on the 
incentivisation of cost efficiency as a means of improving nonfinancial performance. 
The research focus is a comparison of the relative impact of the AHC as compared 
with the Star ratings, applied to NHS hospital Trusts in the period 2003-2008. The 
AHC was characterised by better balance in the weightings given to financial and 
nonfinancial measures and by greater measurement diversity. A review of these 
characteristics, facilitated by the production possibility frontier analysis of Chapter 5, 
gave rise to the prediction that in the AHC the incentive to trade financial for 
nonfinancial performance would be reduced and that the AHC would be more 
effective at incentivising cost efficiency than the Star ratings. Categorical and non-
parametric chi–square analysis provides evidence of manipulation consistent with 
the manipulation of financial performance in order to improve overall performance 
ratings and supports the prediction that the prevalence of deficits would be lower in 
the AHC than in the Stars. The reduction in deficits was most in evidence for small 
deficits of up to 1% of revenue, which reduced from 12% to 2% of all observations. 
A reduction in large deficits of more than 1% of revenue however was not in 
evidence. These remained at a constant 30% of all observations. These findings are 
consistent with the characteristics of the AHC which heavily penalised deficits but 
once a deficit was incurred there was no further penalty. Thus, unless a Trust could 
move into surplus, which practically would be more difficult the larger the deficit, 
there was no incentive to take action. 
Evidence from multivariate analysis provides evidence that the AHC was 
more effective at incentivising cost efficiency than the Stars, consistent with it being 
a more robust performance measurement system which offers less scope for 
manipulation and which incorporates stronger incentives to improve cost efficiency 
as a means of improving service standards. Using separate regressions for each of 
the Stars and the AHC the coefficient on REF, a measure of Trust cost efficiency, 
was higher in the AHC than in the Stars and both results were statistically significant 
and robust to sample selection and choice of financial measure. When interaction 
effects were introduced to identify the significance of the differences between the 
AHC and the Stars, the coefficients remained consistent with the individual 
regressions and for the sample of general hospitals the difference was identified as 
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being significant. These results were robust to alternative measures for financial 
performance and to the exclusion of Trusts converting to Foundation Trust status. 
Indeed the size of the coefficient on REF for the sample excluding converting Trusts 
was higher, indicating that the relative impact of the AHC on the incentivisation of 
cost efficiency was bigger for weaker Trusts. 
It has not been possible to explore the impact of the AHC and the Stars on 
specialist Trusts alone as there are too few observations. However, descriptive 
statistics shows that they are significantly smaller and less efficient50 than general 
(non-specialist) Trusts but have better reported financial performance.  
 
 
  
                                               
50
 The observed lower efficiency of specialist Trusts is consistent with the findings of prior 
research using frontier analysis techniques (Worthington, 2004). 
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6.3 FINDINGS STUDY 2: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PERFORMANCE IMPACT OF 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Financial support was disclosed in financial statements over the three year 
period from 2003-04 to 2005-06. The total number of Trust observations in these 
years is 461 (see Table 1). Eight observations obtained from the Laing and Buisson 
database are eliminated from this population: five observations where an underlying 
surplus was associated with the receipt of financial support and three observations 
of negative financial support. The resulting core sample for this study is therefore 
453 observations. The results from this core sample are subject to additional tests 
to identify their robustness to the inclusion of these eight omitted observations.  
The impact of financial support on the numbers of Trusts reporting surpluses 
and deficits is revealed in Table 15. Panel A shows that, of the 280 Trusts reporting 
a surplus, 97 (35%) had an underlying deficit. This figure of 35% provides an 
indication of the impact of financial support on key performance measures, such as 
the fulfilment of the statutory duty to breakeven and Trust performance ratings, 
which are used for the purposes of public accountability. Table 15 Panel B shows 
that of the 162 Trusts that received financial support 97 (60% of 162) were moved 
into surplus whilst the remainder (65) remained in deficit. Panel C identifies Trusts 
not in receipt of financial support: 108 deficit Trusts, that provide the reference 
group for measuring benchmark nonfinancial performance, and 183 Trusts reporting 
surpluses. Panels B and C provide the framework for the investigation of the 
performance impact of financial support.  
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Table 15: Distribution of reported and underlying financial performance, 2003-04 to 
2005-06: an analysis of the impact of financial support  
 
Panel A: Full sample of Trusts 
Reported financial 
performance (FP)
Deficit             
N
Surplus           
N
Total             
N
Deficit 173 0 173
Surplus 97 183 280
Total 270 183 453
Underlying financial 
performance (UFP)
 
 
 
Panel B: Trusts receiving financial support 
Reported financial 
performance (FP)
Deficit       
N
Surplus               
N
 Total         
N
Deficit 65 0 65
Surplus 97 0 97
Total 162 0 162
Underlying financial 
performance (UFP)
 
 
 Panel C: Trusts not receiving financial support 
Reported financial 
performance (FP)
Deficit       
N
Surplus               
N
Total         
N
Deficit 108 0 108
Surplus 0 183 183
Total 108 183 291
Underlying financial 
performance (UFP)
 
 
FP is reported financial performance scaled by total revenue; UFP is underlying financial performance 
defined as reported financial performance less financial support, scaled by total revenue. Source: 
Laing and Buisson  
 
Reported financial performance is surplus/deficit reported in NHS Trust income statements and is a 
measure of residual income after a capital charge based on current value of assets. 
Financial support is defined as funds transferred into Trusts in financial difficulty from surplus funds 
elsewhere in the NHS. It was not part of the revenue earned by the Trust under its service level 
agreements.  
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Table 16 illustrates the economic significance of the 453 Trusts in the 
sample. Over the three year period the mean revenue of each Trust amounted to 
£185m. However the mean revenue of specialist Trusts (49) was much lower at 
£82m. The mean revenue of the 162 Trusts (36% of 453) receiving financial support 
is somewhat larger at over £203m, than the full sample. In contrast, the revenue of 
specialist Trusts (4) receiving financial support is lower at £69m than the size of all 
(49) specialist Trusts (£82m). The difference in means (not tabulated) between the 
revenue of Trusts receiving financial support and not receiving financial support is 
significant at 5% for the whole sample (453) but not for the subsamples of acute 
trusts (404) and specialist trusts (49). These differences between specialist and 
non-specialist Trusts warrants the investigation not only of the total sample of 453 
observations but also, as for Study 1, a sample excluding specialist Trusts (404 
observations). For Trusts receiving financial support (162) there is no significant 
difference between the mean revenue of those which subsequently report a deficit 
and those which report a surplus. This is also the case when specialist Trusts are 
excluded from the sample (158 observations). However, of the four specialist Trusts 
receiving financial support, none subsequently reported a deficit. All four were 
moved from deficit into surplus. 
  
  
 Page 214 
 
 
Table 16: Trust total revenue £000, 2003-04 to 2005-06: a comparison of Trusts 
receiving financial support and those not receiving it. 
Panel A: All Trusts 
Year N Mean Std.Devn. Min. Max. Median
2004 172  170,975  104,838  11,523  627,148  138,895  
2005 146  185,007  109,035  12,981  677,981  154,001  
2006 135  201,832  120,486  42,855  721,415  164,237  
Total 453  184,693  111,512  11,523  721,415  153,124  
General 404 197,129  110,530  56,286  721,415  162,715  
Specialist 49 82,158    49,917    11,523  220,075  64,487     
 
Panel B: Trusts in Receipt of Financial Support 
Year N Mean Std.Devn. Min. Max. Median
2004 67   189,901  104,710    75,142  627,148  153,758  
2005 56   213,640  119,954    50,840  677,981  180,010  
2006 39   211,413  121,215    57,263  558,478  189,152  
Total 162  203,286  114,043    50,840  677,981  171,208  
General 158  206,677  113,397    68,162  677,981  173,606  
Specialist 4     69,343    22,428      50,840  101,265  62,634    
Surplus 97 204,854  122,629    50,840  677,981  164,673  
Deficit 65 200,947  100,756    68,162  627,148  177,378   
Panel C: Trusts Not in Receipt of Financial Support
Year N Mean Std.Devn. Min. Max. Median
2004 105     158,898   103,613     11,523   538,363       129,640       
2005 90      167,190   98,184       12,981   513,404       146,009       
2006 96      197,939   120,608     42,855   721,415       160,310       
Total 291     174,342   108,905     11,523   721,415       145,712       
General 246 190,997   108,437     56,286   721,415       155,882       
Specialist 45 83,297     51,650       11,523   220,075       64,487        
Surplus 183 177,163   116,175     11,523   721,415       145,868       
Deficit 108 169,562   95,661       41,968   474,983       142,020        
 
Financial support represented funds transferred into Trusts in financial difficulty from surplus funds 
elsewhere in the NHS. It was not part of the revenue earned by the Trust under its service level 
agreements. Source: Laing and Buisson 
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Descriptive statistics relating to the reported financial performance of Trusts 
over the Study 2 period of 2003-04 to 2005-06 are reported in Table 17. The results 
for all Trusts are shown in Panel A and the sample is then subdivided into Trusts 
receiving financial support (Panel B) and Trusts not receiving financial support 
(Panel C). The mean deficit for all Trusts (453) is £2.3m (Panel A). The annual 
mean deficit increased from under £1m in 2004 to £4.5m in 2006. However, 
consistent with the discipline of the financial breakeven requirement, median 
financial performance was marginally positive in all years. Trusts receiving financial 
support (162, Panel B) reported a mean deficit of £2.4m and those not receiving 
support, (291, Panel C), reported a mean deficit of £2.3m. The null hypothesis of no 
difference in the means of reported performance for Trusts not in receipt of financial 
support compared to those receiving financial support (untabulated) is not rejected 
(t =0.0581; p = 0.479), indicating the effectiveness of financial support in narrowing 
the difference (£32k) in reported financial performance between these two groups. 
Panels B and C also show the results for Trusts reporting deficits and those 
reporting surpluses. As for the full sample there is no significant difference 
(untabulated) in the mean reported financial performance for Trusts reporting 
deficits and for Trusts reporting surpluses whether or not they receive financial 
support. In Panel D, as a control for heteroskedasticity in the multivariate analysis, 
financial performance is scaled by total revenue. Consistent with Panel A, the mean 
reported financial performance is a deficit of 1.5% of revenue, with a small positive 
median of 0.003% of revenue and a range from a maximum deficit of 28% to a 
maximum surplus of 6.5%. There is no significant difference between those 
receiving financial support and those not. 
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Table 17: Reported financial performance, 2003-04 to 2005-06: a comparison of 
Trusts receiving financial support and those not receiving it 
 
Panel A: All Trusts
Year N Mean Std. Devn. Minm.  Maxm. Median
£000 £000 £000  £000 £000
2004 172 -826          2,583 -        18,637        9,394 5
2005 146 -2,112          4,946 -        30,657      13,581 3
2006 135 -4,531          7,952 -        40,281        6,481 2
Total 453 -2,345          5,607 -        40,281      13,581 4  
 
Panel B: Trusts receiving financial support
Year N Mean
 Std. 
Devn.  Minm.  Maxm. Median
£000  £000  £000  £000 £000
2004 67     1,332-    2,911    18,637-      513           3
2005 56     2,294-    5,743    30,657-      13,581      7
2006 39     4,241-    8,353    40,281-      6,481        12
Total 162   2,365-    5,701    40,281-      13,581      4
Surplus 97 450 1,613    -            13,581      50
Deficit 65 -6,566 6,924    40,281-      27-             -4506  
 
Panel C: Trusts not receiving financial support 
Year N Mean Std.Devn. Minm. Maxm. Median 
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000
2004 105 -502 2,306 -12,801 9,394 6.000
2005 90 -1,999 4,410 -21,656 10,755 1.500
2006 96 -4,649 7,825 -33,569 3,414 0.500
Total 291 -2,333 5,564 -33,569 10,755 4.000
Surplus 183 406 1,271 0 10,755 28.0
Deficit 108 -6,975 6,824 -33,569 -18 -4952.5  
 
Panel D: Reported financial performance scaled by total revenue 
N Mean
Std. 
Devn. Minm. Maxm. Median
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000
Total sample 453 -1.459 3.487 -28.027 6.501 0.003
Financial support 162 -1.393 3.587 -28.027 5.934 0.003
No financial support 291 -1.495 3.435 -22.094 6.501 0.003  
 
Source: Laing and Buisson 
 
Reported financial performance is surplus/deficit reported in NHS Trust income statements and is a 
measure of residual income after a capital charge based on current value of assets.  
 
Financial support is defined as funds transferred into Trusts in financial difficulty from surplus funds 
elsewhere in the NHS. It was not part of the revenue earned by the Trust under its service level 
agreements.  
  
 Page 217 
 
 
The amounts of financial support received by Trusts and the impact it has on 
reported financial performance is further explored in Table 18. Panel A shows that 
the mean amount of financial support received by 162 Trusts (36% of the total 453) 
amounted to £5.7m and that this increased from £4.8m in 2004 to £6.9m in 2006. 
There is no significant difference (untabulated) between financial support received 
by Trusts reporting a surplus (£5.9m) and Trusts reporting a deficit (£5.3m). The 
amount of support ranged from relatively small amounts of circa £200k to a 
maximum of £32.2m. Panel B shows the significant impact of financial support on 
reported financial performance with mean financial support of £5.7m converting a 
mean underlying deficit of £8.0m to a mean reported deficit of £2.4m. In aggregate, 
over the three year disclosure period, financial support received by NHS Trusts 
amounted to £919m with £573m going to Trusts which subsequently reported a 
surplus and £346m to Trusts which subsequently remained in deficit. It is notable 
that the mean underlying financial deficit of Trusts reporting a surplus is, at £5.5m, 
half the level of Trusts which subsequently reported a deficit (£11.9m). This is in 
contrast to the figures for the amount of financial support received for which there is 
no significant difference (untabulated). It is not possible to identify from these figures 
whether the Trusts which subsequently reported a deficit had originally forecast 
breakeven, and failed to achieve it, consistent with a failure to identify good quality 
managers (potentially as a consequence of opportunism), or whether good quality 
managers were correctly selected but were given limited access to financial support 
which was insufficient to eliminate the underlying deficit. Further insight into this 
question can be provided by the multivariate analysis which follows. If financial 
support was provided to protect service standards then its provision will be 
associated with a higher level of nonfinancial performance than would otherwise be 
the case. This will be the case whether or not the Trust subsequently reported a 
deficit or a surplus.  
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Table 18: Financial support: amounts received by Trusts and impact on reported 
financial performance 
 
Panel A: Amount of financial support received by Trusts 
Year N Mean
Std. 
Devn. Minm. Maxm. Median Skewness Kurtosis
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000
2004 67 4,782 5,962 250      32,210       2,950       2.752 11.161
2005 56 5,886 5,139 209      26,377       4,537       1.847 6.938
2006 39 6,894 5,037 298      19,272       5,481       0.850 2.901
Total 162 5,672 5,504 209      32,210       3,985       2.025 7.925
Surplus 97 5,908      6,199      209 32,210       3,800       2.050 7.360
Deficit 65 5,320      4,284      400      19,272       4,300       1.234 4.412
 
Panel B: Impact of Financial Support on Reported Financial Performance 
Year N % Trusts
Mean 
reported 
income 
Mean financial 
support 
Underlying 
financial 
performance 
Aggregate 
financial 
support 
£000 £000 £000 £000
2004 67 39% -1,332 4,782 -6,114 320,377
2005 56 38% -2,294 5,886 -8,180 329,615
2006 39 29% -4,241 6,894 -11,135 268,880
Total 162 36% -2,365 5,672 -8,037 918,872
Surplus 97 21% 450 5,908 -5,458 573,043
Deficit 65 14% -6,566 5,320 -11,886 345,829
 
Reported financial performance is residual income after a capital charge based on current 
value of assets reported in NHS Trust income statements; Underlying financial performance 
is reported financial performance less financial support received; Financial support is a 
mechanism where additional ‘revenue’ was credited to a Trust in deficit from elsewhere in 
the NHS. 
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Descriptive statistics for nonfinancial performance (NFP) are reported in 
Table 19. The mean performance for all Trusts is 33.5 relative to a maximum score 
of 36. The minimum score is 5. The mean (33.2) and median (34) performance for 
the 162 Trusts receiving financial support is similar to the performance of those not 
receiving financial support (33.6 and 35 respectively). The null hypothesis of no 
difference in mean NFP score is not rejected (t=1.22; p=0.11). There is also a high 
degree of similarity between the performance of Trusts which reported a deficit 
whether or not they received financial support.  
 
 
Table 19: Analysis of nonfinancial performance for Trusts in receipt of financial 
support as compared with those not receiving financial support 
 
NFP N Mean
Std. 
Devn. Minm. Maxm. Median Skewness Kurtosis
Trusts receiving 
financial support
Remaining in deficit 65 32.6 3.8 21 36 33 -1.194 3.646
Converted to surplus 97 33.6 2.8 23 36 35 -1.389 4.992
162 33.2 3.2 21 36 34 -1.404 4.684
Trusts not receiving 
financial support
Reporting a deficit 108 32.3 4.5 5 36 34 -2.758 14.753
Reporting a surplus 183 34.4 2.5 22 36 36 -2.283 9.347
291 33.6 3.5 5 36 35 -3.125 19.433
Total 453 33.5 3.4 5 36 34 -2.594 15.110
 
 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key Government 
measures (Source: Healthcare Commission); Financial support is defined as funds transferred into 
Trusts in financial difficulty from surplus funds elsewhere in the NHS. It was not part of the revenue 
earned by the Trust under its service level agreements (Source: Laing and Buisson). 
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Based on the above analysis, Table 20 reports the results of one tailed t-
tests which show whether the nonfinancial performance (NFP) of Trusts receiving 
financial support was higher than for those Trusts which did not receive financial 
support. As only Trusts in deficit received financial support, the comparison is made 
with deficit Trusts not receiving financial support, in order to ensure a like-for-like 
comparison. Panel A shows that across the sample of 270 observations the 
nonfinancial performance of Trusts receiving financial support was significantly 
higher at 33.2 than for those deficit Trusts not receiving financial support (t=-1.88, 
p=0.031). Further insight into the impact of financial support on these Trusts is 
obtained by subdividing the sample further into support-receiving Trusts which 
subsequently reported a surplus (Panel B) and those reporting a deficit (Panel C). 
Panel B shows that Trusts receiving support and subsequently reporting a surplus 
performed significantly better, at NFP =33.6, than those deficit Trusts which did not 
receive financial support, NFP=32.3 (t=2.39, p=0.009). This result is in contrast to 
the result for Trusts which remained in deficit (Panel C). For these Trusts there is no 
significant difference (t=-0.472, p=0.319) between those Trusts who received 
financial support (NFP =32.6) and those that did not (NFP=32.3). 
 These results provide prima facie evidence that, for the majority of Trusts in 
receipt of financial support, (those that reported a surplus), the receipt of financial 
support is associated with a significant increase in service standards. However 
there is a minority of Trusts for which the receipt of financial support is not 
associated with an improvement in nonfinancial performance. This result suggests 
that, for this minority of Trusts, those that remained in deficit, the selection of ‘good’ 
managers was flawed such that ‘poor’ managers were able to access financial 
support. This question is investigated further in the multivariate analysis which 
follows.  
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Table 20: One tailed t-tests comparing nonfinancial performance of Trusts receiving 
financial support and those not, 2003-04 to 2005-06 
 
Panel A: Trusts reporting a deficit not receiving financial support and all 
Trusts receiving financial support 
 
NFP No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
No FS 108 32.3              0.4              4.5
FS 162 33.2              0.3              3.2
Total 270 33                  0.2              3.8
Difference -0.9 0.5
t-statistic -1.880
p (FS>No FS) 0.031  
 
Panel B: Trusts reporting a deficit not receiving financial support and Trusts 
receiving financial support, reporting a surplus 
 
NFP No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
No FS 108 32.3 0.4 4.5
FS 97 33.6 0.3 2.8
Total 205 32.9 0.3 3.8
Difference -1.3 0.5
t-statistic -2.391
p (FS>No FS) 0.009  
 
Panel C: Trusts reporting a deficit not receiving financial support and Trusts 
receiving financial support, reporting a deficit  
 
NFP No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
No FS 108 32.3 0.4 4.5
FS 65 32.6 0.5 3.8
Total 173 32.4 0.3 4.3
Difference -0.3 0.7
t-statistic -0.472
p (FS>No FS) 0.319   
 
NFP is a measure of nonfinancial performance based on performance against key Government 
measures (Source: Healthcare Commission); FS = NFP for Trusts in receipt of financial support; No FS 
= NFP for Trusts not in receipt of financial support.   
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6.3.2 Multivariate analysis 
As a precursor to multivariate analysis Pearson correlation coefficients for 
the relationships between nonfinancial performance (NFP), underlying financial 
performance (UFP) Trust cost efficiency (REF), and size are reported in Table 21. 
Panel A reports the coefficients and their significance (in italics), for the reference 
group of 108 Trusts reporting a deficit but not receiving financial support. These 
Trusts form the basis for generating a benchmark level of nonfinancial performance 
(NFP) for Trusts in receipt of financial support. For this reference group of Trusts 
underlying financial performance is identical to reported financial performance. As 
can be seen, there is a significant and negative association between NFP and REF 
(p=0.000), indicating that the better a Trust’s cost efficiency the better its 
nonfinancial performance. These results are consistent with those in Study 1. 
Pearson correlation coefficients for the 162 Trusts with underlying deficits 
and receiving financial support are reported in Panel B. Panel B includes an 
additional variable, FS, financial support. As with Panel A, there is a negative 
association between nonfinancial performance (NFP) and Trust reference costs 
(REF), (p=0.046), Trust size (p=0.047) and underlying financial performance 
(p=0.001). The relationship between financial support and nonfinancial performance 
is however negative but insignificant. The negative association of FS with UFP 
(p=0.000) is consistent with the use of financial support to reduce and often 
eliminate underlying deficits. 
The rest of this section proceeds to present the findings from the 
investigation of the three questions identified in Chapter 5: first, was financial 
support associated with an improvement in nonfinancial performance; second, 
consistent with on-going benefits arising from the provision of financial support, was 
an increase in nonfinancial performance in the subsequent period associated with 
the receipt of financial support, and third, consistent with the provision of financial 
support being conditional upon a credible recovery plan, was financial support 
associated with an improvement in underlying financial performance in the following 
period. 
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Table 21: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
Panel A: Trusts in deficit not receiving financial support
108 Trusts NFP UFP REF SIZE
NFP 1
UFP 0.148 1
0.127
REF -0.347 0.041 1
0.000 0.676
SIZE -0.0976 0.069 0.0752 1
0.3148 0.4777 0.4392  
 
Panel B: Trusts with underlying deficits receiving financial support
162 Trusts NFP FS UFP REF SIZE
PMStot 1
FS -0.087 1
0.273
UFP 0.271 -0.680 1
0.001 0.000
REF -0.157 0.019 0.075 1
0.046 0.807 0.344
SIZE -0.157 -0.200 0.126 0.122 1
0.047 0.011 0.110 0.124  
p values in italics 
 
Where: NFP = The key nonfinancial targets in the Star ratings and the AHC are identified in 
endnotes 3 and 4 respectively and the methodology applied to derive uniform measures of 
nonfinancial performance NFP is reported in endnote 12; FS = Financial support as a % of 
total revenue; FP = Reported financial performance; UFP = Underlying financial 
performance calculated by deducting financial support from reported financial performance; 
REF = Trust reference cost index, an inverse measure of Trust cost efficiency; SIZE = Log of 
total assets 
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6.3.2.1 Research question 1: Was the receipt of financial support associated with 
an improvement in contemporaneous nonfinancial performance? 
Table 22 reports the results of the investigation into the impact of financial 
support on contemporaneous nonfinancial performance. A benchmark level of 
nonfinancial performance was first obtained by applying the following OLS 
regression to the 101 deficit Trusts not receiving financial support:  
2006
0 1 2 3
2005
ijt ijt ijt ijt l i ijt
l
NFP REF UFP SIZE YEAR e    

     
 
Where ijtNFP  = nonfinancial performance for Trust i  in year t  for the 
reference group j ; REF  = Trust cost efficiency measured by reference cost 
indices; UFP  = underlying financial performance, which in this reference group, is 
identical to reported financial performance; SIZE  = control variable measured as 
the log of total assets; YEAR  is an indicator variable coded 1 to 3 for the years 
2004-2006.  
The regression coefficients 0 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,     and year effects were then applied to 
the explanatory variables of Trusts receiving financial support to obtain a 
performance adjusted benchmark level of nonfinancial performance, as follows:  
2006
0 1 2 3
2005
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆit
it it it l l
l
NFP REF UFP SIZE YEAR    

     
 
Where ˆNFP is the performance adjusted benchmark level of nonfinancial 
performance. After insertion of coefficient values 0 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , and     and year effects, 
the benchmark level of nonfinancial performance was computed as follows: 
For the sample of Trusts including specialist Trusts: 
ˆ 49.412 0.139 0.051 0.205 0.959*2005 2.118* 2006   it
it it it
NFP REF UFP SIZE    
 
And for the sample excluding specialist Trusts: 
ˆ 45.148 0.065 0.025 0.497 1.437*2005 2.460* 2006   it
it it it
NFP REF UFP SIZE    
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The difference between the fitted and actual values was then calculated: 
ˆresNFP NFP NFP   
Where resNFP  is the nonfinancial performance residual. 
The mean and median values of the residuals of nonfinancial performance, 
resNFP , calculated as the difference between the actual and benchmark levels of 
performance, are reported in Table 22 together with their p and z values for one and 
two tailed tests respectively. The null hypotheses of the mean and the median being 
equal to zero can be rejected, p=0.003 and z=0.000. The coefficient on the mean 
(0.68) indicates that financial support equivalent to 1% of revenue would result in an 
increase of 0.68 in the NFP score. Mean financial support of £5.7m for a Trust with 
mean revenue of £200m would thus result in an increase of 2 points in the mean 
NFP score. These results are consistent with the proposition that, across the whole 
sample of Trusts in receipt of financial support, contemporaneous nonfinancial 
performance is better than it would have been without the application of financial 
support. This finding is consistent with the effective selection of skilled managers 
who use the flexibility accorded by financial support to maintain high standards of 
service. However, when the sample is split between those Trusts which reported a 
surplus and those which remained in deficit a notable difference in results is 
observed. For those Trusts which reported a surplus mean resNFP  is significantly 
increased to 1.144 (p=0.000) whilst, for those remaining in deficit the null 
hypotheses of the mean and median of resNFP  being equal to zero cannot be 
rejected (p=0.515, z=0.394). For an average Trust with £200m revenue, receiving 
mean financial support of £5.7m and subsequently reporting a surplus, the result 
would be an increase of 3.3 points in the NFP score whereas there would be no 
increase in the NFP score of a Trust remaining in deficit. Similar results can be 
found for the median resNFP  score. This is significantly higher than the benchmark 
for the full group (1.393, z=0.00), higher still for Trusts reporting a surplus (1.656, 
z=0.000) but lower, and not significant for Trusts reporting a deficit (0.774, z=0.394). 
These results are robust to the exclusion of specialist Trusts (Table 22, Panel B) 
and the inclusion of the eight eliminated observations (untabulated).  
These findings are consistent with the results of the earlier t-tests reported in 
Table 20. They suggest that while, overall, the receipt of financial was associated 
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with improved service standards, there was a significant minority of Trusts where 
such benefits were not realised, either because the system of selecting Trusts for 
the receipt of financial support was not sufficiently robust, or because the system 
was being used opportunistically to disguise deficits without the requisite effort 
being put into maintaining service standards. However, it is possible that benefits 
from the receipt of financial support take time to be realised. This question is the 
subject of the next part of the investigation of the performance impact of financial 
support. 
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Table 22: Tests of nonfinancial performance residuals for Trusts receiving financial 
support 
Full sample 
N Mean p-value* Median
No. of obs.  
Median>0 z-value**
Trusts receiving financial support 162 0.679  0.003 1.393 104 0.000
Converted to surplus 97 1.144  0.000 1.656 65 0.000
Remaining in deficit 65 -0.016 0.515 0.774 39 0.394  
 
Excluding specialist Trusts 
* One tailed Test 
** Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test 
 
 
To obtain coefficients for the estimation of benchmark levels of nonfinancial performance the 
following OLS regression (Equation 6) applied to Trusts where reported financial 
performance is a precise measure of underlying financial performance, that is, the 101 
Trusts not receiving financial support that reported a deficit. 
2006
0 1 2 3
2005
ijt ijt ijt ijt l i ijt
l
NFP REF UFP SIZE YEAR e    

     
 
ijt
NFP  = nonfinancial performance for Trust i  in year t  for the reference group j ; REF  = 
Trust cost efficiency measured by reference cost indices; UFP  = underlying financial 
performance;
 
SIZE  = control variable measured as the log of total assets; YEAR  is an 
indicator variable coded 1 to 3 for the years 2004-2006.  
The regression coefficients 
0 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , ,     and year effects are applied to the explanatory 
variables of the rest of the sample to obtain a performance adjusted benchmark level of 
nonfinancial performance for other Trusts in our sample.  
Performance adjusted benchmark levels of nonfinancial performance ˆNFP are obtained 
from:   
2006
0 1 2 3
2005
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆit
it it it l l
l
NFP REF UFP SIZE YEAR    

     
 
Which, after insertion of coefficient values 
0 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , and     and year effects, for the sample 
which includes specialist Trusts becomes: 
ˆ 49.412 0.139 0.051 0.205 0.959*2005 2.118* 2006   it
it it it
NFP REF UFP SIZE    
 
 
And for the sample excluding specialist Trusts: 
ˆ 45.148 0.065 0.025 0.497 1.437*2005 2.460* 2006   it
it it it
NFP REF UFP SIZE    
 
The difference between the fitted and actual values is then calculated: 
 
ˆresNFP NFP NFP    
N Mean p-value* Median
No. of obs.  
Median>0 z-value**
Trusts receiving financial support 158 0.392 0.060 1.393 101 0.004
Converted to surplus 93 0.827 0.003 1.656 61 0.001
Remaining in deficit 65 -0.231 0.701 0.774 40 0.528
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6.3.2.2 Research question 2: Was the receipt of financial support associated with 
an improvement in nonfinancial performance in the subsequent period? 
The results for the second research question which investigates the impact 
of financial support on nonfinancial performance in the subsequent period are 
shown in Table 23 for the full sample of Trusts receiving financial support and in 
Table 24 for a sample which excludes specialist Trusts. In each Table three models 
are presented: Model (1) reports the results for all Trusts in the sample, Model (2) 
reports the results for Trusts which subsequently report a surplus, and Model (3) 
reports the results for Trusts which subsequently report a deficit. 
 Table 23, Model (1) shows that the change in nonfinancial performance 
(NFP), for the whole sample including specialist Trusts, is positively associated 
with financial support at the level of 5% significance (coefficient = 0.149, p=0.043). 
The change in NFP for a Trust with revenue of £200m receiving mean financial 
support of £5.7m is estimated at approximately 0.4. This is over and above the 
contemporaneous improvement in NFP associated with the receipt of financial 
support (2 points) taking the total benefit to nonfinancial performance to 2.4. This 
suggests that although the main benefits of financial support were realised in the 
year of receipt, improvements, albeit smaller, continued to flow through into the 
subsequent period. These results are consistent with the view that financial support 
allowed Trusts time to address financial problems through process improvements, 
which had continuing benefits for service standards, rather than through cost cutting 
which might be more damaging to future capacity. Inclusion of the eight eliminated 
observations makes no difference to these results (untabulated). 
However, as in previous analysis, there are notable differences between 
Trusts which subsequently reported a surplus (Model 2) and those which reported a 
deficit (Model 3). The results for Trusts which subsequently reported a surplus are 
consistent with the results for the full sample. However the size of the coefficient is 
slightly smaller at 0.117 as compared with 0.149 suggesting that for an average 
sized Trust receiving average financial support, the NFP score would rise by a 
further 0.3 points as compared with 0.4. There is no association between financial 
support and subsequent NFP for Trusts reporting a deficit. Combined with the 
finding of no contemporaneous benefits this result suggests that no benefits to 
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service standards were realised in these Trusts as a consequence of receiving 
financial support.  
Table 24 shows the results for a sample which excludes specialist Trusts. As 
can be seen the results are virtually identical. The coefficient on financial support is 
0.149 (0.149) for the full sample, 0.124 (0.117) for surplus Trusts and 0.284 (0.284) 
for deficit Trusts. As previously, the results for the full sample and those reporting a 
surplus were significant (p=0.067 and p=0.074 respectively) whilst those for Trusts 
reporting a deficit were not (p=0.268). Inclusion of the eight eliminated observations 
(untabulated) makes no difference to these results. 
In summary, these findings are consistent with the results of the earlier tests. 
They suggest that while, overall, the receipt of financial support was associated with 
improved service standards, the benefits were concentrated in those Trusts that 
reported a surplus. A significant minority of Trusts which reported a deficit 
demonstrated no improvement in service standards as a consequence of receiving 
financial support suggesting that the system of selecting Trusts for the receipt of 
financial support was not sufficiently robust, or that the system was being used 
opportunistically to disguise deficits without the requisite effort being put into 
maintaining service standards.  
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Table 23: Association between financial support and subsequent changes in 
nonfinancial performance  
 
 Full sample Reporting surplus Reporting deficit 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP
FS 0.149** 0.117** 0.284 
 (0.073) (0.060) (0.253) 
 0.043 0.057 0.268 
REF -0.112** -0.076* -0.187* 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.099) 
 0.015 0.081 0.066 
UFP -0.054 -0.052 -0.109 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.099) 
 0.387 0.408 0.278 
SIZE -5.636 -1.621 -10.459 
 (4.000) (3.252) (6.267) 
 0.162 0.620 0.103 
2005 -0.859 -1.396 -0.292 
 (0.769) (0.846) (1.607) 
 0.267 0.104 0.857 
2006 -3.458*** -3.237*** -4.137 
 (0.900) (1.019) (1.793) 
 0.000 0.002 0.026 
2007 omitted omitted omitted 
    
Constant 0.646 0.669 0.728 
 (0.794) (0.831) (1.550) 
 0.418 0.424 0.641 
    
Observations 156 92 64 
R-squared 0.191 0.214 0.215 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Model :
 
2006
0 1 1 2 3 4
2005
t l i it
l
NFP FS REF UFP SIZE YEAR e     


            
1it it it
NFP NFP NFP

   , the change in nonfinancial performance for Trust i  in year t ;
  
1it it it
REF REF REF

   , the change in Trust cost efficiency measured by reference cost 
indices; 
1it it it
UFP UFP UFP

   ,the change in underlying financial performance ; 
1t t
SIZE SIZE SIZE

   , the change in the log of Trust total assets ; 
YEAR  is an indicator variable coded 1 to 3 for the years 2004-2006 and e  is an error term. 
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Table 24: Association between financial support and subsequent changes in 
nonfinancial performance (excluding specialist Trusts) 
 
 Full sample Reporting surplus Reporting deficit 
VARIABLES NFP NFP NFP
 (1) (2) (3) 
FS 0.149** 0.124* 0.284 
 (0.080) (0.068) (0.253) 
 0.067 0.074 0.268 
REF -0.105** -0.056 -0.187* 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.099) 
 0.033 0.022 0.066 
UFP -0.054 -0.048 -0.109 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.099) 
 0.384 0.445 0.278 
SIZE -5.570 -1.291 -10.459 
 (4.074) (3.353) (6.267) 
 0.175 0.702 0.103 
2005 2.629*** 1.894** -0.292 
 (0.760) (0.774) (1.607) 
 0.001 0.018 0.857 
2006 omitted omitted -4.137 
   (1.793) 
   0.026 
2007 3.542*** 3.457*** Omitted 
 (0.937) (1.096)  
 0.000 0.003  
    
Constant -2.843*** -2.667*** 0.728 
 (0666) (0.654) (1.550) 
 0.000 0.000 0.641 
    
Observations 152 88 64 
R-squared 0.191 0.222 0.215 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model:
 
2006
0 1 1 2 3 4
2005
t l i it
l
NFP FS REF UFP SIZE YEAR e     


            
1it it it
NFP NFP NFP

    , the change in nonfinancial performance for Trust i  in year t ;
 
1it it it
REF REF REF

   , the change in Trust cost efficiency measured by reference cost 
indices;
1it it it
UFP UFP UFP

    , the change in underlying financial performance ;
1t t
SIZE SIZE SIZE

   , the change in the log of Trust total assets ; YEAR  is an indicator 
variable coded 1 to 3 for the years 2004-2006 and e  is an error term. 
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6.3.2.3 Research question 3: Was the receipt of financial support associated with 
an improvement in underlying financial performance in the subsequent 
period. 
The provision of financial support was conditional upon a credible recovery 
plan which would bring the Trust back into financial balance without the need for 
further additional funding. As such the underlying financial performance of Trust in 
receipt of financial support should improve in the period subsequent to its receipt. 
Tables 25 and 26 report the impact of financial support on subsequent 
financial performance for all Trusts receiving financial support (Table 25) and for 
general Trusts only (Table 26). In each Table three models are presented: Model (1) 
reports the results for all Trusts in the sample, Model (2) reports the results for 
Trusts which subsequently report a surplus, and Model (3) reports the results for 
Trusts which subsequently report a deficit. 
Table 25 shows that, for the full sample (Model 1) the provision of financial 
support is strongly associated with a subsequent improvement in underlying 
financial performance (p= 0.002). The coefficient of 0.610 indicates that for a Trust 
receiving financial support of £5.7m underlying financial performance in the 
subsequent year will improve by £3.5m. This result is consistent with the 
requirement to produce a credible recovery plan to bring the Trust back into 
financial balance. Further, to the extent that that (unobserved) repayments of 
financial support took place, the improvement in underlying financial performance is 
understated. The results do however indicate that, on average, bringing a Trust 
back into financial balance takes more than one year. For Trusts reporting a surplus 
(Model 2) and Trusts remaining in deficit (Model 3) the results remain significant 
(p=0.007 and p=0.001 respectively) but the coefficient on Trusts reporting a surplus 
(0.355) is much lower than for Trusts remaining in deficit (1.160). The coefficient of 
0.355 on Trusts reporting a surplus is associated with an improvement of £2.0m for 
an average sized Trust receiving an average £5.9m of financial support (see Table 
19 Panel B). The mean underlying deficit for these Trusts is £5.4m (Table 19, Panel 
B) consistent with a period in excess of two years to achieve financial balance. The 
coefficient of 1.160 on Trusts remaining in deficit indicates that the subsequent 
underlying financial performance of a Trust receiving mean financial support of 
£5.3m would improve by £6.1m. However the much higher level of underlying deficit 
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for these Trusts (£11.9m, Table 19, Panel B) results in a subsequent underlying 
deficit which remains above £5m suggesting that these Trusts take about two years 
or more to move to financial breakeven. Table 26 shows the results for a sample 
which excludes specialist Trusts. As can be seen, the results are virtually the same. 
The coefficient on financial support is 0.627 (0.610) for the full sample, 0.360(0.355) 
for surplus Trusts and 1.160 (1.160) for deficit Trusts. As previously, all results were 
significant (p=0.004, p=0.017 and p= 0.001 respectively). Inclusion of the eight 
eliminated observations (untabulated) makes no difference to these results. 
In summary, the provision of financial support is associated with significant 
improvements in financial performance in the subsequent year for all Trusts whether 
they reported deficits or surpluses. However, the improvement was bigger in Trusts 
which reported deficits than for those that reported surpluses. For these Trusts, the 
combination of a strong improvement in underlying financial performance alongside 
no improvement in nonfinancial performance suggests that underlying processes 
were not addressed and that, consistent with the Audit Commission view, financial 
support resulted in a strong focus on the scheduling of repayments, rather than 
acting as a spur to improve all aspects of performance.  
 
  
  
 Page 234 
 
Table 25: Association between financial support and subsequent changes in 
underlying financial performance  
 
 Full sample Reporting surplus Reporting deficit 
VARIABLES UFP UFP UFP
 (1) (2) (3) 
FS 0.610*** 0.355*** 1.160*** 
 (0.195) (0.127) (0.326) 
 0.002 0.007 0.001 
REF -0.046 -0.003 -0.179 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.108) 
 0.284 0.949 0.103 
NFP -0.092 -0.053 -0.183 
 (0.090) (0.062) (0.146) 
 0.312 0.402 0.216 
SIZE -6.110 3.234 -15.121 
 (7.693) (2.632) (11.065) 
 0.429 0.224 0.179 
2005 -3.576*** -2.342*** -4.848** 
 (0.925) (0.682) (1.805) 
 0.000 0.001 0.010 
2006 -5.188*** -2.247** -8.638*** 
 (1.221) (0.886) (2.200) 
 0.000 0.014 0.000 
2007 omitted omitted omitted 
    
Constant -2.570*** 1.099 3.735** 
 (0.883) (0.706) (1.493) 
 0.005 0.125 0.016 
    
Observations 156 92 64 
R-squared 0.314 0.250 0.506 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model:
 
2006
0 1 1 2 3 4
2005
t l i it
l
UFP FS REF NFP SIZE YEAR e     


          
 
1it it it
UFP UFP UFP

   , the change in underlying financial performance ;
1it it it
NFP NFP NFP

    , the change in nonfinancial performance for Trust i  in year t ;
 
1it it it
REF REF REF

   , the change in Trust cost efficiency measured by reference cost 
indices;
 1t t
SIZE SIZE SIZE

   , the change in the log of Trust total assets ; YEAR  is an 
indicator variable coded 1 to 3 for the years 2004-2006 and e  is an error term. 
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Table 26: Association between financial support and subsequent changes in 
underlying financial performance (excluding specialist Trusts) 
 
 Full sample Reporting surplus Reporting deficit 
VARIABLES UFP UFP UFP
    
FS 0.627** 0.360** 1.160*** 
 (0.210) (0.146) (0.326) 
 0.004 0.017 0.001 
REF -0.041 -0.007 -0.179 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.108) 
 0.356 0.877 0.103 
NFP -0.092 -0.049 -0.183 
 (0.090) (0.063) (0.146) 
 0.309 0.440 0.216 
SIZE -5.941 3.507 -15.121 
 (7.701) (2.644) (11.065) 
 0.443 0.190 0.179 
2005 1.552 -2.224 -4.848** 
 (1.162) (0.632) (1.805) 
 0.185 0.724 0.010 
2006 omitted omitted -8.638*** 
   (2.200) 
   0.000 
2007 5.238*** 2.193** Omitted 
 (1.252) (0.948)  
 0.000 0.024  
    
Constant -2.644*** -1.127 3.735** 
 (0.738) (0.565) (1.493) 
 0.001 0.051 0.016 
    
Observations 152 88 64 
R-squared 0.313 0.235 0.506 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, p values in italics 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Model :
 
2006
0 1 1 2 3 4
2005
t l i it
l
UFP FS REF NFP SIZE YEAR e     


          
 
1it it it
UFP UFP UFP

   , the change in underlying financial performance ;
1it it it
NFP NFP NFP

    , the change in nonfinancial performance for Trust i  in year t ;
 
1it it it
REF REF REF

   , the change in Trust cost efficiency measured by reference cost 
indices;
  
1t t
SIZE SIZE SIZE

   , the change in the log of Trust total assets ; YEAR  is an indicator 
variable coded 1 to 3 for the years 2004-2006 and e  is an error term. 
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6.3.3 Study 2: Summary of findings 
The system of financial support served to manipulate reported financial 
performance by shifting income between NHS organisations and to mislead key 
stakeholders such as Parliament and the public about the underlying financial 
performance of NHS Trusts. In the majority of cases the receipt of financial support 
by a Trust in financial difficulty served to advance the recognition of revenue from 
future periods as most financial support was provided on the basis that it would be 
‘repaid’ through reductions in future years’ revenue. 
The policy of financial support had a significant impact on the accountability 
of NHS hospital Trusts. The amount of financial support in circulation in the period 
2004-2006 amounted to £1bn and transformed a mean deficit of circa £8m to one of 
£2m for those Trusts receiving it. Further, of those Trusts which reported a surplus, 
35% had an underlying deficit. There were also implications for the wider 
accountability of the NHS. The requirement to disclose financial support was 
restricted to Trusts receiving it in the year of receipt. There were no requirements for 
disclosure of subsequent ‘repayments’ of financial support nor of funds released for 
brokerage by Trusts in surplus. Further, although the system of financial support did 
not affect the financial performance of the NHS as a whole it did have an impact on 
wider NHS accountability by reducing the number of NHS Trust deficits and 
breaches of their statutory duty to breakeven reported annually to Parliament in the 
NHS Summarised Accounts. These findings are consistent with Thomas, Herrmann 
and Inoue, (2004) and Vinarri and Nasi (2008) who found that, in an institutional 
setting characterised by multi-layered accountability, manipulation of financial 
statements took place not only at the overall group level but also, through the 
manipulation of inter-group transactions, within the group, to meet individual entity 
accountability requirements.  
The literature on the manipulation of financial performance however 
suggests that the flexibility accorded by mechanisms offering opportunities for 
manipulation can have beneficial consequences, provided that such flexibility is 
restricted to those who will work hard in the principals’ interests and not afforded to 
those who will use the flexibility opportunistically. (Demski, Frimor and Sappington, 
2004; Arya, Glover and Sunder, 2003; Scott, 2009). A second aspect of this study is 
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the investigation of the performance impact of the receipt of financial support for 
Trusts in financial difficulty.  
The findings from this investigation indicate that, consistent with the policy’s 
aims, financial support delivered benefits to patients and taxpayers in the form of 
better service standards whilst allowing time for financial difficulties to be 
addressed. The receipt of financial support is associated with a sizeable 
improvement in contemporaneous non-financial performance and a further, albeit 
smaller, improvement in the following year. Underlying financial performance also 
improves in the subsequent year. However, whilst, overall, the receipt of financial 
support was associated with improved service standards, the benefits were 
concentrated in those Trusts that reported a surplus. A significant minority of Trusts 
in receipt of financial support but reporting a deficit, (65/162=40%), demonstrated 
no improvement in service standards. So although overall, the system delivered 
benefits to service standards, these additional findings suggest that the system for 
selecting Trusts for receipt of financial support was not sufficiently discriminating or 
that the system was, in part, being used opportunistically to disguise deficits without 
the requisite effort being put into service standards.  
Evidence in support of an opportunistic interpretation is provided by the 
results for the relationship between financial support and the following year’s 
underlying financial performance. The receipt of financial support is associated with 
a significant improvement in the subsequent year’s underlying financial performance 
not only for the full sample, but for both subsamples of Trusts reporting deficits as 
well as those reporting surpluses. The improvement in deficit Trusts however, was 
higher than in surplus Trusts, albeit against a background of higher mean deficits 
(£11.9m as compared with £5.4m). For these Trusts the significantly higher 
improvement in underlying financial performance combined with no improvement in 
nonfinancial performance is consistent with the Audit Commission’s concern that, in 
failing Trusts, recovery planning focused ‘to an unhealthy degree on the precise 
profiling of future borrowing and the schedule of repayments’. (Audit Commission, 
2006b, para. 76) and is also consistent with an opportunistic interpretation that it 
was ‘sometimes used to cover up deficits and then, at an appropriate time, the 
money was moved back again to where it had come from without any real effort 
being put into sorting out why the deficit arose in the other organisation first.’ (House 
of Commons, 2006b: Q476). 
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In summary, the findings from this study indicate that the policy of income 
manipulation represented by financial support overall delivered benefits to patients 
and the public in the form of better service standards in Trusts in financial difficulty. 
However, in the context of a complex interaction of incentives and multi-layered 
accountability, there is also evidence that the system was not wholly effective and, 
in a significant proportion of Trusts, such benefits were not realised. In particular, in 
a demanding and evolving performance measurement regime, there were 
incentives for SHAs and PCTs to collude in the provision of financial support to 
Trusts in financial difficulty even where a robust recovery plan was not in place. 
Public and parliamentary scrutiny of the policy of financial support has, however, 
been hindered by the limited transparency associated with its impact on key 
measures of public accountability.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
NHS Trusts were introduced in 1991, as part of a wider programme of NPM 
reforms, with the aim of improving the performance, efficiency and accountability of 
NHS hospitals. Their establishment institutionalised a move away from a 
hierarchical mode of governance to a market based model. Operating as quasi-
independent, self-governing organisations, they contracted with healthcare 
commissioners to deliver hospital services to patients. In this quasi-market it was 
envisaged that competition between service providers would drive up both the cost 
efficiency and quality of services. However, poorly developed costing systems 
undermined effective contracting and it was not until the early 21st century that 
sufficient investment was put into the development of the reference costing system 
which allowed the measurement of Trust cost efficiency and the pricing of 
treatments based on cost.  
A key mechanism for delivering enhanced public accountability for NHS 
hospitals was the imposition of a statutory duty to breakeven, satisfaction of which 
was determined by reference to reported financial performance in the Trust’s 
financial statements. During the 1990s this represented the main indicator by which 
Trust performance was assessed and, in the absence of other, more robust, 
indicators, also acted as a proxy for cost efficiency: a Trust achieving financial 
balance was assumed to be operating efficiently. However, concerns that the focus 
on financial performance was having an adverse impact on service standards led, in 
2002, to the introduction of a multi-dimensional performance measurement system, 
the Star ratings, aimed at incentivising better service standards. In turn, the Star 
ratings system was subject to criticism as a result of its perceived vulnerability to 
manipulation and in 2005-06 it was replaced by the Annual Health Check which was 
characterised by wider measurement diversity and a more even balance in the 
weightings attached to financial and nonfinancial measures.  
The statutory duty to breakeven, however, remained the primary measure 
for public accountability purposes and considerable import continued to be accorded 
to reported financial performance throughout the period of study. In the context of 
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rising demand, incomplete contracting, and the natural volatility of some revenue 
expenses this breakeven requirement became increasingly challenging. However, 
consistent with the slow response of hospital accounting systems to the move away 
from hierarchical modes of governance, a number of mechanisms which offered 
flexibility in the reporting of Trust financial performance were initially retained. These 
flexibilities, such as the ability to transfer resources from the capital budget to the 
revenue account and the ability to defer patient treatment into a future period, were 
gradually withdrawn in response to new NPM initiatives. During the period of this 
study therefore only one major source of flexibility remained. This was the system of 
financial support, in which surplus funds from elsewhere in the NHS were 
transferred, as non-recurrent additional revenue, into Trusts in financial difficulty. 
The provision of financial support was conditional upon an agreed recovery plan 
and was often provided in the expectation that anticipated future savings would 
accommodate ‘repayment’ of the funds advanced. Thus financial support acted as a 
form of income shifting within the NHS as a whole and as a form of accelerated 
revenue recognition in Trusts receiving it.  
The conventional view of financial support was that it was provided to Trusts 
which were in financial difficulty to avoid the adverse consequences for patient care 
of short term cost cutting to achieve financial breakeven. Over the period of this 
study, however, concern was growing that financial support was being applied 
opportunistically to disguise deficits rather than to address underlying issues. These 
concerns were exacerbated by the lack of transparency concerning the impact of 
financial support on reported financial performance. All financial support 
transactions, for both receipt and repayment, were effected through adjustments to 
the revenue account and, until 2002-03, were completely hidden from public 
scrutiny. After 2002-03 concerns raised by the Audit Commission led to the 
disclosure of financial support in the financial statements of Trusts in financial 
difficulty. However, disclosure was limited to Trusts in receipt of financial support in 
the year of receipt. There were no similar disclosure requirements for ‘repayment’ or 
for those Trusts who released their surpluses for brokerage. 
7.2 RESEARCH INVESTIGATIONS 
The research paradigm adopted in this thesis is positivist and an empirical 
archival methodology is applied, using an agency perspective to motivate the 
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generation of research questions. This approach, whilst recognising the specific 
institutional and incentive framework within the NHS, has been facilitated by the 
increased emphasis on quasi-market mechanisms to address perceived issues of 
performance and efficiency in NHS hospitals. Two main studies have been 
undertaken. Study 1 investigates the relationship between service standards and 
cost efficiency in English NHS hospitals over the period 2002-03 to 2007-08 and the 
relative impact on this relationship of the AHC as compared with the Star ratings. 
Study 2 investigates the performance and accountability impact of the flexibility in 
reported financial performance afforded by the system of financial support to Trusts 
in financial difficulty over the period of financial support disclosures from 2003-04 to 
2005-06.  
Data to facilitate these investigations is drawn from public sources. Data on 
Trust cost efficiency, in the form of Trust reference cost indices, is obtained from the 
Department of Health; data on Trust financial performance is obtained from the 
Laing and Buisson database of NHS financial reports and data on nonfinancial 
performance, from which a uniform measure of nonfinancial performance (NFP) is 
constructed, is obtained from the Healthcare Commission and its predecessor, the 
Commission for Health Improvement.  
A key element of the investigations in this thesis is the formulation of a 
stylised objective function for NHS Trusts which draws, for its authority, on key 
Government policy documents to model performance against service standards as 
a function of cost efficiency in the presence of a financial resource constraint 
determined by Trusts’ statutory duty to breakeven. This objective function then 
serves as a basis for the application of production possibility frontier analysis aimed 
at the generation of predictions for the impact of PMS design on the incentivisation 
of cost efficiency as a means of improving service standards. Particular reference is 
made to the potential impact of, first, the balance between financial and nonfinancial 
measures and, second, measurement diversity in the form of coverage of activities, 
and the scope that these features offer for manipulation of the system.  
A further consideration in this stage of the analysis is the impact of PMS 
design on the incentive to manipulate reported financial performance as a means of 
improving performance ratings. Two forms of this type of manipulation which have a 
potential impact on Trust efficiency are considered in this thesis: first the trading off 
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of financial for nonfinancial performance and secondly, the selective use of an NHS 
specific transaction, financial support, which served to shift income from NHS 
organisations in surplus to those in financial difficulty and, in Trusts receiving 
support, to accelerate the recognition of revenue.  
Study 2 also draws on the stylised objective function and the same 
measures of performance to investigate whether the flexibility afforded to reported 
financial performance by the accounting treatment of financial support generated 
benefits in the form of better performance in NHS Trusts in financial difficulty. This 
question is broken down into three subsidiary questions. First, did the receipt of 
financial support lead to an improvement in nonfinancial performance (NFP) in the 
year of receipt? Second, did benefits in the form of further improvements in 
nonfinancial performance continue to flow through in the year subsequent to 
receipt? Lastly, consistent with the aims of the policy of financial support, which was 
to allow Trusts time to address financial difficulties, was the receipt of financial 
support associated with an improvement in underlying financial performance in the 
year following receipt?  
7.3 FINDINGS 
The findings from Study 1 indicate that the relationship between 
performance against Government measures and cost efficiency is significantly 
positive whichever performance measurement system is in place. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies in the frontier analysis literature 
(Ludwig, Van Merode and Groot, 2010; Deily and McKay, 2006) and with the 
findings of studies such as Propper, Sutton, Whitnall and Windjmeier (2010) where 
better quality of care in English hospitals as compared with Scottish hospitals was 
consistent with process improvements implemented in order to meet Government 
targets. Nonparametric analysis however showed that the trading off of financial for 
nonfinancial performance was greater in the Star ratings than in the AHC, consistent 
with the Star ratings being more vulnerable to manipulation. Further, results from 
multivariate analysis indicate that the relationship between nonfinancial 
performance and cost efficiency in the AHC is significantly higher than in the Star 
ratings, consistent with reduced potential for manipulation. This result is robust to 
choice of financial performance measure and to the exclusion of the best performing 
Trusts, those which converted to Foundation Trust status during the period. This 
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finding is of particular interest because it provides evidence of the impact of PMS 
design on less well performing and inefficient Trusts. Although the inclusion of 
specialist Trusts, with very different performance characteristics, results in a loss of 
significance in the difference between the two performance systems, the results 
clearly point to the AHC as being a more effective vehicle for incentivising cost 
efficiency as a means of improving nonfinancial performance, than the Star ratings.  
Notwithstanding the findings from Study 1 which suggest that reduced 
potential for PMS manipulation facilitates the incentivisation of cost efficiency whilst 
maintaining service standards, the findings from Study 2 suggest that, for Trusts in 
financial difficulty, some flexibility in the measurement of financial performance can 
be beneficial. The findings from Study 2 provide evidence that, over the whole 
sample, the policy of financial support generated benefits in the form of improved 
service standards not only in the year of receipt but also in the following year. The 
level of nonfinancial performance for Trusts in receipt of financial support was 
significantly higher than the performance adjusted benchmark level of nonfinancial 
performance, based on the performance of a reference group of Trusts not in 
receipt of financial support and further on-going improvements were observed in the 
following year. Further, consistent with the objective of allowing Trusts time to 
address their financial difficulties, subsequent improvements in underlying financial 
performance were also observed. However, when the full sample was segregated, 
into those Trusts subsequently reporting a surplus and those reporting a deficit, 
significant differences arose. Although improvements in underlying financial 
performance were observed in both sub-samples, the benefits to service standards 
were found to be concentrated in those Trusts which subsequently reported a 
surplus. The significant minority of Trusts (40%) reporting a deficit showed no 
improvement in service standards. These findings are consistent with the Audit 
Commission’s concerns that in failing Trusts undue emphasis was placed on the 
repayment of financial support rather than on addressing underlying issues (Audit 
Commission, 2006b). So although, overall, the system delivered benefits in the form 
of improved service standards, these additional findings suggest that the system for 
selecting Trusts for the receipt of financial support was not sufficiently robust or that, 
in an increasingly demanding performance regime and multi-layered accountability, 
an evolving incentive framework led to the opportunistic application of financial 
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support to disguise deficits without the requisite effort being put into performance 
improvements. 
The accounting policy for financial support had a significant impact on the 
accountability of NHS Trusts. The amount of financial support in circulation in the 
period 2004-2006 amounted to £1bn and transformed a mean deficit of circa £8m to 
one of £2m for those Trusts receiving it. Further, of those Trusts which reported a 
surplus, 35% had an underlying deficit. So, although the system of financial support 
did not affect the reported financial performance of the NHS as a whole, it reduced 
the number of NHS Trusts in deficit, and in breach of the statutory duty reported 
annually to Parliament by the Department of Health in the NHS Summarised 
Accounts. There were also other implications for accountability. The requirement to 
disclose financial support, which was introduced in 2002-03, was restricted to Trusts 
receiving support, and only in the year of receipt. There were no similar disclosure 
requirements for subsequent ‘repayments’ of financial support or of funds released 
for brokerage by Trusts in surplus.  
7.4 CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it makes 
a contribution to the limited number of empirical archival studies in public sector 
accounting research in the UK, Europe and Australasia, particularly in the domain of 
performance measurement where a qualitative paradigm is dominant. Secondly, it 
makes a contribution to the literature on the cost efficiency of hospitals by utilising 
broad based measures of cost efficiency and service standards to investigate the 
relationship between them in the presence of multi-dimensional performance 
measurement systems. Thirdly, it makes a contribution to the literature on public 
sector performance measurement, including the balanced scorecard literature, by 
investigating, in a quasi-experimental setting, the impact of PMS design on the 
incentivisation of cost efficiency as a means of improving service standards. 
Fourthly, it makes a contribution to the public sector literature on the manipulation of 
financial performance, by investigating whether a form of manipulation, as manifest 
by the accounting policy for financial support in English acute hospitals, can 
generate benefits in the form of better performance. Fifthly, it makes a contribution 
to the wider literature on the manipulation of financial performance, by investigating 
manipulation in a novel setting characterised by a multiple layers of accountability 
  
 Page 245 
 
and interacting incentives. Finally, it makes a contribution to the literature on 
financial accountability and the application of UK GAAP in the UK public sector by 
investigating the impact of financial support on the financial accountability not only 
of NHS Trusts, but also of the wider NHS.  
7.5 POLICY DISCUSSION  
There are a number of policy implications arising from the findings of this 
thesis. 
First, in the context of a multi-dimensional performance measurement 
system, the findings from Study 1 add to previous findings that cost efficiency and 
service standards are positively associated. However, although a key objective of 
the two performance measurement systems was to incentivise cost efficiency as a 
means of improving service standards, neither system incorporated specific 
measures of cost efficiency as was originally intended (Department of Health, 1999, 
2000) and as is characteristic of other hospital systems, such as the Ontario 
Hospital Report in Canada. Measures which have typically been adopted in Canada 
for example include not only measures related to costs and liquidity but also to 
aspects of process efficiency such as theatre utilisation rates. Although reference 
costs and Trust reference cost indices were initially subject to criticism because of 
data quality and coding issues, the reference costing system has now been in 
operation for over ten years, with substantial investment to address early concerns. 
Its outputs are now used by a wide range of users for a variety of purposes, 
including allocation of resources to commissioners and contracting between 
commissioners and providers. Reported financial performance, which has typically 
been used as a proxy for cost efficiency, is an imprecise measure which could 
beneficially be supplemented by other measures of efficiency, including the Trust 
reference cost index.  
The positive association of service standards and cost efficiency also 
provides evidence that the multi-dimensional performance measurement systems 
introduced by the Labour Government do provide a framework within which service 
standards are not, overall, sacrificed in the pursuit of cost efficiency. Study 1 further 
indicated that the AHC, characterised by wider measurement diversity and a better 
balance between financial and nonfinancial measures, incentivised cost efficiency 
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as a means of improving service standards, more effectively than the Star ratings. 
These findings are consistent with the interpretation of the results of other studies 
not directly investigating cost efficiency and service standards which suggest that 
achievement of waiting targets is associated with improvements in other, 
unmeasured aspects of care, consistent with the improvement of business 
processes that generate benefits beyond immediate target achievement. The 
findings from the study in this thesis, that the AHC more strongly incentivises 
improvements in service standards through improved cost efficiency suggests that, 
in a review of PMS design, such as that currently being undertaken by the Care 
Quality Commission51, care should be exercised in reducing measurement diversity 
and in weakening the incentives to achieve good performance through improved 
efficiency. Initial reports52 suggest that, in the future, waiting targets may not feature 
as strongly in a new performance measurement system. Performance standards are 
to become advisory rather than mandated and, with predictions that Trusts offering 
lower quality services will attract lower funding, market forces are to be relied upon 
to maintain service standards and promote efficiency. Such a system would be 
similar to that envisaged in the 1980s. However, policy documents have not yet 
made clear what the implications of such a system would be for NHS Trusts and 
local service provision, as compared with the current targets based system53. The 
empirical archival research findings for the current system of mandated targets and 
standards suggest that, overall, such a system incentivised local hospitals to 
improve their services cost efficiently within their resource constraints, through 
process improvements which have produced wider benefits for overall quality of 
services. A system which relies on market forces may, in contrast, result in the 
gradual withdrawal of services from some local communities. 
 Whilst acknowledging that the potential for gaming and manipulation which 
characterises any performance measurement system, can have adverse 
consequences for patients, the evidence from the research literature which focuses 
                                               
51
 The Care Quality Commission replaced the Healthcare Commission from 1 April 2009. 
52
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10469270 
53
 A number of broad policy documents have been issued by the Care Quality Commission 
but performance assessments of hospital Trusts will not be provided for 2009/10 and, at 
the present time, there are no published policy documents for the assessment of acute 
services. http://www.cqc.org.uk/guidanceforprofessionals/nhstrusts.cfm 
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on the adverse consequences of the Star ratings and the AHC is largely restricted to 
critical and case study approaches where the findings are more difficult to 
generalise (see for example, Bevan and Hood, 2006). The non-parametric analysis 
of Study 1 however provides evidence that financial breakeven was the target most 
frequently sacrificed, albeit less so in the AHC. However, whilst some scepticism 
may be expressed regarding the ability of market based mechanisms to deliver 
improvements in care, in the absence of further information about proposed 
developments and in the light of the findings from Study 1, it may be that the Care 
Quality Commission’s review will represent a further step in Courty and Marschke’s 
(2007) evolution of performance measurement in response to revealed gaming 
which will result in improved goal congruence and reduced manipulation.  
Whereas NPM policy initiatives in the early 21st century were consistent with 
a negative view of the manipulation of service standards to meet accountability 
objectives, a more tolerant view was taken of the manipulation of financial 
performance where service standards would otherwise be jeopardised. During the 
period of this thesis one particular source of flexibility in reported financial 
performance, the system of financial support, was available to NHS Trusts in 
financial difficulty.  The findings from this study indicate that, for these Trusts, this 
policy of income manipulation delivered overall benefits to patients and the public in 
the form of better service standards. The finding of an improvement in service 
standards in Trusts receiving financial support as compared with those that did not 
suggests that there is an argument for the retention of such a policy in a demanding 
performance measurement environment where the achievement of accountability 
objectives, such as the statutory duty to breakeven, may involve managerial action 
which is potentially damaging to standards of care.  
However, Study 2 also provided evidence consistent with some opportunistic 
application of financial support, which may have been facilitated by the limited 
transparency around financial support transactions. The accounting policy for 
financial support, significantly impaired Trust and wider NHS accountability and, in 
the context of multi-layered accountability allowed Trusts, SHAs and PCTs to 
cooperate to disguise deficits without addressing underlying issues. These findings 
raise interesting questions related to the withdrawal, in 2006-07, of the flexibility in 
reported financial performance which financial support provided. The withdrawal of 
financial support addressed the issue of accountability but at the cost of losing the 
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potential benefits of flexibility in reported financial performance. Rather than 
abandoning the system altogether, an alternative solution might have been to 
improve the transparency of financial support transactions, by requiring more 
comprehensive disclosures,  thereby allowing better public scrutiny of the policy.  
The continuing programme of NPM reforms in the NHS has, over the last 
thirty years, resulted in tensions between the ‘new’ market modes of governance 
and the previous hierarchical mode of governance. In this context, the investigation 
of financial support also exposes some interesting issues concerning the nature of 
the transaction, the accounting policy that was adopted and the interaction of Trust 
accountability and wider NHS accountability. The nature of financial support 
transactions was ambiguous, consistent with the slow adaptation of NHS accounting 
systems to the new marketised NPM environment. From a conventional GAAP 
perspective, financial support transactions had, variously, the characteristics of 
loans (where support was repayable), non-recurring ‘grants’ or ‘non-reciprocal 
transfers’ (where support was not repayable), income shifting (internal manipulation 
to generate added value), and accelerated revenue recognition (earnings 
management). Further, from a hierarchical perspective, financial support might be 
viewed as a budget reallocation, consistent with hospitals’ previous status as cost 
centres within a local health authority. A more refined consideration of the nature of 
such transactions would have facilitated the development of disclosure 
requirements which recognised and acknowledged the public sector setting whilst 
realising the benefits which might accrue from the selective manipulation of reported 
financial performance. Consideration, for example, could have been given to more 
clearly identifying the nature of the transactions, and more rigorous disclosure 
requirements capturing not only the receipt of financial support but also its 
repayment, with equivalent disclosures being made in the financial statements of 
NHS organisations releasing surpluses for brokerage. 
In 2006-07, however, the flexibility which was accorded to reported financial 
performance by the system of financial support was withdrawn. The arguments in 
favour of abandoning financial support included greater transparency in financial 
reporting and an equitable system of funding for a diverse range of providers of 
acute hospital services. However, NHS Trusts operate under more onerous 
constraints than other types of provider. They not only have a statutory duty to 
breakeven but their ability to adjust their service portfolio is constrained by the 
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requirements associated with public consultation, which can prevent service 
adjustments being made even in the presence of supporting clinical arguments. In 
the context of more onerous constraints on their service portfolio, there is an 
argument that NHS Trusts should be treated differently to other types of provider 
and that some flexibility in reported financial performance is appropriate. 
A system of interest bearing loans is now in place for NHS Trusts in financial 
difficulty which permits liquidity issues to be addressed and contingency reserves 
are held centrally in order to secure overall NHS financial balance. This system 
does not, however, allow any flexibility in reported financial performance and thus 
does not address the incentive to engage in more damaging responses to the 
breakeven target. Indeed, the carrying of surpluses and of contingency reserves to 
deliver overall NHS balance may, from a public accountability perspective, be 
criticised as not generating the best outcomes for patients within a resource 
constrained environment. There is an argument therefore that, in the context of 
evidence that the recirculation of surpluses within the NHS delivers benefits to 
patients, the maintenance of such reserves should be subject to more explicit 
scrutiny and be justified on service delivery grounds.  
During the period of this study, the best performing Trusts have been 
permitted to transfer to Foundation Trust status. Foundation Trusts, which are 
excluded from this study, are subject to a different model of regulation. The Labour 
Government’s vision was that, with its programme of reforms in place, all NHS 
Trusts would be in a position to become Foundation Trusts by 2008. During the 
period of this study however the majority of Trusts remained as NHS Trusts and a 
significant number of NHS Trusts are yet to convert. This raises questions about the 
robustness of the remaining Trusts and whether Foundation Trust status is 
appropriate for all hospitals. For those which remain as NHS Trusts there is an 
argument, on the basis of the findings here, for considering the reinstatement of the 
flexibility that the policy of financial support afforded hospitals in managing the 
balance between service standards and financial performance.  
7.6 LIMITATIONS 
A number of limitations characterise the studies in this thesis. Those related 
to measurement and data issues are considered in this section whilst those 
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limitations which are associated with opportunities for further research are 
considered in the next section, (Section 7.7). 
7.6.1 Nonfinancial performance 
The stylised objective function which models service quality, in the presence 
of a financial resource constraint, as a function of cost efficiency underpins much of 
the analysis in this thesis. In order to operationalise this function, a uniform measure 
of nonfinancial performance (NFP) is constructed from data on Trust performance 
against key Government measures. These measures were identified through public 
and professional consultation as being the primary concerns of the public and so 
represent a proxy for alignment with stakeholder interests. They are dominated by 
access measures, in the form of waiting times for treatment. As waiting times often 
influence clinical outcomes, with many conditions deteriorating the longer the wait 
for treatment, and adverse consequences for the ultimate outcome, waiting times do 
represent a proxy for the quality of treatment, as well as representing a concern of 
patients whose quality of life may be impaired during the period of wait.  
However they do not measure the quality of care once treatment is 
undertaken. This aspect of service standards is regulated by the medical profession, 
and includes key indicators such as mortality, readmission and complication rates. 
NFP does not include such clinical measures of quality although some measures do 
provide a context for the analysis of the findings from this study. Mortality and 
readmission rates are, for example, incorporated into the ‘balanced scorecard’ 
component of the Star ratings system and in the AHC, which is dominated by 
process indicators, is implicitly captured by indicators such as the ‘standard of 
patient protection systems’, ‘clinical governance’, ‘audit participation’ and ‘MRSA’ 
indicators. These additional measures provide part of the context for the 
investigations in this thesis but, because of lack of comparability, they are not 
incorporated into the aggregate measure of nonfinancial performance NFP.  
Detailed data is available on indicators such as mortality and readmission 
rates are available and these have been used in other studies, largely in the 
economics literature, which investigate the impact of performance measurement 
systems on quality of care. However, these measures represent a very narrow 
measure of quality of care and, in the absence of a consultation exercise of the kind 
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that characterised the development of both the Star ratings and the Annual Health 
Check, cannot easily be aggregated with other measures to form a composite 
measure of quality. Further, although appearing to be a more direct measure of 
service standards, use of these measures is not without problems as they need to 
be adjusted for case mix if inappropriate policy conclusions are to be avoided. The 
dangers associated with a crude interpretation of mortality rates, for example, 
include a retreat to defensive medicine with its consequent impact on the skills of 
medical staff, the development of new and innovative treatments and perversely, on 
the clinical outcomes for high risk patients.  
Although NFP does not directly incorporate measures of clinical quality, such 
as mortality rates, evidence that it represents a reasonable proxy for these aspects 
of care is provided by studies in the economics literature which demonstrate that 
performance against waiting targets is positively associated with other quality of 
care indicators such as mortality, morbidity and re-admission rates. In this respect 
waiting targets, although narrow in themselves, can be considered, consistent with 
Bevan and Hood’s (2006) concept of synecdoche, as being representative of the 
whole. 
7.6.2 Trust cost efficiency 
The measure for cost efficiency used in this thesis is the Trust reference cost 
index. This is a relative measure of efficiency and so, although the multivariate 
analysis can identify the relationship between relative efficiency and the level of 
nonfinancial performance (NFP) the findings say nothing about the absolute levels 
of efficiency and the trends in absolute efficiency over time. This however was not 
the remit of this thesis and other studies, such as Phelps, (2009) and LeGrand 
(2002a) have sought to do this using alternative methods. Other measures of 
efficiency such as theatre utilisation are used in other international PMS. However, 
these suffer from similar limitations to the use of narrow measures of quality such as 
mortality rates: they are a narrow measure of efficiency, covering only surgery, not 
medicine or diagnostic services, and increased theatre utilisation may have adverse 
consequences for patient safety. Further, the data for these alternative measures 
are not readily available and are not subject to data control and quality checks in the 
same way as reference costs. Further, there is no means of aggregating them into a 
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broad based, consistent measure of efficiency such as is represented by the Trust 
reference cost index.  
Alternative measures of Trust cost efficiency can be derived using frontier 
analysis techniques but these techniques have been subject to sustained criticism 
for the sensitivity of results to model specification and choice of input and output 
variables. In the NHS the use of these techniques could be further criticised for 
using data which is subject to less quality control than the underlying data used for 
constructing reference cost indices.  
7.6.3 Financial support 
The aim of Study 2 is to investigate the performance impact of the receipt of 
financial support for Trusts in financial difficulty. Data for financial support was 
available only from 2003-04 to 2005-06, (after which the system was withdrawn). 
The period of study was therefore restricted to the three years of disclosure and by 
necessity excluded 2002-03 for which data on efficiency and nonfinancial 
performance was available and which featured in the investigations for Study 1. 
Further, disclosures for financial support were only required for financial support 
received. Repayments and the release of funds for brokerage were not subject to 
disclosure, nor was it possible to identify the Trusts where the financial support was 
provided on condition that it was repayable. Information from Audit Commission 
reports and the descriptive statistics in Section 7.6.3 that over £900m of financial 
support was provided to NHS Trusts over the period of study, and that therefore the 
majority, at least two thirds, of financial support was provided a repayable basis.  
An underlying assumption of Study 2 is that the funds transferred into NHS 
Trusts in financial difficulty were, temporarily, genuinely surplus to requirements and 
that service standards elsewhere in the NHS were not adversely affected by a 
temporary relinquishment of them. It has not been possible to test this assumption 
because of the lack of availability of data on the release of funds for brokerage. 
However, transfers of funds out of NHS organisations with surpluses, whether 
SHAs, PCTs or NHS Trusts, are subject to agreement by their Boards and the 
assumption that these organisations would be unlikely to agree such a transfer if it 
were to adversely affect their own service standards is not an unreasonable one 
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given the demanding performance environment that the Star ratings and the Annual 
Health Check represented. 
7.7 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The findings from this thesis suggest a number of opportunities for further 
research.  
Study 1 found that the AHC was more effective at incentivising cost 
efficiency as a means of improving service standards but it has not been possible to 
identify which features of the AHC had the most impact on this increased 
effectiveness. However, further investigation of this question may be possible using 
alternative methods such as principal component analysis. The findings of such a 
study would further contribute to our understanding of PMS design in a healthcare 
setting and could serve to inform future PMS design in the NHS. Further, although 
the AHC was found to be more effective than the Star ratings, there has been no 
assessment in this thesis of the cost of operating these systems. An assessment of 
these costs would permit a cost-benefit analysis which could further inform future 
PMS design. 
Study 2 investigates the performance impact of financial support for Trusts in 
financial difficulty and finds that, overall, the system served to improve performance. 
In 2006-07 the system of financial support and the flexibility it accorded in the 
reporting of financial performance was withdrawn. A further study of Trusts in 
financial difficulty in this new regime could offer further insight into the incentive to 
engage in short term cost cutting to meet the financial breakeven target which may 
have adverse consequences for service standards. An empirical archival study 
drawing on the literature on the manipulation of real transactions to achieve financial 
objectives may prove fruitful although the challenges of developing an appropriate 
research design in the context of the complex incentive framework of the NHS 
would be substantial. A qualitative research paradigm and an interview based 
method, may however offer an alternative approach to this question. The findings 
from such a study would add to our understanding of the manipulation of financial 
performance in a public sector setting and would have the potential for informing 
future accounting policy in the public sector. 
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This thesis is restricted to a consideration of NHS acute Trusts. However the 
full sample includes a number of specialist Trusts whose performance 
characteristics are shown by univariate analysis to be significantly different from 
acute general hospitals. Inclusion of specialist Trusts in the sample reduces the 
significance of the findings in some cases, particularly for Study 1, which 
investigates the relative impact of the AHC as compared with the Stars on the 
incentivisation of cost efficiency. However the number of specialist Trust 
observations is insufficient to conduct the investigations in this thesis on a sample of 
specialist Trusts only.  The performance of these Trusts is however of interest. They 
are observed to have better financial performance, similar nonfinancial performance 
but much worse cost efficiency than acute general Trusts. Further insight into these 
smaller Trusts and the impact that the imposition of a performance measurement 
system on them as compared with general hospitals may however be possible 
within the context of an alternative research paradigm and method. Such a study 
has the potential for shedding light on the reasons for different performance 
characteristics of specialist Trusts which could have relevance for the development 
of future service design and delivery.   
Foundation Trusts, which began to be established in the latter part of the 
period of study, and which are subject to a different form of financial regulation, 
have been excluded from the studies in this thesis. Foundation Trusts offer a 
different setting in which to explore the impact of performance measurement. As 
they are not subject to the statutory duty to break-even they also offer the possibility 
of a quasi-experimental study which explores the impact of the financial breakeven 
duty on the manipulation of financial performance by comparing a sample of 
Foundation Trusts with a sample of NHS Trusts.  
Finally the research questions in this thesis have been approached using a 
positivist research paradigm and an empirical archival approach facilitated by 
predictions developed from an NPM informed agency perspective. This approach 
has been facilitated by the increasingly marketised environment in which NHS 
hospital services are delivered. The public sector literature which adopts a 
qualitative paradigm is extensive but the dominance of this paradigm potentially 
restricts the development of the wider public sector research agenda. Consistent 
with Goddard (2010) the findings from this thesis have suggested a number of ways 
in which alternative paradigms and models can further develop and add to our 
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understanding of performance measurement systems and of mechanisms which 
accord flexibility in the reporting of financial performance in public sector 
organisations. 
7.8 PERSONAL REFLECTION 
There were numerous challenges associated with the development of the 
studies in this thesis. My primary interest was the incentive impact of balanced 
scorecard inspired performance measurement and management and I had data on 
both financial and nonfinancial performance from the Laing and Buisson database 
and from the Healthcare Commission.  
The first challenge was the development of a broad measure of service 
standards. I had very broad aggregate measures of performance in terms of Trust 
performance ratings but the performance ratings under the Star system were not 
directly comparable with those under the Annual Health Check. The first 
breakthrough was that, although the Star ratings and the AHC each had a number 
of distinctive features, there was a degree of commonality in the key performance 
targets which were determined by the Government, after consultation with the 
public, as the main priorities for the NHS. It was these similarities which permitted 
the construction of a uniform aggregate measure of service standards (NFP) that 
opened the way to investigation of the impact of performance measurement 
systems. 
 The balanced scorecard empirical archival literature is almost wholly 
focused on the private sector. My initial research designs were based on this 
literature and focused on reported financial performance. Initially, none of the 
analysis I performed gave consistent results. A second breakthrough came after an 
extensive reading of policy documents. This led to two developments: first, the 
acknowledgement that, in the public sector, reported financial performance 
represented a poor measure of ‘financial performance’ as it was effectively a 
measure of the ability of the organisation to deliver services within a resource 
constraint. Second, as a consequence, cost efficiency, for which data were 
available, was a better measure of ‘financial performance’ in the NHS context and 
was consistent with Government policy objectives. These two insights led to the 
final major breakthrough which was to formulate an objective function for NHS 
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Trusts based on Government policy statements which models service standards as 
a function of cost efficiency and the financial breakeven requirement. 
The development of NFP, (an aggregate measure of service standards), the 
availability of Trust reference cost indices as measures of Trust cost efficiency and 
the formulation of a Trust objective function have not only facilitated the 
investigation of the research questions in this thesis but have also opened up 
opportunities for the investigation of other research questions within the healthcare 
sector and, in terms of modelling, in the wider public sector. 
A further hurdle to overcome in the analysis of performance measurement 
was the identification of ‘financial support’ as a form of manipulation which served to 
disguise the underlying financial performance of Trusts. Given the largely 
undisclosed nature of these transactions and the ambiguity of language used in 
official documents, the identification of the nature of financial support transactions 
proved particularly challenging and required persistence, ingenuity and long periods 
of reflection to synthesise and digest information from a diverse range of sources.  
This work however eventually provided a basis to explicitly link the policy of financial 
support, which permitted flexibility in accounting for revenue, to propositions in the 
formal agency-based literature that manipulation of financial performance can be 
beneficial if measures taken to address gaming result in other, more damaging, 
consequences for service delivery. The investigations in this thesis have formed the 
basis of four papers submitted for publication in internationally recognised journals. 
The experience of developing this thesis highlights the importance, 
particularly in the context of public sector research, of diligent and careful study of 
policy documents. Persistence and determination in the identification of features 
distinctive to the institutional setting facilitates a deeper understanding of the impact 
of the regulatory framework and of organisational design on managerial incentives. 
This understanding, in turn, is a necessary pre-requisite for the identification and 
motivation of innovative, well-designed research questions and methods, for the 
interpretation of the findings and for the generation of appropriate policy 
recommendations.    
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CHAPTER 9 APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1  PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN THE STAR RATINGS SYSTEM 2003-2005 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN THE STAR RATINGS SYSTEM 2003-2005 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Key measures Key measures Key measures 
12 hour waits for emergency admission via A&E 
post decision to admit  
12 hour waits for emergency admission via A&E 
post decision to admit  
12 hour waits for emergency admission via 
A&E post decision to admit 
Hospital cleanliness  Hospital cleanliness  Hospital cleanliness 
Improving Working Lives  Improving Working Lives  Improving Working Lives
54
 
Outpatients waiting longer than the standard  Outpatients waiting longer than the standard  Outpatients waiting longer than the standard 
Total time in A&E: 4 hours or less Total time in A&E: 4 hours or less  Total time in A&E: 4 hours or less 
Patients waiting longer than the standard for 
elective admission (inpatients) 
Patients waiting longer than the standard for 
elective admission (inpatients) 
Patients waiting longer than the standard for 
elective admission (inpatients) 
All Cancers: 2 week wait  All Cancers: 2 week wait  All Cancers: 2 week wait 
Cancelled operations not admitted within 28 
days  
Outpatient and elective (inpatient and day case) 
booking  
Outpatient and elective (inpatient and day 
case) booking 
Financial management  Financial management  Financial management 
   
Balanced scorecard measures Balanced scorecard measures Balanced scorecard measures 
Patient focus Patient focus Patient focus 
A&E emergency admission waits (4 hours)  A&E emergency admission waits (4 hours)  A&E emergency admission waits (4 hours) 
Better hospital food  Better Hospital Food  Better Hospital Food 
Breast cancer: 1 month diagnosis to treatment  Breast cancer: 1 month diagnosis to treatment  Breast cancer: 1 month diagnosis to treatment 
Delayed transfers of care  Delayed transfers of care   
Cancelled operations  Cancelled operations  Cancelled operations 
Day case patient booking  Day case patient booking   
Thirteen week outpatient waits  Thirteen week outpatients   
                                               
54
 The indicator for Improving Working Lives was originally retained for 2004-05 but was subsequently dropped as the processes associated with this indicator 
were fully implemented across all Trusts by 2003-04. 
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PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN THE STAR RATINGS SYSTEM 2003-2005 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Patient focus – cont’d   
Six month inpatient waits  Six month inpatient waits   
Thirteen week outpatient waits  Thirteen week outpatients   
Patient complaints  Patient complaints   
Nine month heart operation waits  
Breast cancer: 2 month GP urgent referral to 
treatment  
Breast cancer: 2 month GP urgent referral to 
treatment 
Outpatient A&E survey - access & waiting  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: 
access and waiting  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: 
access and waiting 
Outpatient A&E survey - better information, 
more choice  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: better 
information, more choice  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: 
better information, more choice 
Outpatient A&E survey - building relationships  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: 
building closer relationships  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: 
building closer relationships 
Outpatient A&E survey - clean, comfortable, 
friendly place to be  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: clean, 
comfortable, friendly place to be  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: 
clean, comfortable, friendly place to be 
Outpatient A&E survey - safe, high quality, co-
ordinated care  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: safe, 
high-quality, coordinated care  
Adult inpatient and young patient surveys: 
safe, high-quality, coordinated care 
Paediatric outpatient did not attend rates  
Patients waiting longer than standard for 
revascularisation  
 
Privacy & dignity    
Total inpatient waits    
Waiting times for Rapid Access Chest Pain 
Clinic  
  
   
Clinical focus Clinical focus Clinical focus 
Clinical Negligence  Clinical negligence  Clinical negligence 
Deaths following a heart bypass operation  Deaths following a heart bypass operation  Deaths following a heart bypass operation 
Deaths following selected non-elective surgical 
procedures  
Deaths following selected non-elective surgical 
procedures  
Deaths following selected non-elective surgical 
procedures 
Emergency readmission following discharge 
(adults)  
Emergency readmission following discharge 
(adults)  
Emergency readmission following discharge 
(adults) 
Emergency readmission to hospital following 
treatment for a fractured hip  
Emergency readmission following discharge for 
a fractured hip  
Emergency readmission following discharge 
for a fractured hip 
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PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN THE STAR RATINGS SYSTEM 2003-2005 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Clinical focus – cont’d   
 Child protection  Child protection 
 Clinical governance composite indicator  Clinical governance composite indicator 
Thrombolysis - 30 minute door to needle time Thrombolysis - 30 minute door to needle time  Thrombolysis - 30 minute door to needle time 
 Composite of participation in audits  Composite of participation in audits 
Emergency readmission to hospital following 
discharge for children  
  
   
Emergency readmission to hospital following 
treatment for a stroke  
Indicator on stroke care  Indicator on stroke care 
Infection control procedures    
Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus 
(MRSA) bacteraemia improvement score  
Infection control  Infection control 
 "Winning Ways" - processes and procedures "Winning Ways" - processes and procedures 
   
Capacity and capability Capacity and capability Capacity and capability  
Consultant appraisal  Consultant appraisal  Consultant appraisal 
Information Governance  Information governance  Information governance 
Data quality  
HES & Workforce datasets: data quality on 
ethnic group  
HES & Workforce datasets: data quality on 
ethnic group 
Junior doctors' hours  Junior doctors' hours  Junior doctors' hours 
Fire, Health & Safety  
Staff opinion survey: health, safety and incidents  Staff opinion survey: health, safety and 
incidents 
Sickness absence rate  
Staff opinion survey: human resource 
management  
Staff opinion survey: human resource 
management 
Staff opinion survey  Staff opinion survey: staff attitudes  Staff opinion survey: staff attitudes 
 
  
 Page 285 
 
APPENDIX 2  SCORING METHODOLOGY FOR THE KEY TARGETS AND THE BALANCED 
SCORECARD IN THE STAR RATINGS SYSTEM 
Key Targets 
A trust’s performance on each Key Target is assessed as either ‘achieved’, 
‘underachieved’ or ‘significantly underachieved’. This is based on expected levels of 
performance as defined in government policy using two defined thresholds. The first threshold 
distinguishes between achieved and underachieved; the second distinguishes between 
underachieved and significantly underachieved.  
For each Key Target, a trust is allocated penalty points in relation to its performance level 
using the following rules:  
Achieved target:   0 points 
Underachieved:   2 points 
Significantly underachieved: 6 points 
Thus, significantly underachieving on one Key Target is equivalent to underachieving on three 
Key Targets, reflecting the seriousness of failure to meet the desired level of performance. 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) indicators  
For BSC indicators, performance on each indicator is banded onto a scale of one to five - with 
5 awarded for good performance and 1 for poor.  
In 2004-05 three methods were applied to band the Balanced Scorecard indicators:  
a. The absolute threshold method (as for Key Targets) 
b. The mapping score method (for indicators with only a few value choices, e.g. 1, 2, 
3) 
c. The statistical confidence interval method whereby performance is assessed on 
whether there is statistical evidence that a trust’s value is different from an 
expected range of values based on values from all trusts. This method was used 
for clinical, survey and change rate indicators.  
All indicators are equally weighted within their focus area by simply summing up indicator 
band scores to produce the total score for the trust. These aggregated scores are then split 
into 3 bands (0, 1, and 2) according to specific thresholds for each Focus Area. In 2004-05 
the approach to deriving these thresholds point was the same as that used in the previous 
year. 
 For the acute and specialist trusts, the overall scores were awarded as follows: 
 trusts whose performance is in the top band (equal or above 45th percentile): two 
points 
 trusts whose performance is in the middle band (17th-45th percentile): one point 
 trusts in the bottom band (below 17th. percentile): zero points 
These overall scores for each focus area: patient, clinical and capacity and capability 
are added together to give a score for the Balanced Scorecard on a scale of zero to six where 
a score of six indicates the highest level of performance on Balanced Scorecard indicators. 
This approach means that the contribution of each focus area is given equal weighting.  
 
Source: Commission for Health Improvement/Healthcare Commission 
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APPENDIX 3  QUALITY OF SERVICES: NONFINANCIAL MEASURES IN THE ANNUAL HEALTH CHECK 
 
 
 Quality of Services
55
   
 Existing national targets   
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
1 Total time in A& E: four hours or less Total time in A& E: four hours or less Total time in A& E: four hours or less 
2 All cancers: 2 week wait All cancers: 2 week wait All cancers: 2 week wait 
3 Outpatients waiting longer than the standard Outpatients waiting longer than the standard Outpatients waiting longer than the standard 
4 Inpatients waiting longer than the standard Inpatients waiting longer than the standard Inpatients waiting longer than the standard 
5 Cancelled operations Cancelled operations Cancelled operations 
6 All cancers: 1 month diagnosis to treatment All cancers: 1 month diagnosis to treatment All cancers: 1 month diagnosis to treatment 
7 All cancers: 2 month GP urgent referral to 
treatment 
All cancers: 2 month GP urgent referral to 
treatment 
All cancers: 2 month GP urgent referral to 
treatment 
8 Revascularisation waits (3 months) Revascularisation waits (3 months) Revascularisation waits (3 months) 
9 Thrombolysis: 60 minute call to needle time Thrombolysis: 60 minute call to needle time Thrombolysis: 60 minute call to needle time 
10 Rapid access chest pain clinic waits Rapid access chest pain clinic waits Rapid access chest pain clinic waits 
11 Convenience and choice: patient booking + 
information 
Convenience and choice: patient booking + 
information 
Convenience and choice: patient booking + 
information 
12 Delayed transfers Delayed transfers  
 
Continued ….. 
 
                                               
55
 Sourced from the Healthcare Commission’s published performance ratings accessible at: 
 http://www.cqc.org.uk/guidanceforprofessionals/nhstrusts/annualassessments/annualhealthcheck2005/06-2008/09.cfm 
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  APPENDIX 3 Quality of Services cont’d   
 Core standards
56
   
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
    
 Domain 1 Safety Domain 1 Safety Domain 1 Safety 
 C1: Patient protection systems C1: Patient protection systems C1: Patient protection systems 
 C2: Child protection compliance C2: Child protection compliance C2: Child protection compliance 
 C3: NICE compliance C3: NICE compliance C3: NICE compliance 
 C4: Hygiene and cleanliness C4: Hygiene and cleanliness C4: Hygiene and cleanliness 
 Domain 2 Clinical and cost effectiveness Domain 2 Clinical and cost effectiveness Domain 2 Clinical and cost effectiveness 
 C5: NICE technology appraisals C5: NICE technology appraisals C5: NICE technology appraisals 
 C6: Working in partnership C6: Working in partnership C6: Working in partnership 
    
 Domain 3 Governance Domain 3 Governance Domain 3 Governance 
 C7: Clinical and corporate governance C7: Clinical and corporate governance C7: Clinical and corporate governance 
 C8: Staff support C8: Staff support C8: Staff support 
 C9: Records management C9: Records management C9: Records management 
 C10: Employment checks C10: Employment checks C10: Employment checks 
 C11: Recruitment, training and qualifications C11: Recruitment, training and qualifications C11: Recruitment, training and qualifications 
 C12: Research governance C12: Research governance C12: Research governance 
    
 Domain 4 Patient focus Domain 4 Patient focus Domain 4 Patient focus 
 C13: Dignity and respect C13: Dignity and respect C13: Dignity and respect 
 C14: Patient information on making a 
complaint 
C14: Patient information on making a 
complaint 
C14: Patient information on making a 
complaint 
 C15: Hospital food C15: Hospital food C15: Hospital food 
 C16: Patient information on services C16: Patient information on services C16: Patient information on services 
 
                                               
56
 Many of the core standards had more than one subsidiary measure resulting in more than 40 measures in total. 
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 APPENDIX 3 Quality of Services – cont’d   
 Core standards – cont’d   
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
 Domain 5 Accessible and responsive care Domain 5 Accessible and responsive care Domain 5 Accessible and responsive care 
 C17: Patient and carer consultation C17: Patient and carer consultation C17: Patient and carer consultation 
 C18: Equality and equity  C18: Equality and equity  C18: Equality and equity  
 C19: Emergency access C19: Emergency access C19: Emergency access 
    
 Domain 6 Care environment and 
amenities 
Domain 6 Care environment and 
amenities 
Domain 6 Care environment and 
amenities 
 C20: Safe and secure environment; privacy C20: Safe and secure environment; privacy C20: Safe and secure environment; privacy 
 C21: Environment for effective care C21: Environment for effective care C21: Environment for effective care 
    
 Domain 7 Public health Domain 7 Public health Domain 7 Public health 
 C22: Partnership C22: Partnership C22: Partnership 
 C23: Disease prevention and health 
promotion 
C23: Disease prevention and health 
promotion 
C23: Disease prevention and health 
promotion 
 C24: Incident and emergency procedures C24: Incident and emergency procedures C24: Incident and emergency procedures 
    
 New National targets   
1 Audit participation Audit participation Audit participation 
2 Access to GUM clinics Access to GUM clinics Access to GUM clinics 
3 Patient experience Patient experience Patient experience 
4 Emergency bed days Emergency bed days Emergency bed days 
5 MRSA MRSA MRSA 
6 Ethnic group data quality Ethnic group data quality Ethnic group data quality 
7 Self harm NICE compliance Self harm NICE compliance Self harm NICE compliance 
8 Obesity: identification and management Obesity: identification and management Obesity: identification and management 
9 Drug misusers: information, screening, 
referral 
Drug misusers: information, screening, 
referral 
Drug misusers: information, screening, 
referral 
10 Smoke free NHS Clostridium difficile data quality Clostridium difficile data quality 
11 Infant health: data completeness Waiting times for diagnostic tests Waiting times for diagnostic tests 
12 MRI and CT scan waits Referral to treatment time milestones Referral to treatment time milestones 
13  Smoking during pregnancy/breastfeeding Smoking during pregnancy/breastfeeding 
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APPENDIX 4  USE OF RESOURCES MEASURES 2006-2008 
1 Financial reporting and external accountability 
1.1 Production of annual report 
1.2 Availability and transparency of public reporting 
  
2 Financial Management 
2.1 Medium term financial strategy 
 Medium term financial strategy 
 Corporate and financial planning links 
 Budget setting 
 Cash management 
 Savings plan and cost improvements 
2.2 Performance against budgets 
 Budget monitoring process 
 Budget monitoring information 
 Partnerships 
 Planned savings 
2.3 Management of asset base 
 Estate strategy 
 Asset register 
 Asset management  
  
3 Financial Standing 
3.1 Financial breakeven  
3.2 Financial projections 
  
4 Internal control 
4.1 Business risks 
 Assurance framework 
 Risk management  
4.2 Internal control systems 
 Statement of internal control 
 Systems of internal control 
 Audit Committee 
 Internal audit 
 Partnership arrangements 
4.3 Probity and propriety 
 Codes of conduct 
 Counter fraud policy and culture 
 Local counter fraud specialist 
  
Continued……. 
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5 Value for money 
5.1 Strategic and operational objectives 
 Setting objectives 
 Reviewing objectives 
 Implementing objectives 
5.2 Stakeholder needs 
 Communication 
 Patient feedback 
 Engaging with hard to reach groups 
5.3 Monitoring and reviewing performance 
 Performance management process 
 Data quality 
5.4 Demonstration of value for money 
 Efficiency plans 
 Corporate and back office functions 
 Clinical services 
 Key NHS reforms 
 Efficiency and productivity metrics 
 Other benchmarking 
 Reference costs/service line reporting 
 Procurement 
  
 SUMMARY: 5 perspectives; 14 main measures; 42 measures in total 
 
 
 
